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Abstract
The main thesis of this work is that planners and transportation professionals must think broadly in
designing systems. Specifically, when designing an intercity transportation system, the objective is
getting the customers from their actual origins to their ultimate destinations. With today's large and
sprawling metropolitan areas, interconnections between urban and intercity transportation systems are a
must - the customer's actual origin and ultimate destination are usually nowhere near an airport or a rail
terminal. Whether this 'access leg' is provided by intermodal transfers or direct service is a matter of
local circumstances, but it must be considered in the intercity transportation system planning process.
Future rail technology should not be designed to emulate either aircrafts or taxicabs. An aircraft is very
good at traveling long distances quickly, but is unable to make intermediate stops, and thus a poor
alternative for servicing dispersed demands. An automobile can make many intermediate stops
efficiently, but cannot travel very fast. The ubiquitous automobile also suffers from ubiquitous urban
congestion. Thus, it cannot service either extremely high demand densities or long corridors. Rail
technology offers an intermediate option. In urban areas, rail offers efficient service to massive
demands through high carrying capacity and dedicated rights-of-way. In rural areas it offers higher
speeds by virtue of steel-wheels-on-steel-rails guidance. The combination of these two qualities makes
intercity rail a winner in connecting one sprawling metropolitan area with another nearby - especially
when coupled with such incremental enhancements as 'maglevication' of existing railroads. 'Shiny-go-
faster' or personal rapid transit approaches ignore these advantages of rail transportation at their peril.
Intercity rail must exploit both advantages to compete effectively. The traditional, limited-stop high-
speed rail approach ignores rail's ability to service many dispersed points of origin (streetcar suburbs),
while the 'airport access' approach ignores the possibility of a direct service from a neighborhood
'subway station' to another one in a different metropolitan area. The key to success is not the one-seat-
ride, but in eliminating the transfer, terminal and 'backtracking' time associated with many air-rail or air-
bus solutions. These advantages are best demonstrated with a passenger utility model that is sensitive to
the different values-of-time a customer perceives during difference phases of a door-to-door trip.
In the United States, higher speed rail is necessary in many cities for rail to stay competitive, but highest
speeds are neither cost-effective nor necessary. Each scheme for increasing line-haul speed should be
judged, using the total logistics-utility framework, against alternatives to improve access and options to
make time disappear. Demands for speed, accessibility, amenities, and other upgrades that improve the
customer utility must be balanced against each other. The results from the customer utility studies
should be used to inform intercity transportation system design, to create a system that works in
harmony to move people.
Thesis Supervisor: Carl D. Martland
Title: Senior Research Associate
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is a very general and very broad attempt at reframing the high-speed rail debate in the United
States. This thesis represents a realization that intercity rail is a set of cross-cutting issues.
Technological evaluation inevitably involves assumptions about network design and service planning,
which in turn has implications on travel demand and institutional relationships between carriers
operating different modes. In the longer term, infrastructure investment decisions and project
evaluation would be influenced by all of the above. Focusing in any one area while assuming that all
other areas would remain unchanged or continue the present trend, would inevitably result in a wrong
answer. Worse still, the accumulation of small incremental changes (wrong answers) could result in the
system evolving in a way that results in a state of affairs many would agree is undesirable.
The present research in many aspects of high-speed rail and other transportation options are too narrow
in focus, and there is a strategic void in the role of rail in the future. At a policy level, there are many
issues requiring discussion. Recently, issues such as the role of Amtrak, incremental high speed rail,
intermodal connections, and transportation security have taken the center-stage in discussions of the
future intercity ground transportation system. These are important issues, but these do not address the
systems question - how would the U.S. deliver a transportation system that provides a reasonable
service to a large number of people, at an affordable cost? The transportation system as a whole --
highways, railroads, airlines, urban transit, and other movement technologies -- should be thought of as
different ways of getting people from one location to another. The transportation system user should
be at the very center of this discussion: how would people want to travel from here to there? What is
needed is not a supply-oriented approach that discusses modes, investment, institutions and service
delivery, but a user-oriented approach that discusses market segments, their different needs, and the
most economically efficient way to consolidate these needs so that services could be provided in bulk at
lower costs. Warning: this approach would almost certainly cause disruptions in existing institutions,
funding mechanisms, and modal coalitions.
At the heart of this thesis, there are a number of core ideas. When considering intercity passenger
transportation, it is necessary to evaluate the utility of the entire trip experience from door to door --
similar to a total logistics cost model in freight transportation. When constructing a model of
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generalized costs, it is important to appreciate that different activities that occur during the trip have
different values of time, depending both on the market segment and the quality of the experience.
When evaluating high-speed rail projects or advanced guideway technologies, it is necessary to use this
door-to-door utility model, applied from the customer's standpoint for a representative sample of
origins and destinations, to ensure its success.
The United States is a country with a vastly distributed economy. Within the cities, suburbanization is
rife -- people commute for up to 100 miles daily, and even within city neighborhoods the densities are
low compared to many other countries. Between the cities, interstate commerce dominates most
production operations as cities assume equally important roles in the region and the nation's economy.
This type of economic geography calls for a totally-connected transportation network that takes people
from one point directly to another, due to the general lack of 'supernodes' or natural hub locations. The
result of applying this model suggests that provision of fast access from all locations is a necessary
prerequisite to high-speed rail's success. Similarly, with important clusters of metropolitan areas being
separated by large distances of rural plains, overnight rail could become competitive if service design
were driven by a home-based generalized cost model, and amenities were made available but charged at
marginal costs. In essence, overnight trains are able to 'pick up' within multiple cities in a region, travel
overnight over areas of low demand density, and deliver people to multiple cities within the next
industrial region.
Accumulation of small changes may result in important consequences. A historical example would be
William Mulholland's great aquaducts, which brought more and more water into Southern California,
but resulted in significant environmental damage elsewhere. The more sustainable solution would have
been to include water demand management. Another example would be the phenomenon of urban
sprawl -- which is wonderful in moderation, but dreadful when taken to extremes. The quest for ever
higher speeds in rail transportation, is likely to be a similar wild goose chase, if maximum or average
line-haul speed remain the only criteria for evaluation of high-speed rail schemes.
1.1 Thesis Outline
The total logistics cost model is necessary to understand the customer's journey experience. A total
logistics perspective calculates utility as a function of traveler, trip, and transport characteristics, taking
into account such things as the value of time for particular travelers and activities. The passengers are
your customers from the moment they leave their home or work, and they remain your customers until
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they either arrive at the vacation resort, the home of the friend or family they are visiting, or back at
their own home. Supporting the business traveler with hotels and local transportation at the destination
city and providing them with information they need to navigate an unfamiliar city are all legitimate
business objectives. Intercity transportation is a happy business; it's about taking care of people -- until
they are safely in the hands of another trusted party, or no longer requires looking after. Thus, getting
people from a transportation node to another node by the fastest possible means isn't necessarily in the
best interest of an intercity carrier. This concept is reviewed in Chapter 2.
The value of time concerns the customer's experience during a particular point in the journey. Clearly,
customers feel different about different experiences, and some may be willing to pay a premium to travel
in a more pleasant environment. More importantly, amenities that the customers are willing to purchase
may actually alter the perceived value-of-time. Although the morning commuter pays marginal costs to
purchase a cup of coffee, the morning commute would be unbearable without it. If carriers were able to
price onboard and en-route amenities at marginal costs, it can induce customers to behave in a way that
lowers the perceived disutility of time spent en-route, indirectly influencing mode share. This idea is
presented in Chapter 3.
Recent academic literature and state-of-practice on high-speed rail planning have mostly neglected the
multi-faceted service dimension of the intercity transportation business. Technologies that are hailed as
the next-generation high speed rail have mostly focused on increasing speed and reducing line haul time,
sometimes at the expense of access and amenities. This approach is inappropriate, except in cases where
the existing speeds are dismally slow (e.g. in a few very old parts of coastal and suburban corridors in the
United States). Reducing line-haul time by skipping stops will increase total logistics costs for some
passengers and may increase average logistics costs for all passengers if access time is properly
accounted for. Increasing speed by reducing vehicle weight, reducing consist length, and introducing
other such technical 'improvements' may actually increase the generalized logistics costs and diminish
the value of the journey experience for the customer.
Some of the current high-speed rail schemes under consideration by state and Federal authorities could
actually be a 'double whammy' when examined in light of this framework: sacrificing amenities for
maximum speed not only increase the average passenger logistics cost for the market, but also fail to
provide sufficient incremental benefits of journey time saving to offset the capital costs required for a
new right-of-way or technology. With minimal amenities, the automobile with its low incremental cost
per passenger, low out-of-pocket costs, easy access to amenities offered en-route by independent
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vendors, begins to look like an extremely attractive proposition. The 'shiny-go-faster' approaches that
focus on maximum speed are at best not cost effective when examined in light of rational project
evaluation and in some circumstances are a retrograde step for the average customer. Current plans and
state of practice are analyzed in Chapter 4.
An important result when applying this framework to a region with sprawling metropolitan areas such as
those in the United States is that the access time is actually a significant portion of the intercity travel
time for the majority of customers. Thus, further reducing line-haul time may not achieve the desired
goal. The most highly leveraged technologies in intercity rail travel may not be technologies that enable
higher speeds on the mainlines, but those that allow many more stops with less time penalty per stop.
Air technology is extremely apt at minimizing point-to-point travel time, but suffers from very poor
access and inability to make multiple stops efficiently. Highway technology is limited to traveling at
much lower speeds and suffers from the effect of urban congestion, but it is ubiquitous. Rail
technology may find a niche by offering an intermediate level service that connects neighborhoods and
suburbs in one metropolitan area directly to neighborhoods and suburbs in another metropolitan area.
This idea is expostulated in Chapter 5.
Poto: Lexae Lo &Mike Botrman
Plate 1.1: Today's Sprawling Metropolitan Areas Require
More Than One Intercity Transportation Access Point
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The biggest payoff in the creation of this type of infrastructure is likely to be the enhanced commuter
and regional rail access it will achieve, but intercity rail must take regional access seriously to withstand
attack from both sides by air and auto. Contrary to what some public transit activists may believe,
inability to offer one-seat rides is actually seriously hampering the competitiveness of regional and
intercity rail in large metropolitan areas.
High speed rail advocates in the United States like to position overnight rail as the enemy. Those who
are focused on increasing efficiency in a particular corridor portray overnight rail as outdated,
outmoded, and an obstacle to efficient daytime train operations. Those who are focused on maximizing
profitability realize that overnight rail has never been particularly profitable even in its heyday and prefer
to focus management attention on shorter corridors that are both easier to manage and more profitable.
These views are reasonable, but inconsistent with sound economic analysis. Although the demand for
long-distance rail service is small, it is not zero, and long-distance trains are also able to carry local
passengers unlike long-haul flights. Overnight rail fulfils an important niche in rail operations, and
expands the portfolio of the rail carrier's offerings. Although it would never be the most profitable
service, in partnership with airlines it could provide the day-return business traveler with a much
upgraded service, while providing a late train for intermediate origins and destinations, and serves many
other disparate purposes including express freight. The overnighter is a 'catch all' train. If its costs
could be kept under control, continued operations of overnight trains will maintain network benefits for
rail carriers and attract people living in rural areas to use rail network when they visit the metropolitan
areas. A detailed evaluation of overnight services in the United States appears in Chapter 6.
1.2 Important Note
High speed rail investment proposals and evaluation criteria in the United States require a thorough
rethink from the perspectives of potential customers. The current plans have mostly resulted from
discussions between the operators, the informed current customers, and the politicians. Occasionally,
non-customers enter into the discussion if the promoters threaten to take their house. Missing from the
list of stakeholders are the millions in the United States who have never ridden a train and may not
realize that trains still carried passengers. That's a big market to leave behind.
Using a theoretical model that evaluates passenger utilities for the entire door-to-door trip, this thesis
demonstrates that the potential customers do not take the train for a good reason: the train does not
meet their needs and is not competitive with the private automobile. Many live in a rural areas, but
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others live in suburbs around large metropolitan areas with rail service. Many of these are potential rail
customers. For example, in the states traversed by the 'Capitol Flyer' - a hypothetical overnight service
corridor running from Boston via Washington to Cleveland, Chicago and Milwaukee, approximately
40% of total population would live within a county with (or within 50 miles of) rail service. However,
even within the Northeast Corridor in such origin-destination pairs as Washington-New York, both rail
and air achieves a poor market share against the private auto. Longer door-to-door times compared to
driving likely a handicap for collective intercity transportation in these areas.
Investing in access, amenities, and other improvements that increase the customer's total utility over the
entire trip, from their departures from home until their arrivals back home, is likely to be as important -
and much more cost-effective - than simply investing in speed. It is the customers - passengers -
patrons - guests that we take care of, that ultimately make or break the railroad. We feed the customers,
we keep them warm in the winter and cool in the summer, we give them material to read or provide
other forms of entertainment, we give them directions and help with baggage. We price these services at
marginal costs and we might then have some pricing power in terms of the fares. For instance, a New
Jersey Transit study demonstrated that regular passengers in a commuter market would be willing to pay
an additional $0.15 per trip for the convenience of having a luggage rack on board the vehicle. These
amenities are much cheaper to provide than line-haul journey time reductions, but may have much more
dramatic effect on revenue potential.
Intercity passenger transportation is a set of cross-cutting issues. Planners, carriers, and technology
developers should be aware of these issues. Evaluation of intercity passenger rail proposals should take
the wider, all-encompassing approach that may better represent the needs of potential customers who
are not currently choosing rail.
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Chapter 2
Transportation Demand
and Utility Analysis Fundamentals
This chapter reviews the current state-of-practice in transportation demand modelling for both freight
and passenger flows, and ridership forecasting. Implicitly, some generalized cost models (utility models,
logistics cost models) are also reviewed as "feeder" to demand models. Predictive approaches that allow
demand prediction sensitive to changes in transportation characteristics are favoured over explanatory
approaches that simply correlate demand with non-transportation factors such as land-use and regional
culture. The review of modelling methodologies is broad and all-emcompassing, but the comments on
the current approaches will focus on adapting the methodologies for the purposes of high-speed
intercity rail (HSR) planning and evaluation.
The chapter both demonstrate the wide variety of excellent approaches that have been developed in
many different fields and highlights how application of the existing methodologies could be improved
when specifically applied to medium-speed passenger transportation (i.e. 90mph-150mph). In general,
the existing approaches encounter the following difficulties when applied to HSR: (1) inappropriate
geographic aggregation, resulting in insufficient attention to access time; (2) insufficient detail with
respect to utilities derived by passengers during various parts of the trip, resulting in a bias towards short
and uncomfortable journeys; (3) failure to account for induced demand, resulting in a focus of
investment in areas that are traditionally successful at the expense of rapidly developing areas.
The review of the many different demand modelling approaches may seem totally arbitrary and
unrelated at first, however, each approach features strengths that could augment the development of an
evaluation framework for HSR. Traditionally, urban transportation planning techniques have been
applied to intercity transportation planning. However, adaptation of such models to HSR without due
attention to the special conditions of the intercity travel market could result in misleading conclusions.
Specifically, in the area of service planning, demand modelling issues must be well-understood to
develop the optimal service plan.
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2.1 Total Logistics Cost Models
Economists have studied the movement of goods for almost as long as goods have been moving. Not
always in a formal way, but it is clear from the actions of the robber baron railroad tycoons in the late
19th century that they were aware of the changing value of goods due to spatial movement, and the
inter-dependence between the cost-basis of the production facility and the economic well-being of the
serving carrier (Schafer & Solomon, 1999). As evidenced by the rate-making structure that existed
following the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 for the regulation of
railroads and other common carriers, it is clear that the notion of logistics costs were well understood by
those in the industry. Higher-value items were subject to higher carrier tariffs, partially due to the firm's
increased willingness-to-pay for the then-fastest mode of transportation, but also to account for the
logistics costs that were avoided over slower modes such as canals and initially, the much higher costs of
air transportation. This set-up for distributing the high capital costs of the railroad over many industries
for essentially a shared facility functioned adequately for many years.
The basic ideas behind relating freight transportation demand to transportation costs, economic
geography, and land-use patterns are very simple: the price charged by the retailer at the consumer's
premises for given goods is made up of two components, the cost of production and the cost of
transportation. This is called the spatial price equilibrium of commodities. Theoretical treatments of
this concept at first considered the cost of production as fixed for each commodity, and the cost of
transportation as linear with distance (Isard, 1956). More elaborate version of this model appeared
subsequently, which suggested that transportation and production costs can be further fragmented into
different components (Kresge & Roberts, 1970).
Production costs contain a component of land-rent, which changes as the location of production
facilities are changed but does not change with the quantity produced; it contains a component of capital
costs for production facilities, which does not vary with location in the long term (but will in the short
term, when some costs are considered sunk); it also contains other terms which may or may not vary
spatially and may or may not change with the quantity produced, such as the cost of labor and other
inputs. Transportation costs can also be fragmented in the same way: there are fixed costs and variable
costs, which may be affected by variables such as the transportation technology, transportation demand
in a given corridor, and other variables. Other costs are also incurred in transit, such as warehousing
costs, insurance costs against loss or damage to consignments, and time-value of money of capital tied
up in goods-in-transit (called inventory costs). The basic thesis, thus, is that freight moves in such a way
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as to minimize total logistics costs. The total logistics costs is simply defined as the sum of all the
aforementioned costs, summarized in the following equation (Roberts, 1971, 75).
Total Logistics Cost = Production cost + Ordering cost + Line-haul cost +
Warehousing cost + Local delivery cost + Inventory cost + Risk + Stockout cost
Line-haul and local delivery costs are simply transportation costs associated with different modes (e.g.
Line-haul cost might come from a rail freight bill, whilst Local delivery cost might be the cost of drivers
and delivery vans); the warehousing cost is associated with the warehouse capacity requirements, and can
possible be demand responsive (i.e. when goods compete for warehouse space, it is more expensive); the
inventory cost is like the time-value of money (or value-of-time in passenger transportation), it is the
cost associated with holding onto inventory and essentially paying interest on the value of the goods; the
risk term is a way of quantifying the insurance cost against shipping and warehousing damage, which
may be related to the mode or transport, the length of time that the inventory is held, and other factors
such as the location of the warehouse. In an optimization model, the decision variables might be: the
line-haul mode or carrier, the local delivery mode or carrier, the warehouse location and capacity, the
minimum delivery quantity, and the inventory cost under different economic scenarios.
Given the abstract framework, Roberts formulated a utility model which predicts consumer choice
based on extensive information about the available options (Roberts, 1975). In essence, the consumer
utility is assumed to be equal to the total logistics costs, and relevant variables are changed until
equilibrium is reached. If the objective is to evaluate choice of manufacturing sites, the quantity
produced at each site is changed; if the objective is to evaluate whether to invest in a new technology for
a specific corridor, the transportation cost or delay is changed. Sometimes, a joint-evaluation is
required, since choices of production sites may depend on investment in new transportation facilities.
In a series of follow-up work, the total logistics cost idea (i.e. the utility model describing consumer
preferences) was integrated with a number of different approaches to predicting transportation demand.
A disaggregate choice model, combined with a logistics cost model, was used to develop a policy-
sensitive working model for forecasting freight demand (Chiang, Roberts & Ben-Akiva, 1981).
Empirical estimation of model parameters was carried out by building a database of intercity shipment
flows, level-of-service attributes, commodity attributes, receiver attributes, and market attributes. The
model allowed the practitioners to test the sensitivity of transportation demand with respect to a vast
array of parameters and derive useful insight about the transportation system, however, the report
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acknowledges that there are innumerable ways in which the statistics can be improved though the better
use of data. Carrier system concepts, combined with a total logistics cost model, gave rise to a decision
support model that enabled carriers to leverage more value from high speed service, and shippers to
make more optimal decisions amongst bids from different carriers and modes (Sheffi, 1988). Here, an
optimization model is used to find the lowest cost for getting a piece of freight from the factory to the
shopfloor.
Interestingly, the freight literanture is much closer to total logistics analysis than the passenger literature,
possibly due to the traditionally vertically-integrated institutional arrangements in the freight industry
(i.e. the same freight consolidator would take your freight at the origin and ensure it gets to the
destination with one price). Models in the urban and air passenger transportation have traditionally had
utility functions which related to the passenger's total logistics costs in much less detail than the freight
models outlined above. Application of the total logistics concept to passenger flows will produce some
results which have been documented only in a handful of cases, and somewhat contrary to conventional
models (although entirely consistent with industry experience). Some models in the urban and air
transportation sectors will be reviewed later in the chapter.
2.2 Classic Passenger Transportation Demand Models
In Manheim's classic Transportation Systems Analysis text (1979), a top-down approach is taken to
understand transportation demand. Manheim describes transportation demand as consequences of
long-run choices such as locational choices, activity patterns, and lifestyle aspirations. Having
acknowledged that it may not be entirely possible to separate the long-run decisions from the short-run
choices, he presents a utility model to predict the short-run portion of consumer behaviour. The basic
assumption behind the model is that the long-run choices remains fixed. Given that, how would an
individual decide which mode to take for a given trip on a given day?
Manheim suggests calculating passenger utility for a given mode (or combination of modes) by assuming
that the utility is a function of a number of modal characteristics such as in-vehicle time, access time,
out-of-pocket costs, service frequency, and others. Given the utility of a particular mode or
combination of modes (an intermodal path), the utilities are then fed into a discrete choice model which
computes the probability that one individual would choose a specific one of the given options for a
given trip. Thus, the discrete choice model acts like a decision rule: given the relative characteristics of
the modes or paths, how likely am I to choose mode n over all others? Many different formulations of
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the discrete choice model are possible. The logit model assumes that the probabilities are distributed
with respect to utility according to the logistic function. The probit model assumes that the utilities for
each path is randomly distributed about the mean value calculated, and asks what the probability of the
utility of mode n (drawn from the normal distribution) is the highest of all modes. The assumption is
then made that the total demand multiplied by the probability of a random individual choosing mode n
would predict the total ridership expected on that mode (or that path).
There are three classic criticisms of this model. First, it assumes that transportation demand is fixed,
and changes in mode characteristics for any of the modes would not affect the total transportation
demand. This is reasonable for marginal changes. Second, it assumes that transportation demand and
transportation mode characteristics do not affect long-run choices such as locational choices and activity
patterns, which is reasonable for a short-run forecast. (For long-run modelling, activity shifts reflected
in a series of feedback loops was a classic but rarely implemented extension.) Third, a fundamental issue
with this model is, like many models, the model is only as good as the analyst. In essence, this model
takes a bottom-up approach, adding variables that the analyst believe that will be relevant one at a time.
While the advantage of this model is that each and every step can be empirically shown to be relevant
and robust, the disadvantage is that the lack of empirical data can cause important key variables to be
discarded or not taken into account. For example, in Small and Winston (1999), they explicitly
recognize that other independent variables, such as whether the vehicle in question is electrically
powered, and the amount of luggage space available, can have a measurable effect on the mode choice.
In the Manheim model, the effect of these variables would have been captured in the "idiosyncratic
preferences constant", thus the model would not have been sensitive to changes in the service level in
these variables. While this classic framework is fully extensible to cover any variables that a present-day
analyst believe is important and influence travel choices, the classic framework does not provide a way
to systematically disaggregate travel choices into its constituent drivers.
2.3 The Planner's Four-Step Model
The Planner's Four-Step Model was developed in the 1950s as a methodology for urban highway
planning in the cities of Chicago and Houston (Mitchell and Rapkin, 1954). The basic idea is to forecast
the highway capacity required given geospatial data on expected land-use pattern, such as population
density per square mile, and other demographics data, such as the number of jobs, households, auto
ownership, and other exogenous variables. Although referred to as a Four-Step Model, it is more of a
framework consisting of a series of steps which different models could be used in succession to translate
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the base dataset into a set of transportation flows and thus capacity requirements. The Four Steps are:
(1) Generation, (2) Distribution, (3) Mode Split, (4) Route Assignment. (Mcnally, 2000)
Generation refers to the translation of demographic and land-use data into number of transportation
generated per unit area. Generally, the trip production is considered to be a function of population and
perhaps other variables such as car ownership rates and average household income. This is thought of
as the transportation base demand. Conversely, the trip attractions could be calculated based on a
function of number of jobs in a given unit area and the type of economic activity that takes place there.
Distribution refers to connecting the origins to the destinations. In general, a friction factor is used to
determine how far people will travel in order to conduct their desired activity (e.g. employment, school,
shopping), and the origins are linked to the destinations. The gravity model is a method often used,
which basically assumes that the attraction between an origin and a destination will decrease with the
square of the separation distance, similar to the formula for calculating gravitational attraction. Given
the demands between a number of origins and destinations pairs, these flows are then distributed over a
number of modes and a number of routes. Usually a method similar to that described in Section 3.2 is
used for assigning the flows to different modes and routes.
The classic criticism of this type of model fall into a number of categories: (1) the Planner's Four Step
Model is designed to calculate traffic volumes given land use, and does not explicitly account for the
interaction between transportation infrastructure provision and land-use patterns; (2) the model does
not take into account of induced demand, the phenomenon that if the generalized costs of
transportation is lowered, more transportation demand would be generated as a result; (3) the mode and
route choice portion of the model is based on a discrete choice framework, as a result the model is very
mode-based, requiring definition of distinct modes. While hybrid vehicles are still a rarity, it is not clear
that the model accurately captures the effect of subtle changes in levels-of-service. In a wide transit
network, it may be possible to travel between two given points via a variety of routes and mode
combinations. Access can be achieved by walking or with the private auto; some nodes offer rail, bus
rapid, express bus, and local bus services, while other nodes offer local bus service only. It is not clear
how such subtle effects could be captured in this model, even with a nested-logit implementation of the
combined Mode-Split/Assignment stage. While in urban transportation applications, since public transit
captures such a small market share of all urban trips, these transit-auto interactions may not be
important. However, in mid-distance intercity travel (about 200-600 miles), where truly contestable
markets exist and all line-haul modes (air, rail, and highway) capture a respectable share of the market,
such micro-interactions could become the driving factor behind the mode choice.
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2.4 Discrete Choice Methodologies
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) offers a very theoretical treatment of discrete choice modelling
methodologies in their book, discussing the advancement of the field into multidimensional choice,
nested logit models. These are extensions of the basic discrete choice framework that were discussed in
Manheim's treatise. The focus of the book, however, appears to be computationally estimating such
models. Adaptation of the mathematical techniques into a form that will support transportation analysis
is left up to the reader. Ben-Akiva and Lerman discuss some of the issues that arise when their
approach is adapted for urban transportation planning, but this was not the main focus of the book.
There was no explicit mention of application of this methodology for intercity transportation demand
forecasting in the book. While it is evident that the approach could be adapted, clearly further work is
required in that area.
Where the authors have provided examples of how to apply their model to an actual situation, great care
has clearly been taken to ensure that the model is indeed sensitive to what the they were testing. For
instance, in their study on urban transportation forecasting, Ben-Akiva and Lerman recognized that
disaggregation of originating demands and flows down to a traffic analysis zone level is important. The
question a policymaker or a manager is likely to ask may involve decisions to close a street, construct a
bridge, or reroute a bus. Much of the impact of these decisions may be felt within a town or a
neighbourhood, thus a town-by-town analysis may not capture all the expected congestion effects, or
localized ridership changes. They did not provide a specific framework or checklist to ensure the
modelling results are valid for the intended purposes. It was generally felt this was the task of the
modeller, and not the developer of the modelling methodology.
As alluded to earlier, there is a fundamental problem with this statistical approach, especially when
applied by analysts thinking too narrowly. When attempting to calibrate the model, the analysts collect
the dependent variable (i.e. mode choice) and collect data on a number of independent variables that the
analyst believe will influence the dependent variable. However, if a key independent variable was not
believed to be important (or indeed, happen to have very similar values in all the data points that the
analyst happen to collect), a model of high statistical significance could be obtained without considering
the effect of the key variable. In that sense the model can only be as good as the data that is collected,
and the modelling process does not challenge the analyst to seek further explanations of travel
behaviour beyond what is exhibited in the dataset.
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An analogy in the field of transit performance measures are the approaches presented by Lee (1989) and
Fielding (1987), as summarized in Wilson (2001). Fielding suggested a bottom-up statistical approach
where a number of performance measures are collected and measures that do not yield much
information are progressively removed using correlation and factor analyses. The main problem with
this approach is that measures that are not in the initial dataset would not be present in the final results.
Lee suggested a top-down approach, disaggregating a cost-effectiveness measure into many constituent
measures and searching for representative measures systematically down a tree. Perhaps a better
approach to explaining travel behaviour is to start at the top and disaggregate the ultimate mode-choice
decision into a series of factors, then collecting data on these individual factors to construct the ultimate
model.
2.5 Demand Models Sensitive to Operating Plan
The sensitivity of travellers to the departure and arrival times has long been known. Especially in the
intercity sector, there have been attempts to quantify the effects in a model. Slagmolen (1980) examined
the concept of "adjustment time" in a study on intercity travel demand. Adjustment time is the extra
time added to the trip because schedules do not conform exactly to the travellers' needs. Rather than
simply considering service frequency and/or expected wait time, with Slagmolen's model, it is possible
to input the entire operating plan for a passenger railroad and forecast the effect of operating plan
changes, such as insertion of additional stops into express trains, or scheduling a late-night departure to
leave 30 minutes later to capture extra passengers. The model is then making an explicit trade-off
between the additional wait time for the passenger wishing to travel at, say half-past-twenty-three, versus
those who would otherwise miss the train because they need to leave at midnight.
The classic criticisms of this type of model is that while it does attempt to capture an extra attribute not
traditional considered, the model is very data-hungry and the preference parameters may not be fully
transferable. It is conceivable that the value of adjustment time depends on the extent to which the trip
is plannable. The plannability of the trip would in turn depend on factors such as the need for planning
when travelling by a competitive mode, or historically the level of transportation services provided to
the region. For instance, in a rural region where even a automobile trip requires substantial planning
(e.g. fuel, maintenance, weather, and time-of-day concerns), the value of adjustment time for a highly
reliable mode such as rail may be substantially lower than in an urban region with good infrastructure,
where the automobile trip can be obtained on-demand. Conceivably the disutility of planning
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requirements may also correlate with extraneous factors such as the gross regional product or the
automobile ownership. Thus, due care is needed when applying this type of models to an environment
for which it is not originally designed. In essence, the model is very sensitive to the operating plan, and
has been an invaluable aid to carriers evaluating incremental operating plan changes, but it is not a type
of model suitable for strategic planning.
Almost certainly independently, Boeing developed a "Decision Window Model" (1996) intended to
forecast the effect of multiple-carrier airline operating plans on the consumer. The basic hypothesis is
that there is a latent airline travel demand for a given airport-to-airport origin-destination pair, which is
dependent on the time of day (i.e. more people like to travel at noon than at midnight). It is then up to
the carriers to "cover" that demand by spreading flights out throughout the day that capture the
maximum number of riders. Each passenger has a "decision window" which extend for x-number of
hours around his or her intended departure time. If only one flight is available within this decision
window, then he or she is captive to this flight. If more than one flight is available, then he or she could
choose based on carrier, adjustment time or other criteria. If no flights are available within this decision
window, then the traveller would elect to cancel the trip. Thus, two carriers scheduling their single daily
flights both at 8am would capture only half the passengers that they would if the same two carriers
scheduled their daily flights at 8am and 8pm respectively.
These effects are certainly replicated in the real world. Carriers have slowly been staggering their
departure times to attain better coverage of the market. For instance, the two shuttle operators in the
Northeast Corridor operate hourly shuttles, with one carrier departing on the hour, the other departing
on the half-hour. The Decision Window Model (DWM) also correctly replicates the effect of "red-eye"
flights, where a mini-peak in demand is observed for a flight lasting more than about four hours long, at
around 9pm each evening. For international flights, DWM correctly replicate the effect of time-zone
changes on customer preference for flights. For instance, on transatlantic flights, most of the demand
from London occurs in the morning and early afternoon, to reach New York in the afternoon or early
evening (local time). In the reverse direction, most of the demand from New York occurs in the late
evening, arriving in London early morning (local time). Of course, this also happens to allow a very
simple aircraft-cycle every 24-hours, achieving high aircraft utilization (approximately 16 flying-hours
per day).
2.6 Demand Models Recognizing Trip-Chaining
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The issue of trip-chaining has already been considered by demand modellers, at least in the urban
transportation sphere. Ben-Akiva and Bowman (1995) carried out research in the Boston area and
constructed models that represented the entire day's activity, with data based on diary surveys. The
model is thus capable of considering trips that are avoided due to either trip-chaining or substitute
activities, such as eating at home instead of eating out. In a follow-up paper, Ben-Akiva et al (1996)
considered other elements of complexity such as activity time allocation, temporal variation of feasible
activities over the day, and distribution of levels-of-service during the day (such as transit frequency,
road congestion). Also, in an innovative step, "no-travel" options (tele-commuting, tele-shopping) were
explicitly considered, along with information which can cause changes in departure time, mode, and
route choice. This work tacitly acknowledge that the simplified approach of the 1970s and 1980s is
insufficient to model the complex decisions facing the travellers with many more options. However, the
work also acknowledges that even a typical person's daily activities cannot be modelled at a microscopic
level of detail, due to the sheer number of permutations possible. In particular, Bowman estimated that
there are 1016 different possible ways that a typical person with 10 daily activities may structure his/her
day, therefore producing different permutations of transportation requirements.
2.7 Airport Ground Access
Coogan (2000) reviewed the current status of public transportation services to large airports round the
world (Chs.2 & 4) and discussed a market research approach to planning public transportation service to
airports (Ch.3). He postulates that airport ground access market can be divided into two segments: air
travellers, and airport employees. Coogan then further classified passengers by geographic distribution
and by trip purpose. The 1996 Logan Survey demonstrated that 36% of all traffic (or 13,644 passengers
daily) to the airport originated from more than 16 miles away. The 1995 American Travel Survey
suggests an even higher figure, 55%, for New England airports. Coogan further proposes a
methodology for developing a market research study, in which he suggested that market research for
airport access should focus on data such as residence location, trip purpose, destination airport, access
mode, origin of access leg, and other like variables. The uses for such a market research exercise
includes: developing public transportation schedule, identifying suitable types of access services, and
locating access boarding stops.
The Coogan report is titled "Improving Public Transportation Access to Large Airports". It is clear
that, within the context of this work, the airport is seen as a trip attractor, a target, a destination in itself.
The market research focuses on the destination "airport", and assumes that the objective of the exercise
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is getting the traveller from wherever he is travelling from locally, to the airport, as quickly and
comfortably as possible. No consideration is given to the possibility that the traveller may by-pass the
airport altogether by choosing either highway- or rail-based intercity transportation. The report similarly
assumes that there are no airside capacity problems, and as long as mass-transit can deliver people to the
airport, endless streams of aircraft will come in and out seamlessly to gobble up the same passengers.
Thus, the report isn't really what could be termed a regional intercity transportation strategy. At best, it
is a strategy to improving airport access in the region. However, improving airport access may not be
the most germane objective function if what we're trying to do is to improve intercity transportation
between every point in a region to every point outside this region.
The airport focus aside, Coogan makes some good points about local distribution, and integration of the
airport into the regional transportation system. Successful rail systems around the world are discussed in
the report (Coogan, Ch.5), including a description of the Heathrow Rail Strategy which proposes local
services from Heathrow stopping at key stations on the national rail network around London: Ealing
Broadway, Wembley Central, Watford Junction, King's Cross, and following the Thameslink alignment
to Gatwick Airport and Brighton. Coogan observed that the existing Heathrow Express service is a
good substitute for a hackney carriage to a downtown location, but is not useful for other locations in
the metropolitan area. London has a strong downtown, thus a downtown-centric approach to
metropolitan distribution may make sense, but even with London Heathrow, a substantial number of
patrons come from the greater metropolitan area, and expanding service beyond one single downtown
node will most likely benefit more people than a single downtown dispersal point, as Coogan observes:
"Examination of total trip times shows... only the stations immediately adjacent to Paddington show a
time advantage for the Heathrow Express" (p.85).
Although the report states that the analysis is based on unweighted transfer times, the analysis
demonstrates an important insight: the door-to-door time is more important than in-vehicle time for the
express portion of the trip. "The data reveals... the comparative travel time on a door-to-door basis
seems to influence choice." The report is clearly understanding of the customer's needs to reach a
diverse range of destinations within the metropolis: "Travel-time characteristics to downtown may not
be a surrogate for travel-time to actual destination." (p.87)
The report does not acknowledge that the same concept could be applied to not just the local-access
portion of the intercity trip but the entire intercity itinerary. Having acknowledged that an airport-to-
downtown airport-express train is not the complete answer, it does not acknowledge that an airport-to-
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airport, interairport express airbourne vehicle (i.e. an aeroplane) is also not the complete answer. At
least for shorter trips, the airport access time and flight time could easily exceed the total journey time by
high speed rail, if high speed rail became more easily accessible. Coogan came to exactly that conclusion
on a different level -- the connexions to the regional transportation system and better accessibility of the
London Underground is in fact a business advantage for the non-express transportation mode, and that
convenience factors may drive mode choice more than the total trip times. Although the report is
predominantly about airport access, many of Coogan's observations (Ch.5) are applicable to the intercity
travel market in general. The Hong Kong Case Study (p.86) suggested that the directness of the service
plays an important role in mode choice, implicitly suggesting the transfer penalty is substantial even with
dedicated and well-timed connexions.
2.8 Air Travel Demand Forecasting
Much has been written on the subject of air travel demand forecasting, especially by Belobaba who leads
the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS) research effort at MIT and Boeing (e.g. Belobaba
(1989), Belobaba & Weatherford (1996), Belobaba & Hopperstad (1999), amongst others).
Traditionally, trending on a flight-leg basis had been used by airlines to understand travel demand, and
to assign aircraft capacity. Before the deregulation of the American airline industry in 1978, the airlines
only had to worry about individual flight legs, interline transfers were commonplace, and the focus is on
capacity provision rather than management. Trend-based models, using seasonally-sensitive data, are
often used to predict loads. Essentially, PODS expands the standard model to take into account of
changes that have occurred since deregulation, and takes advantage of the increased computing power
which had become available since then. Significantly, instead of dealing with a single flight-leg, the
PODS model is able to forecast passenger demand on an origin-destination basis, with a variety of
routings and connecting options. This allowed the airline industry to investigate network effects, and
for the first time evaluate the system impact of route changes and hub connection dynamics
quantitatively.
Another interesting feature of the PODS model is its ability to simulate the consumer's reaction to the
revenue management system. The basic idea behind the revenue management system is that consumers
will "bid" for airline seats with an internal willingness-to-pay. In a capacity constrained situation, the bid
price would increase with time, as passenger who must travel would be afraid of not being able to secure
a seat; where there is overcapacity, the bid price would decrease with time, as the airline would be keen
to "sell-off" any unsold seats close to the time of departure. However, for any given flight, the load
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situation may change from one of overcapacity to one of capacity constraint - depending in real time on
the bookings received. The same airplane also services a number of market segments: commuters who
must depart early in the morning and return in the evening, business travellers who must travel on
specific days or at specific times, leisure travellers who may be able flexible on their travel dates. Thus,
for each individual, there is a different willingness-to-pay, a different elasticity with respect to time-of-
day and day-of-week, etc. The revenue management system is designed to extract the most consumer
surplus from each individual consumers depending on their willingness-to-pay and flexibility to travel at
off-peak times.
Belobaba's work has focused on both forecasting the loads and pricing the flights in such a way that the
loads are even. In a way, the they are two different facets of the same problem - in operations planning,
changes in aircraft rotations occur about once every two months, when the goal is to maximize the
productivity of the assets by ensuring that demands can be met with the appropriate gauge of the aircraft
(i.e. minimizing any passengers "spilled" due to inadequate capacity); in pricing, the goal is to maximize
the revenue given the aircraft you have already assigned to the flight-leg (thus, in a capacity constrained
situation, you would hope to capture the passengers with the highest willingness-to-pay). In a modern
operations planning model, the two phases would be combined into the same optimization model to
maximize profit: the challenge is to assign aircrafts such that the highest profit is realized systemwide.
(As you change aircraft assignment, the costs also change as aircrafts of different gauge are flown
different distances). Readers interested in this subject, and related subject areas may refer to
Lohatepanont (2002) and TRB E-Circular No. EC-040 (2002). Relevant courses taught at MIT do not
reference any textbooks (Belobaba, 2002), suggesting a gap in the current teaching literature.
2.9 Explicit Comparison of Amenities, Journey Time and Fares
Using adaptive conjoint analysis trade-off exercises, Spitz & Adler (2003) asked a sample of commuter
rail riders in New Jersey to explicitly compare costs of tickets to the level of amenity provided. The
customer was asked questions like: "Which option would you prefer? 10-trip cartel for $52.50 and vinyl
seating, or 10-trip cartel for $50.00 and cloth seating?" Rather than a simple yes/no answer, Spitz &
Adler asked the customers to rate the importance of their preference. The Spitz study went into utility
analyses in some level of detail: customers were asked to trade-off across different types of seating
arrangements (e.g. stand in aisle v.s. sit in aisle or window of three-across with center seat unoccupied),
and reported that the latter arrangement is worth $0.95 more than the former for a Newark Penn-New
York Penn trip. The importance scores also revealed something quite interesting: four more trains per
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hour is worth almost as much as a 20% change in fare or better seats. (Better seats was quite well
defined in this study - Spitz allowed consumers a selection of six types of seats from commuter rail seat
vendors, and had samples for the participants to sit in prior to completing the questionnaire). More
importantly, an 8-minute reduction in travel time is only worth half as much as the better seats.
The result from the frequency v.s. journey time trade-off is broadly consistent with previous studies: 4
trains/hr frequency change on an existing service headway of every 30 mins is equivalent to lowering the
combination of adjustment time and expected waiting time from about 15 mins to about 5 mins - in
other words, 10 mins time saving; if we assume from previous literature that access time is worth about
one and a half times as much as in-vehicle time, it would translate to 15 minutes of effective in-vehicle
time saving. The Spitz result indicated that the frequency change was worth approximately twice the 8-
minutes reduction in travel time; we calculated that the change in frequency is equivalent to about 15
minutes in-vehicle time saving.
2.10 Performance Based Technology Scanning
In an earlier working paper (Martland et al.,WP 2002-02), Martland hypothesised that intercity demand
modellers are not disaggregating variables that drive travel demand in sufficient detail to capture the
nuances of the different technologies. If the objective is to evaluate different technologies to find the
best technology for a given intercity corridor, it would be necessary to understand the consumer's
response to the all aspects of the technology, not simply the new technology's impact on traditional
factors like journey time, reliability, and access time.
This review has found that many aspects of intercity travel technology have already been studied in great
detail in the current or even older literature. Some of these models only apply tangentially to technology
- for instance, the Belobaba model that simulate the interaction between operating plans, demand, and
revenue management algorithms, may appear to have nothing to do with technology. However, in the
real world, the costs of a new technology may constrain the operating plans to such an extent that it
would be necessary to understand the impact of such a new operating plan on demand and revenue
before it is possible to choose between technologies. However, all the models reviewed - and probably
many others that were not reviewed - are important in evaluation of technologies. The current
approach, of using standard utility analysis to understand the customer's reaction to different aspects of
transportation operations and technologies, is termed Performance-Based Technology Scanning (PBTS).
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In this chapter, a distinct number of methodologies traditionally considered separate domains were
reviewed: (1) total logistics cost framework, usually found in the freight demand modelling and shipping
decision support literature; (2) classic demand models driven by values-of-time, usually comprising of in-
vehicle and access time, plus other factors such as service frequency; (3) explicit willingness-to-pay
surveys based on certain amenities or aspects of design for a particular journey. These approaches are
all germaine to evaluating intercity transportation system technology and design, and should all be used
together in a PBTS study.
The problem of adapting these models to evaluation of intercity transportation solutions has not yet
been solved. In the absense of a guiding framework - a checklist of all likely design considerations that
will affect customer utility when using the system, it is very tempting to simply adapt a model that has
already been calibrated based on a narrow subset of variables that happen to be the most significant
factors in a particular situation, and use the model to do strategic analysis. Doing so results in strategic
plans that may maximize or minimize a single variable (such as speed) while ignoring other aspects of
the design, simply because the design variable were not included in the original model.
By encouraging practitioners to consider total customer utility, it is hoped that in the system design
stage, more detailed consideration to design variables would be possible than with a standard approach
that simply seeks to minimize journey time between two fixed points with several different technologies.
In the rest of this thesis, several cases utilizing the PBTS framework would be demonstrated, showing
different circumstances where variables other than average speed could have a dramatic impact on
passenger experience - thus revenue, ridership.
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Chapter 3
The Disutility of Time
in Transportation
This chapter postulates a new framework for examining the disutility of time in transportation.
Traditionally, transportation demand modellers have assumed that journey time is onerous and generates
a disutility which is added to the generalized costs of making the trip. The value-of-time is often
assumed to be a percentage of patrons' salary. Service amenity improvements such as food service,
seating, and entertainment were seen as ways to lower the average values-of-time and thus increasing
ridership. Relative effectiveness of improvements is often gauged through either stated preference
surveys of existing passengers, or revealed preference data after service improvements were
implemented.
There are a number of pitfalls to this approach: (1) the analysts using this approach have not attempted
to understand theoretically the effects of new technologies and amenities on the value-of-time, instead
are treating it as an empirical result making prediction and sensitivity analyses difficult; (2) the traditional
disutility analyses assumes that the time invested in travelling has no other purpose than travelling when
in reality, especially in intercity markets, many things with positive utility could be accomplished while
travelling; (3) the conventional framework has meant that transportation systems have been designed
with users of average values-of-time in mind, when market segmentation (as apposed to aggregation)
may achieve higher utility and ultimately revenues; (4) inappropriate uses of values-of-time has often
resulted in a transportation system design question being treated as an optimization problem to
minimize travel time or generalized costs when the objective ought to be the maximization of passenger
utility; there may be multiple combinations of travel time, level of amenities, and other transportation
system attributes that gives rise to the same passenger utility when subjected to an out-of-pocket cost
constraint.
In this chapter, we develop a framework to enable system designers to take a fresh look at the value-of-
time. The essences of this framework are: (1) the value-of-time is not an average value but a
continuously changing function throughout the trip, depending not only on the activities that the
traveller is taking part in during that time but also potential activities that are available to the traveller;
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emerging technologies can influence that function; (2) travel time can "disappear" if the traveller is
engaged in activities that would have needed to take place anyway had the travel not occurred; such
activities may include sleeping, eating, or simply relaxing; (3) when evaluating values-of-time, a
probabilistic evaluation is needed - the probability of one market segment taking part in a certain
activity is p [a] and generates a value-of-time for that segment of v(a), thus the design calls for features
that will maximize the sum of all p[a] times v[a], not simply the features that maximize v[a]. (3) when
making travel choices, individuals are making a constrained optimization decision - given the out-of-
pocket cash resources available, how can an individual best leverage that resource to produce the
maximum utility associated with a trip (or indeed no trip at all).
3.1 Hypothesis Regarding the Value of Time
Martland et al (2002) postulated that traditional utility models do not evaluate the value-of-time in
sufficient detail to examine specifics of technology change or operating change. As demonstrated in the
literature review (Chapter 2), carriers have been developing models that forecast the effect of operating
plan changes for at least thirty years (Roberts, 1971; Martland, 1972). However, even the more recent
models developed in the airline industry (Belobaba, 1996) only take into account of a small number of
service attributes. These models are typically highly sensitive at a detailed level to price, cost, and
technical attributes such as trip time, number of transfers, frequency and departure time of service.
When applied to passenger transportation, these models are often unsuitable to strategic analysis
because they are not sensitive to some service attributes that the customer may consider important, such
as amenities and access time. Some of the more sophisticated models attempt to estimate the value-of-
time based on some function of the prevailing wage, whether this time is spent in the terminal, on
board, or accessing the terminal.
The main hypothesis in this paper is that to equate the value-of-time to a function of the prevailing wage
rate is misleading, and the value-of-time will depend on how that time is spent, or how else that time
could be spent. The amenities available, the physical surroundings, and activity that the consumers are
engaged in, will all affect their perception of values of that time. The New Jersey Transit bilevel study
examined the impacts of level of crowding, type of seat, and the seat material on commuters' value of
in-vehicle time (Spitz & Adler, 2003), supporting our hypothesis. Spitz & Adler demonstrated that the
value of in-vehicle time differed by as much as $2.20, of which $1.30 is attributable to a capacity upgrade
resulting in less standees, $0.65 is due to the type of seating and $0.15 is due to the type of luggage rack.
Such empirical work is valuable. The transportation community have been aware for a long time that by
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adding concessions or providing climate controls at the terminals, travellers' average disutility-of-time at
the terminal could be reduced. However, without more such empirical work, it is difficult to say how
much, and it is difficult to ascertain whether climate control is more important than presence of
concessions.
Furthermore, Martland et al (2002) suggested that the value-of-time depends on the motivation for
spending time. In general, if the consumer chose to spend that time, the disutility of time tends to be
very low; if the consumer feels trapped and feels that they must spend that time, the disutility of time
tends to be higher. This paper builds on Martland's work by demonstrating the link between
consumers' motivation for investment (in time), consumer's resulting quality of experience, and the
disutility-of-time incurred while en-route between origin and destination.
Dealing with the average values-of-time over a large time period is counterintuitive. For instance, using
a theatre example, if a two-hour movie cost $8 in admission, it could be argued that the utility gained by
the consumer per hour of movie is about $4 per hour. However, consumers are generally unwilling to
pay $6 to watch the first 1.5 hours of the movie; on the other hand, latecomers will often pay $8 for the
last 1.5 hours of the movie. The entertainment example is appropriate since transportation industry is
becoming more of a service industry as user-produced transportation (the automobile) is becoming
more widespread. Thus, it is conceivable that the time spent on-board vehicles and in terminals could
be further subdivided into different activities, each with different values of time. For instance, the
disutility-of-time while standing in line at an airport waiting for check-in is most likely very different
from the disutility-of-time after check in when the travellers may browse around in the airport mall.
3.2 How the Value-of-Time Relates to Concessions
Interestingly, although perhaps unsurprisingly, the literature in the economics of airport and transit
center concession development has mainly focused on the success of the concession as a going concern
rather than the value the retail development is adding to the traveller experience in the terminal. Most
literature mention that the presence of concessions add to the traveller experience (Bay Area
Economics, 1999); airports in Europe studied the possible effects of abolishment of intra-EU duty-free
in 1999 on competitiveness of airports (Hopkins, 1998), competitiveness of international versus
domestic vacation destinations, and its expected impact on stores that specialize in duty-free goods
(Commission of The European Communities, 1998). There appears to be little quantitative work done
specifically on the effect of the concessions on the traveller's experience, although its positive influence
39
is well documented. However, the reverse has been established, at least in one study: The House of
Common contended that abolishing duty-free might encourage smuggling, and that the carriers profit
from concessions onboard the vehicle or at the terminals (House of Commons, 1999).
This suggests some will travel more frequently or pay more because of the possibility of enjoying the
duty-free concessions, and that the carrier is able to leverage additional profits from the consumer
surplus resulting from decreased disutility-of-time while on-board due to the use of vehicle-bourne
concessions. While the House of Commons report gives us an idea of the sign and the order of the
benefit, it is not a quantitative assessment. Decreased travel demand in light of abolishment of duty-free
would suggest the elasticity of travel demand with respect to the price of duty free goods is nonzero. If
we hypothesize that the reason the elasticity is nonzero is because the purchasing of duty free goods are
resulting in a consumer surplus, the nonzero elasticity suggests the surplus is affecting demand for travel
and hence the utility of travel, it is reasonable to suggest that by removing the airport concessions,
thereby removing the possibility of generating that surplus, travel demand would be aversely affected.
The reverse may also be true: by adding concessions where they do not previously exist, travel demand
may be stimulated.
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Plate 3.1: Utility is Free
The Channel Tunnel Example
Following the construction of the Channel Tunnel, the crossing of the English Channel with an
automobile was cut from a four-hour ferry trip to a two-hour trip onboard a freight train. Originally,
the ferry operators thought that their core business was being undercut and asked for government
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compensation. When the government compensation did not materialize, they chose to refit some old
cruise liners to offer luxury overnight service. Although the ridership declined compared to pre-
Chunnel levels, the carriers found a clear market niche and continued to operate profitably. Clearly, the
onboard amenities were a sufficient attraction to compete at some level, compensating for the longer
journey time.
The Fishing Example
When a user is choosing to use a service, the user is making an investment in time to use the service.
This is a well-known concept in transportation systems analysis called "generalized costs". However,
when economists are evaluating other service industries, they do not generally include explicitly in their
framework unless they are explicitly talking about time consumed by transportation as an overall
vacation schedule. For instance, two studies in Central Idaho contained quantitative data on the number
of vacation trips taken per year versus travel time (Normandeau Associates, 1999). Based on survey
data, the study demonstrated that the demand for fishing is sensitive to both the trip cost, and the access
time. Significantly, the study confirms what seems intuitively obvious:
Each angler has a different travel cost (price) for a sportfishing trip from home to the river. Variation
among anglers in travel cost from home to sportfishing site (i.e., price variation) [... is significant.] Non-
monetary factors, such as available free time and relative enjoyment for sportfishing, will also affect the
number of river visits per year. The statistical demand curve should incorporate all the factors which
affect the publics' willingness-to-pay for sportfishing at the river.
This suggests that the demand for fishing vacations depend not just on the price of the fishing permit
and other costs, but also on the investment in time required to get to the site. The number of fishing
trips per year drops significantly beyond about 7.5 hours or $100. These results, backed by survey data
and commonsense, suggests that the intercity demand modeller ought to consider a much broader range
of variables than in-vehicle time in intercity transportation, especially when vacation travel is involved.
The recognition that each angler has a different travel cost is key - in Chapter 5, the idea that each
intercity traveller has different access costs to terminals serving different modes will be explored in
much greater detail.
Economic research has recognized for a long time that the time taken to search for a service can be
considered the cost of using a service (e.g., Stigler, 1961), and that good advertising and product
accessibility can lowers that cost to the point that it's not worthwhile for the consumer to invest
additional time in searching for a marginally cheaper or better alternative. The lowered communication
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and search costs have also been implicated in the creation of cities (Mills, 1993). It is conceivable that a
conceptual economic model could be formulated that breaks the generalized cost of using a service
down to three components: (1) time taken to locate the service; (2) price charged by the service
provider; (3) time taken to actually consume the service. The Stigler concept suggests substitutability
between (1) and (2). The anecdotal evidence suggests that (2) and (3) are actually also substitutable, as
evidenced by various initiatives that are offered by service industries that are queue-intensive: turnpike
toll-collection, airport check-in, mail order companies and other retail outlets that charge extra for
"express service". All these evidence suggests that the time taken to consume the service could be
considered part of the generalized costs of using the service, and it is a necessary investment on the part
of consumers choosing to use such service. In the restaurant industry, anecdotal literature suggests the
time taken to prepare food at restaurants is a driver in restaurant demand (Foodservice.com, 2002),
which would be consistent with the aforementioned economic model. In the next section, we will
examine the restaurant model in more detail.
3.3 How the Value-of-Time Relates to Foodservice
It is possible to illustrate this using the example of time spent eating in a restaurant. An investment in
time is required to consume a meal in a restaurant, including the need to wait between ordering and
serving. If prevailing wage rates were used to evaluate the value of time spent waiting and actually
eating, it is not clear that restaurants are in general a very profitable proposition. The restaurant sells a
product (a meal) at much more than the cost of the competition (cooking at home), with conceivably a
much longer waiting time (access time to restaurant, queue at restaurant, plus time between ordering and
serving). Yet restaurants are clearly a viable proposition, even in low-income economies. It is not clear
that the amenities offered by the restaurant in fact creates sufficient consumer surplus to overcome the
alleged disutility generated by the time-investment required. We postulate that the reason the time spent
at a restaurant is grossly undervalued by the consumer because the consumer in fact is choosing to
invest that time. Even with the same physical surroundings, if the consumers feel that they have no
choice, restaurant economics would simply not work.
Basic economic theory suggests that there is a supply for food, and a demand for food. You will pay for
food at a price if the food generates more utility than the price; the difference between the two is then
the consumer surplus: the food is worth more to you than what the producer is charging, so you buy it.
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3.3.1 The Culinay Utilioy Model
What does the food do to the value-of-time? Let's examine this in terms of the value-of-time
framework. The consumer derives a positive utility from eating food; the consumer then has to spend
time eating the food he just bought - an investment in time; the consumer then isn't hungry anymore -
hopefully the increased value-of-time while not feeling hungry, discounted back to the point of
ingestion, compensates for the investment in time in eating, and investment in out-of-pocket dollars
expended to buy food. The "consumer surplus" associated with the food is simply the value of not
being hungry discounted back to time of ingestion minus the time spent eating food. If the consumer
surplus is negative, then obviously the consumer isn't hungry enough; he will wait another few hours,
until hunger-prevention becomes more critical; until the increase in future value-of-time by hunger
prevention exceeds the present time-investment required to complete the ingestion process. In equation
form:
Consumer Surplus from Food = - (Price of Food + Value of Time Spent Eating)
+ (Utility of Eating + Discounted Hunger-Prevention Value of Time)
Let's call this the Culinary Utility Model. This helps us explain why you hear people say, "I'm too busy
to eat now, I'll eat later". The value-of-time before the deadline is reached dominates the disutility of
enduring hunger. When faced with expensive food of poor value, sometimes people don't feel hungry;
faced with all-you-can-eat buffets, people eat more than they normally do. Really, people in general are
quite efficient project evaluation machines. Most people just don't realize it.
3.3.2 The Classical Justification for Making a Trip
Putting this in a transportation context: how do you change the value-of-time of someone either (1)
sitting in a terminal waiting for a connexion, or (2) sitting aboard a vehicle waiting to get to the
destination? Take the latter case, the justification for sitting in a vehicle is usually because whatever
event that is anticipated at the destination (a business meeting, or a vacation) has a high value. People
usually trade-off the generalized costs involved in getting there and back against the wonderful utility
they will derive by being there. We can null-out the value-of-time "wasted" in getting there if we can
somehow give the consumer another justification for investing his or her time. The consumer then
wrongly attribute the time spent "in-vehicle" as the time spend doing something else, and the value-of-
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time in-vehicle decreases to an insignificant value. Although people might be efficient project-
evaluation machines, most people are really quite bad at joint-value attribution.
This is an important concept, and has widespread implication in the world of transportation demand
modelling and investment evaluation. Let us illustrate with an example, seen from the traveller's frame
of reference:
Benefits yay!
Disney!
Time
Costs
hungry are we
there
damned yet?
airfare
Plate 3.2: Are we there yet?
Exhibit 3.2 illustrates the way in which a traveller may evaluate a trip. The traveller has to make all the
investment up-front: out-of-pocket costs of carrier fees, and the investment in time in travelling. We
hypothesize that the value-of-time is different for different parts of the trip - in this case, we simplify
the trip to a single-segment door-to-door trip in which the traveller takes part in no activities except sit
in a seat, we might expect the disutility per unit-time to increase nonlinearly with the time already
elapsed. Even with simple trips, the disutility of time is not necessarily a linear function of time. In
making a go/no-go decision about the trip, the traveller evaluates the expected benefits of the
destination (in terms of utility generated), and compares that to the investment costs required to get
there. If the cost/benefit ratio is less than one, the decision is a go. In some cases, as discussed
previously, the traveller may have other constraints such as the capital available to invest. Some
travellers will use a decision rule; others will use different implicit methodologies of project evaluation
(such as payback time analysis, etc.)
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3.3.3 Changing the Travellers' Value of Time Through Food
Supposing the carrier now elects to make food service available either on-board or during a particular
part of the trip, for example, in the terminal. Assuming that the food is made available at marginal cost,
so the travellers purchase socially optimal amount of fude. Thus, anyone who can afford it buys some
food, stores it until he or she is hungry, eats it such that hunger is prevented during the time on board.
How does the cost-benefit diagram look now?
Benefits
time for
eating
Time
Costs
cost of surplus
food from
food
Plate 3.3: Are we there yet? (with food)
Exhibit 3.3 shows the evaluation diagram, from the travellers perspective. The out-of-pocket
transportation costs and benefits of taking the trip remain the same, but now there's the incremental
costs of buying food. Under what circumstances do people buy food? The Culinary Utility Model tells
us that people will not buy food unless the price of food and value-of-time spent eating it is justified by
the increase in future value-of-time by hunger prevention. The food costs are therefore attributed
entirely to hunger-prevention; the value-of-time spent eating is also attributed to future hunger-
prevention.
All this occurs on board a carrier vehicle, during which time the traveller is also moving in space. But
we just attributed the time-taken-to-eat to hunger-prevention: a self-sufficient profit center in its own
right. So does this mean the same time expended eating on board, during which we are also moving in
space, comes free? No longer are we investing time in order to move in space; we are investing time to
prevent hunger. From the perspective of the investor who likes to move in space, the time expended
eating on board is a sunk cost: "I gotta spend this time eating anyway - I am hungry!" So the cost-of-
time involved in hunger-prevention and movement-in-space arejoint costs which the traveller allocates
exclusively to eating. The traveller is reaping economies of scope in joint time-utilization (normal
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people call this "saving time" or "doing two things at once"). To achieve movement in space, without
investing time, is called teleporting. If you believe this time-cost-attribution model, teleporting is really
possible.
Exhibit 3.3 also shows another very subtle point. The time between when the traveller finishes eating,
and when the traveller arrives, the traveller is sitting on board a vehicle, and investing time to achieve the
movement in space. Let's ask this hypothetical traveller a simple question: "Would you rather travel
hungry, or having had some food?" Question of motion-sickness aside, most would prefer to part-take
in everyday activities, including travel, while their stomach are not making gurgling noises. In other
words, the value-of-time in vehicle is lower if the traveller is not hungry; being hungry on board a
vehicle adds to the disutility of simply sitting bored. Thus, by making food easily available, you are
actually changing the value-of-time on-board a vehicle by encouraging travellers to feed their stomachs.
3.3.4 Issues in Railroad Cafi Economics
You might argue that the baseline case is a traveller travelling when he or she is not hungry; the fact that
he or she hadn't eaten adds to the disutility, and making food available brings it back to the baseline
level. Is this correct? Two issues with this argument: (1) Business travellers are too busy to eat before
departure; students are too disorganized to eat before departure, so people end up hungry. (2) A carrier
with relatively long in-vehicle times and no possibility of en-route stops, such as the high-speed train,
would compete with modes such as air which offers short journey times, and modes offering unlimited
unplanned stops such as the private auto. People will get hungry. Thus, making food available either at
terminals or on board is key to a rail carrier, but not to others, since the other carriers offer other means
to combat hunger while in-transit.
Why should food be priced at marginal cost? Pricing at marginal costs mean that everyone who is
hungry enough to justify food production will get food. It ensures that the evaluation process for
deciding whether to buy food or not is based on entirely the same Culinary Utility Model whether you're
in a grocery store, at a terminal, or onboard a vehicle. On board a vehicle or in a terminal, there is
always the temptation to price up since the customers are perceived as captives. Yes, they are captives,
but if you price at more than the marginal costs, that means some passengers who want food will not get
food, because they can wait until later - or perhaps take another mode of transportation the next time
just so they won't have to go hungry. If the passenger elects to wait, you the carrier have just made his
in-vehicle experience miserable. If the passenger elects to travel by another mode to avoid the hunger
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or the overpriced food, well, you've just lost a ticket revenue. Either way, you can't win, because the
customer utility is tied to his or her stomach and to your bottom line.
Why not subsidize food? Not only does it lead to wastage, some passengers who do not need to eat will
end up with food just because it's cheap. To the carrier, or the provider of the food, this represents a
deadweight loss. Of course, any such loss-making operation eventually comes back to haunt the carrier
through increased ticket prices to cover increased costs. This will tend to divert customers to other
modes which do not have such overhead. After all, if you're in a private auto, you have near perfect
competition in the market for food provision, and price is going to be pretty close to marginal costs.
The railroad caf6 is not a monopoly; it competes with all other food providers available to all other
transportation modes, and it has an important effect on the railroad's ticket revenue through the value
of time.
This is not necessarily an argument for the Caf6 Car. A Caf6 Car might be an effective way to sell food,
or it might not. The whole point is that the access to food for those who are prepared to pay the
marginal costs must be available. The provision of a microwave oven, a hot water source, and a vending
machine in a vestibule area may be all that is needed. The facilities that are made available converts
onerous on-board time into neutral time spent cooking as if in one's own kitchen. In the context of the
maintenance and capital costs of railcars, these facilities are loose change. By providing a Caf6 Car, the
carrier is providing a value-added service, an opportunity to dine on board or purchase food services in
a caf6 setting. Like the roadside caf6 or diner, this feature should be self-sustaining. Perhaps legislative
changes would be required owing to liability concerns before this type of scheme will become practical.
I've caught myself refusing to eat at airports because of the inflated prices of airport concessions and
thus making my own journey very uncomfortable. Moms will pack food for college students going off
to college; moms will tell you always to travel with food. No one calls a convenience store or a gas
station a luxury. A restaurant might be a luxury, but it's providing a service at a price the consumer is
willing to pay, and it's making it (i.e. the cost of production is below the price charged). You'd be pretty
dismayed if you drove into a small town and didn't find any restaurants or any stores, no Dunkin'
Donuts and no McDonald's. That sort of place is called a ghost-town, and people tend to minimize the
amount of time they spend there. On the other hand, it's hard not to stop while driving through a
quaint village peppered with touristy places. The presence of businesses, even those that charge a little
more than marginal costs, clearly enhance the value of time in the close proximity. People like to trade.
People go to great lengths to trade - they even created the silk road.
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3.3.5 Food Can Make Onerous Journey Time Disappear
Let us complete our discussion on food service with some old railroaders' wisdom. Railroaders (and
truckers, too) are kind of a special breed. They always know where to go eat. They always have food,
even if it is just a can of spaghetti that explodes in the engine room of a Missouri Pacific locomotive
(Santucci, 2001) - because you don't want to be "stuck hungry on a train". Employees are on the
system day-in and day-out; employees know that they do not like to be stuck without food. Customers
don't necessarily know this, or have the organizational skills, time, or local geographic knowledge to buy
food. Let's feed them.
'Journey Time Just Magicaly Disappears"
I originally coined this phrase with respect to overnight services, meaning that the time spent sleeping is
nearly equivalent to the time spent sleeping at home. Thus, if one is able to sleep while achieving
movement in space, in effect, the movement in space becomes a byproduct of whatever other activity
the traveller chooses to engage in. The onerous "journey time" has then disappeared from the traveller's
mental model of the trip, because the traveller attributes that time to something else. We have already
seen the application of this principle to the time spent eating on board. It also applies to a variety of
other activities that could be performed on-board, such as work, entertainment, rest, and socializing.
3.4 The Dollar Value of a Day Methodology
The Dollar Value of a Day Methodology is gaining increasing recognition amongst the academic
community. Britain, for example, has conducted surveys in recent years that attempted to calculate the
economic impact of household or voluntary work (BBC News, 2002). According to analysis performed
on data generated in The UK 2000 Time Use Survey, the average hourly rate for housework is C4.72
(about US$ 7). In Switzerland, a recent paper describes an analysis of the 1997 Swiss Labour Force
Survey, where the allocation and value-of-time assigned to housework and childcare was analyzed. The
value-of-time quoted was calculated with two market replacement cost methods and three opportunity
cost methods (Sousa-Poza, 2001). In Spain, where the food market is being influenced by rapid cultural
and economic changes, a study determined that high-income families are more likely to consume food
away from home and spend more than others on food away from home (usto & Jensen, 1998). This
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tacitly suggests that in effect, different families have different evaluations of the value-of-time required
in preparing food.
The British analysis is driven by The UK 2000 Time Use Survey, which is a field-survey involving
individual questionnaires and telephone follow-ups. Selected household heads or their partners
completed a household questionnaire. All individuals aged eight or over were asked to complete
individual questionnaires, two one-day diaries and a one week work and education time sheet (National
Statistics Online, 2002). The data provided no information about how these individuals valued the time,
but the aggregate results enabled useful insights into how individuals allocate their limited time. For
instance, the average Brit spends about 80 minutes each weekday eating, a further 50 minutes each
weekday on "food management", but only about 80 minutes per weekday travelling. Significantly, the
average Brit spends up to 140 minutes each weekday watching television or video. Interestingly, in an
independent study (Schafer, 1999) using American subjects, Schafer concluded that the average person
spends about 90 minutes per day travelling, and a faster mode simply induced people to travel further
each day (for work or other purposes). The 2000 U.S. Census, which gave an average commute time of
94 minutes, is consistent with Schafer's findings. Given the totally different demographics, and
perception of longer commutes in the United States, it is surprising that the time spent travelling is very
similar. The data are not directly comparable, since the 80 minutes cited in the British survey included
the non-work population who may spend time travelling to a shopping mall, while the Census data deals
in work-travel only, but the consistency of the data is striking.
In the U.S., a comparable data source was the Dollar Value of a Day publication available from
Expectancy Data (Ward, 2002). Ward and Associates used a similar time-diary data provided by the
National Human Activity Pattern Survey (Environmental Protection Agency) and a Department of
Labor Survey of wages by occupation by geographical area.
The common element of the Dollar-Value of a Day methodologies reviewed is that they only attempt to
evaluate those parts of the day which are actively engaged in producing monetarily valuable work for
others. For instance, in the housework category, the recipient of the benefits is everyone in the
household, while a specific task might be carried out by a specific member of the household. In that
way, they produce external benefits which can be evaluated using the replacement cost method. If the
household member was not available to do the specific task, what would be the market rate for hiring a
replacement for that length of time? In some other surveys, the opportunity cost method asks the
question, if the household members were not engaged in performing that task, what value could they
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generate (for others) if they performed other tasks? Neither method was able to evaluate the question:
what is the value of time for the time that individuals invest for the benefit of themselves?
When Producer and Consumer of Services is the Same Individual
The value of time where the individual is both the producer and consumer of services is a particularly
interesting question economically because it is both difficult to estimate by conventional methods and
related to many transportation problems. It is difficult to measure since it's not possible to hire an
individual to produce the same services - if you hire somebody to eat for you, you don't exactly gain any
weight; if you hire somebody to travel for you, you don't get to go on the trip. While it is possible to ask
a subordinate to make the trip for you in a business situation, most business travel involves at least some
kind of incentive for the individual (whether that be because the individual values the opportunity to
attend the conference for personal career development, or the individual just likes to travel), and
pleasure travel requires the presence of the individual. The conventional argument that the consumers'
willingness-to-pay in out-of-pocket price for the trip represents the utility they derive from that trip is
misleading for two reasons: (1) the price is determined by competition in the market, consumer surplus
is generated over and above the investment, thus the price is in fact a lower-bound on what the
individual is willing to pay for that trip; (2) the individual is investing time to make the trip, and it is not
clear how that time should be valued. Conventional methods assume that the individual would
otherwise be at work, but this may not necessarily be true. Other leisure options are available, but most
individuals choose a mixture of leisure options over the course of one year. While welfare-maximizing
economics will suggest that the individual will persistently choose the leisure option that generates the
best "return" on the time invested - other than adamant philatists, electronics enthusiasts, and train
spotters, it is rare that individuals will devote all their free time to the same leisure activity. There are
also other activities which are necessary to sustain life, such as eating. The value-of-time spent eating (or
utility derived from investment in out-of-pocket cost and time seeking and eating food) is likely to be
somewhat dependent on the level of hunger. The value-of-time in those cases could be difficult to
evaluate.
How does this relate to transportation? The case of the automobile operator on a business trip, with a
bagel in hand and talking on a personal cellphone while listening to the news on the radio demonstrates
that a person can easily be fulfilling lifetime necessities while accomplishing both personal enjoyment
and a business goal. Such individuals are not only consumers and producers of transportation services
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at the same time, but also utilize the same time to take part in activities that generate surplus both
personally and perhaps for others.
Marketing-Informed Design of Transportation Systems
In transportation systems design, the system should be designed to facilitate activities for a range of
different user groups, and not simply the "average" user. The type of activities that are likely to be of
value to travellers could be found through analysis of time-use survey data. The most leveraged
activities - in the sense that the type of activities that travellers would most likely to want to take part in
during a long journey, are presumably the ones where individuals spend most of their time doing during
a day, such as sleeping, watching television, or eating. The Metro newspaper became an astounding
success around the world in transit-friendly cities because the Metro's owner realized that he could
produce a newspaper that are suitable for reading in between transit stops. At the margin, the Metro
probably produces a small benefit for the carrier, as a subway ride without reading material incurs more
disutility than one with.
Transportation users are individuals, and it is these differences in individual characteristics that we must
exploit to consider design issues. The ideal transportation system may not be the same for every
individual, but it is the designer's goal to ensure that it is close to ideal for a sufficient number of people
that the investment is justified. Systems that are tailored to the average values tend to end up being
unsatisfactory for every individual. It is possible to argue that those who eat or socialize while they
travel are the minority or the exception, and for most people the time they spend travelling are wasted
and thus must be compensated for by an explicit remuneration at rates similar to their wage. But there
are many different alternatives in transportation systems, and the goal of creating alternatives is so that
certain alternatives can attract certain types of consumers. By tailoring the system to cater towards
certain type of consumers, not only do we do "better than average" in terms of value-of-time, the
consumer's behaviour can also be influenced - hence altering the average value of time for a particular
mode, market segment, or any other population.
3.5 How the Value-of-Time Relates to Time-Use Surveys
The Time-Use Survey data can be further analyzed to gain insights into consumer behaviour, and how
travellers might like to spend their time on board a transportation vehicle for prolonged periods.
Intercity transportation, typically associated with door-to-door travel times of at least three hours, will
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necessarily create a disruption in the day's activities. Research into how transportation companies could
leverage the time that consumers spend in their custody, both to generate additional revenue from
offering additional services, and to generate better market share by allowing the consumer to utilize the
journey time (especially on the slower modes) more effectively.
Interpreting Aggregate Time-Use Survey Data
The UK 2000 Time Use Survey suggests that, amongst the adult population, the average male spends
520 minutes per day working at a paid job outside the home (8.7 hours), and a similar amount of time
sleeping. However, the average female only spend 350 minutes per day working (5.8 hours), but 520
minutes sleeping. This does not necessarily mean that females who do work spend less time per day
working than their male counterparts. It probably reflects the fact that the percentage of adult females
who choose to work is smaller than the percentage of adult males who choose to work. Thus, it is quite
difficult to predict individual behaviour (on which individual travel decisions would be made) based on
the average time-use data. Nonetheless, this does not mean the aggregate data is unusable; it can in fact
be quite useful, if one is careful to notice such aggregation effects. When combined with the shape of
the distribution, time-use data can be very helpful indeed.
Understanding How Travel Time Could be Used More Effectively
The average individual spends 80 minutes per day travelling. It is possible to hypothesize that this
represents the time taken to commute daily from work, and on non-work days this represent the time
taken to travel between leisure activities and maintenance activities (such as shopping). It should be
highlighted at this point that much research has been done already in building activity-based models of
travel demand (See Chapter 2 for a review). The current approach is much more proactive - given the
typical activities that take place during the day, and given that the individual has decided to travel, how
can we enabled the "dead" time invested in travel to be used more productively?
The key to integrating the travel experience with an individual's daily routine, and thus making the time
"disappear", is to identify the activity which takes up a large portion of the day for many individuals, and
enable those to take place while travelling. Some activities would not be practical on board
transportation vehicles, but could be practical in the terminals. Other activities are possible on board at
least some vehicles. The average individual spends 520 minutes per day sleeping; 220 minutes watching
tele; 160 minutes eating; and 50 minutes a day socializing. These are activities which are perfectly
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practical on board vehicles. By presenting a range of options to occupy the consumer's time that would
otherwise be idle and invested solely for the purpose of travelling, the carrier is able to leverage the value
of much of that time. Different people will value that time differently, but provided that the carrier is
able to provide the option on a break-even basis, it really does not matter what the value of that time is;
the value of that time is known to be positive.
3.6 Consumers' Attitudes Towards Travel Time
Previous research in social psychology has demonstrated this phenomenon in quite a different setting.
Miller and Form (1951) described an experiment at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric
Company in Chicago between 1924 and 1927. In this experiment, team of six girls were chosen to
determine the production rate of telephone relays against such variables as rest-breaks, availability of
free hot-meals at lunchtime, and physical conditions such as lighting. The increased amenities
apparently caused an increase in output. However, at the end of the experiment, the team was returned
to the same physical conditions, the output increased even more. The explanation offered by Brown
(1985) in his review is that by asking for the cooperation from the girls, the experimenter has made them
feel important and thus the girls' attitude to the work changed, and they worked harder than ever before,
irrespective of the physical conditions. The fact that the experimenter listened to the workforce and
pampered them was producing increase in output far greater than the loss resulting from rest-breaks and
shorter work hours. Mayo (1933), author of several textbooks on the subject, researched the behaviour
of Philadelphia mill workers, reached broadly the same conclusions.
Applying the concept to transportation would suggest that the consumer's attitude towards the time he
or she is spending on onboard the vehicle is important. If the transportation company makes amenities
or other entertainment options available that signals to the consumer that the company cares, the
disutility of time could be reduced or may even become non-existent. This research would suggest that
the economics of provision of amenities should not be analysed on a case-by-case basis; it is the
existence of options that allow the consumers to spend the time as they please which generates the
surplus, and not the existence of any particular amenity.
This would also be consistent with the hereto unexplained dominance of the automobile in medium-
distance transportation. Despite the long journey time, the automobile achieves 8.3m trips per year,
much more than the 0.2m trips by train (American Travel Survey, 1995) and roughly 0.5m trips by air.
Some (Morrison & Winston, 1985) have attempted to explain this in terms of unrealistically low
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disutility-of-time of over-the-road intercity travellers. Significantly, in the Morrison & Winston study,
the data was collected from vacation travellers. These travellers are clearly choosing to spend the time in
the vehicle, where the drive itself is part of the vacation experience. The travellers are also able to
choose to spend the time as they wish -- vacation highway routes are typically peppered with
entertainment options ranging from restaurants, hotels, scenic spots to casinos en-route.
Exactly how much of these options can be replicated by intercity rail carriers economically remains to be
seen, since it is both a function of carrier technology and the actual cost of the entertainment business.
However, it is conceivable that with creative design of terminals and vehicles, sufficient competitive
choices of activities could be offered by long-distance carriers to change the attitude towards the
investment in travel time of most travellers. Another observation to follow logically is the importance
of educating the consumers on ways of enjoying the journey. The auto industry spends a great deal of
its budget on reinforcing the auto dominant image, and stressing the freedom element associated with
the automobile. The consumers also respond by spending a great deal of resources on luxuries onboard
the vehicle.
3.7 Conclusions
The most important conclusion that follows from this research is perhaps that evaluation for high-speed
rail or other intercity transportation technologies should not focus too narrowly on the technical
attributes such as journey time, frequency, and capacity. Equally important are the human attributes of
how the time on-board could be spent and the ability of the technology to adapt to changing human
demands.
In this chapter, we demonstrated that concessions and other activity options en-route influence
transportation demand sufficiently significantly that a carrier should take notice. We proposed a model
for understanding how people evaluate decisions regarding how to invest their time. Using this model,
we were able to explain why dining concessions, shopping opportunities, and other amenities can make
journey time 'disappear' - essentially by incurring transportation time as a joint cost with another
activity. To determine what kind of amenities are most leveraged, and most likely to be applicable to
many market segments, we briefly reviewed results of time-use surveys. Thus, a proactive approach to
transportation systems design is introduced - given the typical activities that take place during the day,
and given that the individual has decided to travel, how can we enabled the "dead" time invested in
travel to be used more productively?
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In examining the nuances of technological enhancements of the travelling experience, it is necessary to
examine the nuances of the travel experience. If new technologies can enable mobile communication
from within the train, we can quantitatively determine what percentage of travellers would derive a
higher value of time as a result, and compare that to conventional technologies that may reduce travel
time, or service enhancements that would provide food or other amenities. By evaluating the cost and
benefits of each of the options, using the value-of-time framework, we are able to rationally prioritize all
possible service enhancements or technological innovations. It is likely that a combined package
featuring some journey-time reductions, some service enhancements and some hi-tech gizmo would be
optimal.
In large metropolitan areas, where further capacity expansion of the highway network is nearly
impossible, rail's ability to haul large amount of weight cheaply and its relatively small terminal footprint
may become a strong advantage in offering the diversity of entertainment options en-route that the
consumers are likely to expect. The ability to haul weight increases the options of entertainment on-
board, while those elements that are not available on-board could conceivably be offered at the terminal.
The small terminal would enable such options to be offered close to population centers, decreasing the
reliance of such businesses exclusively on travellers -- as is the case at an airport mall. In addition, the
small terminal footprint may allow multiple terminals to be constructed in an urban area, allowing
substitution of onerous access time for more pleasant in-vehicle time - an idea explored further in
Chapter 5.
References
BBC News. Housework Worth 100bn Annually, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, England
(2000). http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/1948016.stm
Brown, J.A.C. The Social Psychology of Industry, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, England. (1985)
Bay Area Economics. Evaluation and Market Positioning for Transit-Oriented Retail for Arlington
County, Virgnia. Berkeley, Calif. (1999).
EU Duty Free Working Paper - http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation-customs/publications
/official-doc/sec/taxation/sec9801 994/sec98_01 994en.pdf
55
Foodservice.com. Fast-casual Restaurants Quickly Expanding Their Niche, Friday October 25, 2002.
http://www.foodservice.com/news-homepage-expandtitle-fromhome.cfm?passid=4922
Hopkins, Kelvin (M.P. for Luton, North). Proceedings of the United Kingdom Parliament, May 6,
Westminster, England (1998) - http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa
/cml 99798/cmhansrd/vo980506/debtext/80506-05.htm
House of Commons. Duty Free Shopping, Research Paper 99/74, Westminster, England (1999).
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-074.pdf
Miller, Delbert C. and Form, William H. IndustrialSociology, Harper, New York, N.Y. (1951)
Mayo, E. The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, MacMillan, London, England. (1933)
Martland, Carl D.; Lu, Lexcie; Shi, Dalong and Sussman, Joseph M. Performance Based Technology
Scanning for Intercity Rail Passenger Systems. Presented to TRB 82nd Annual Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (2002)
Marique, Justo and Jensen, Helen H. Working Women and Expenditures on Food Away-from-Home
and At-Home in Spain. Journal ofAgriculture Economics, v.49, no.3, p.32 1-3 33 (1998).
Mills, Edwin S. What Makes Metropolitan Areas Grow?
Normandau Associates. Willingness-To-Pay and Expenditures by Anglers in the Snake River Basin in
Central Idaho, Drumore, Pennsylvania (1999).
http://www.nww.usace.army.mil/lsr/reports/sportfish/central-idaho/wtp-anglers/anglers.htm
National Statistics Online. United Kingdom Time Use Survey, Edinburgh, Scotland (2000).
http://datalib.ed.ac.uk/EUDL/UKtimeuse.html
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/timeuse/key-findings.asp
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/timeuse/default.asp
Spitz and Adler. Presentation to TRB 82nd Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. (2002)
Stanford Working Paper - http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/wolfers2/POLECON230
/documents/Session_06/Aldeasa(B) %20-%20Integrated%20Strategy.pdf
Santucci, Joseph. The Hot Times on the High Iron, Kankakee, II. (2001).
Small, Kenneth A. and Winston, Clifford. Ch.2: The Demand for Transportation: Models and
Applications, in Essays in Transportation Economics and Polig, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
(1999)
Sousa-Poza, Alfonso; Schmid, Hans and Widmer; Rolf. The Allocation and Value of Time Assigned to
Housework and Child-Care: An Analysis for Switzerland. Journal ofPopulation Economics, v.14, no.4,
p.599-618 (2001).
John 0. Ward & Associates. Dollar Value of a Day, ExpectancyData.com, Prairie Village, Kan. (1999).
http://www.expectancydata.com/dvd.html
56
Chapter 4
High Speed Rail Technology
and Route Planning Fundamentals
This chapter reviews the current state-of-practice in high speed rail technology and route planning in the
United States. In particular, attention is devoted to the following three areas: (1) How the high-speed
rail routes in terminal areas are determined, using currently proposed schemes in North America and
existing arrangements in Japan and Europe as case studies; (2) What is the role of magnetically levitated
ground transportation (Maglev) in intercity passenger and freight transportation, and how it might fit
into the current strategic planning for high speed ground transportation (HSGT), using the deployment
of the Tokaido Shinkensen in Japan in the 1960s, and the construction of Shinkensen-type high-speed
rail in the Formosa in the 2000s, as case studies in quantum improvement of radical technologies.
With respect to route planning, we emphasize the importance of access time and control of access
mechanisms to the competitiveness of high speed rail. With the Performance-Based Technology
Scanning (PBTS) framework introduced in Chapter 2, we demonstrate that very high speeds of
150mph~300mph available with expensive exclusive right-of-way technologies can achieve very high
market shares at very high costs, but are not necessary and not cost effective ways of accomplishing
mass intercity transportation. We postulate that Maglev technologies are most effective when deployed
in an incremental fashion, and current high-speed rail strategic planning is too fragmented. Airport
access, urban transit, regional rail systems, conventional high speed rail and Maglev-type technologies
are really all different facets of intercity mass transportation. These different modes should be evaluated
and designed together such that system optimal is achieved. In some cases, this may involve joint-
operation and sharing of large capital facilities, such as track and stations.
4.1 General Review of Current High Speed Rail Planning Studies
In this section, we will review very briefly the current high-speed rail strategic plan in North America,
and compare it to the high-speed rail vision of Japan in the 1960s, France in the 1970s, Britain in the
1980s, and Germany in the 1990s. Review of specific high-speed rail schemes such as the California,
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Midwest, Florida, North Carolina, Baltimore & Washington Maglev, Pittsburgh Maglev schemes, will be
deferred to a later chapter.
4.1.1 Federal Railroad Administration Next Generation High Speed Rail Technology Demonstration Program
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)'s Next Generation High Speed Rail Technology
Demonstration Program (NGHSR) today appears to be focused on the development of enabling
technologies. The Five-Year Strategic Plan for Railroad Research, Development and Demonstrations
(2002) devotes Chapter Five to the programme, which is divided into four sections: Positive Train
Control, High-Speed Non-Electric Locomotive, High-Speed Grade-Crossing Protection, High Speed
Track and Structures. This is not surprising, since the FRA's statutory mandate is to ensure safe
operation of railroads, but not necessarily to promote the railroad industry.
The Positive Train Control programme is mainly intended to deliver a more cost-effective cab signal
technology than the current state-of-practice on the Northeast Corridor, which is a system based on
coded track circuits first developed by the Pennsylvania Railroad. Demonstrations are being conducted
using digital radio communication technologies in the Michigan Corridor for operating speeds of up to
110mph. The High-Speed Non-Electric Locomotive Technology programme is mainly an attempt to
develop high-speed locomotives using alternative technologies, including gas-turbine and flywheel, to
give rise to a lower-weight locomotive with better acceleration. No attempts are currently being made to
build advanced diesel locomotives (such as the British Intercity 125) to achieve the same functional
performance. The High-Speed Grade-Crossing Protection programme is mainly concerned with
physically preventing impatient motorist from jumping the crossbucks as an alternative to full-grade
separation. The main technologies being considered are four-quadrant gates, and full-width drag-nets.
The High-Speed Track and Structures programme aims to use innovative methods to reduce the cost of
high-speed, freight-compatible track structures, both in terms of construction and maintenance.
Attempts are also being made to address ride-quality concerns.
4.1.2 Intermodal Suface Transportation Efficieng Act Section 1010 Designated Corridors
The Five-Year Strategic Plan builds upon prior work which had already been carried out on high-speed
corridor planning as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). Section
1010 of the act identified five corridors, which were supplemented by three additional corridors in
Section 1103(c) of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). These are: the Pacific
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Northwest Corridor, linking Eugene, Oregon and Vancouver, British Columbia through Seattle
Washington; California, linking Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento and the Bay Area; the Chicago
Hub linking St. Louis, Missouri, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Detroit, Michigan;
the southeast, extending the northeast corridor through Charlotte, North Carolina, Spartanburg and
Greenville, South Carolina, to Atlanta and Macon, Georgia and linking Raleigh, North Carolina to
Columbia, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia and Jacksonville, Florida; and Florida linking Miami to
Tampa via Orlando. The new 1103(c) corridors are: the Gulf Coast corridor linking Houston, New
Orleans and Mobile plus New Orleans to Meridian and Birmingham; the Empire Corridor linking New
York to Buffalo via Albany; and the Keystone corridor linking Harrisburg and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.
Sporadic references to the ISTEA corridors can be found in a variety of documents that discuss high-
speed rail planning, especially in literature distributed by high-speed rail advocacy groups. As evident
from this quote, achieving the Federal designation status is a symbol of having "arrived" in the North
American high-speed rail scene:
Pennsylvania gained a designated HSGT corridor with the enactment of the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century (TEA-21). The newly-designated Keystone corridor, which runs between
Philadelphia and Harrisburg, is owned by Amtrak, is fully electrified, and contains very few grade
crossings. With official designation, dedicated Federal authorization for a Philadelphia-Pittsburgh HSGT
study, and the current efforts by the State, there are now expanded opportunities to improve the speed
and service of east-west passenger rail in Pennsylvania, to complement the superb north-south Northeast
Corridor service already in place and constantly being improved.
-- Pennsylvania's Role in High Speed Rail, Federal Railroad Administration
The designated corridors seem to reflect the results of political discussion as apposed to demand-based
transportation planning. In the original process for selecting Amtrak routes, the Secretary of
Transportation simply designated endpoints of transcontinentals, which left many important
intermediate cities without direct service. The corridors designation followed a similar process which
was based on historical rail traffic levels, instead of a detailed analysis of current highway travel patterns.
None of the four studies reviewed (Southeast Corridor study, Midwest Corridor study, Boston to
Montreal study, Florida study) demonstrated a demand-driven way to determine routing, or showed
multiple routing options. Studies that are at an advanced stage and involve selecting a route amongst
different options tend to take the form of selecting a route given that a fixed list of station locations.
No attempts were demonstrated to study demand variation within metropolitan areas, or refining
designated routes and corridors on the basis of expected travel patterns. The current DOT high speed
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rail strategy seems mainly driven by a political process at a strategic level, and not a city-to-city search for
the route with the highest benefits.
There also appear to be a general lack of planning resources at the local level. In FRA's NGHSR enacted
budget (2002), corridor planning represents 21% ($5.9 million) of the total budget; in the 2003 budget
request, corridor planning receives a mere 7% ($1.7 million). Track structures -- a major part of costs of
high-speed rail systems, received an average of 5% of total budget over the two years (2002-03).
The maps that are produced by the planning process shows a number of nodes, but no intermediate
points, and treat metropolitan areas as single nodes. For instance, Chicago is one node, Boston is one
node, New York is one node. There is also little coordination between the different corridors: The
Empire Corridor to Buffalo and the Keystone Corridor to Pittsburgh are both designated corridors;
both of the ex-New York Central alignments (via Detroit and via Toledo) are designated corridors.
Apparently it was deemed unwise to connect Cleveland to Pittsburgh or to serve Detroit via Toledo (or
Toledo via Detroit!). Some other designations that appear suboptimal include the designated New
Orleans-Houston v.s. the undesignated Texas Triangle, Houston-Dallas Ft. Worth and Houston-San
Antonio. The track mileage required to serve New Orleans-Houston is approximately the same as that
from Dallas Ft. Worth-San Antonio via Houston.
4.2 Detailed Analysis of An Example High Speed Rail Plan
The Boston-to-Montreal High Speed Rail study is in a very preliminary stage. We chose the Boston-
and-Montreal study as an example due to the availability of data, and the cross-border international
significance of the line. Other high speed rail studies in the United States may be subject to some of the
same issues. This analysis is intended to serve as an example of some of the wider issues that should be
considered when considering implementation of high speed rail corridors.
The Boston to Montreal Corridor (B&M HSR) is 325 miles long (309 miles by highway, MapQuest.com).
Without considering whether such speeds are in fact attainable, the journey time at an average speed of
90mph is thus 3 hours and 36 minutes, compared to driving times of around four and a half hours. The
principle cities visited by the B&M HSR are: Boston (Mass.), Nashua, Manchester, Concord (N. Hamps.),
White River Jct., Montpelier, Burlington (Vt.), and Montreal (Que.). There is, in fact, a current Amtrak
service that covers parts of the B&M HSR route from White River Jct. to St. Albans that attained an
annual ridership of 76,784 passengers (NARP, 2001), or 210 passengers daily.
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The study website compared the B&M HSR to the Northeast Corridor between Boston and Philadelphia.
Let's see if there is anything wrong with that picture. Firstly, a demand model of the Amtrak Northeast
Corridor, using very simple gravity models and Census data on metropolitan area population, is
constructed. The spreadsheet analysis is shown in Plate 4.1:
Gravity Model Constant 2.50E+07
Train Average Speed 90
Seats per Train 200
Annual Ridership
Distance Journey T4 Population BOS PVD NHV STM NYP EWR Sum
Boston ME BOS (miles) (hours) 3297201
ProvidencE PVD 50 0.56 1125639 267225 267,225
New Hawr NHV 102 1.13 522279 40785.6 20749.33 61,535
Stamford STM 41 0.46 332835i 20470.08 9431.8 15263.36 45,165
New York NYP 40 0.44 8712600 443853.6 192929.4 202240.4 260987.2 1,100,011
Newark M EWR 10 0.11 1954671 95480.64 41041.01 40386.6 46841.97 PATH 223,750
Philadelph PHL 89 0.99 4949867 176971.5 71128.89 51704.23 42668.78 1568226 391362.9 2,302,062
Total 20895092 3,999,748
Riders per day (both directions)18.21
Trains per day (in each direction) 27.39554
Plate 4.1: Simple Model calibrated with Boston-Philadelphia Amtrak Ridership Data
We calibrate the model to give us roughly the correct number of annual riders and trains per day, using
important variables such as average train speed, seats per train, and a constant. This model gives us a
reasonable number of four million annual riders between Boston, New York and Philadelphia. The
actual current Northeast Corridor ridership is about 6.2 million for all services between Boston, New
York, Philadelphia and Washington (NARP, 2001), excluding the Clockers. We don't expect this model
to be sensitive to important attributes like service quality, on time performance, and locations of
stations. However, we're only using this model to investigate how much demand we think there is in the
corridor. It is simply intended as a screening tool to investigate the viability of corridor concepts. As a
sanity check, this model was validated against the current Amtrak Vermonter ridership-performance
statistics:
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Gravity Model Constant 2.50E+07
Train Average Speed 40
Seats per Train 200
Annual Ridership
Distance Journey TihPopulatoniP 5TM NHV SPG LEB MPR Sum
New York NYP (miles) (hours) 87126001
Stamford STM 35 0.88 332835 NEDirect 0
New Hawer.NHV 36 0.90 522279 NEDirect NEDirect 0
Springfield SPG 58 1.45, 573940 62021.83 3251.529 8269.153 73,543
White Rive LEB 133 3.33 12395 659.4973 29.07834, 54.22951 85.58179 828
MontpelierMPR 59 1.48 7686 333.7821 14.31144 25.69111 36.76086 2.583538 413
Burlington BTV 39 0.98 165917 6424.749 271.867 479.7507 659.5768 33.57618 52.31746 7,922
Total 10327652 82,706
Riders per day (both directions) 226.5914
Trains per day (in each direction) 0.566478
Plate 4.2: Simple Model validated against New York-Burlington Amtrak Ridership Data
With an average speed of 40mph, having excluded the riders between New York and New Haven
(which are attributed to the Northeast Direct service group), the model gives a number close to the
actual performance: ridership audit gives the actual number as 76,784 (NARP, 2001), v.s. projected
number of about 83,000. These analyses, surprisingly simple, but give us reasonably accurate results.
Considering that the model was not calibrated in any scientifically defensible way, but was based on
engineering estimates of constants coupled with simple linear functions, the model appears to be robust
even when applied to a corridor of a very different characteristic. So, applying the model to the Boston-
Montreal corridor:
Gravity Model Constant 2.50E+07
Train Average Speed 90
Seats per Train 200
Annual Ridership
Distance Journey Ti Population BOS MHT PSM LEB MPR BTV Sum
Boston M1 BOS (miles) (hours) 3297201
Mancheste MHT 53 0.59 190332 42626.91 42,627
Concord PSM 171 0.19j 38981 6610.0211 1571.153 8,181
White RihcLEB 60 0.67 12395 1131.7521 110.29861 28.99017 1,271
Montpelier MPR 59' 0.66 7686 482 7102 38.72361 9.06377 5.812961 536
Burlington BTV 39 0.43 165917 8637.816, 649.6316 147.3633 75.54641 86.61994 9,597
Montreal YMX 97 1.08 1016000 37107.21 2559.406 559.1251 232.4921 206.7082 6256.268 46,921
Total 4728512 109,134
Riders per day (both directions) [98.9962
Trains per day (in each direction) 0.747491
Plate 4.3: Simple Model applied to Boston-Montreal Market
The model tells us that annual ridership of about 109,000 on the corridor can be expected, or about 300
passengers per day in both directions. Since one train will carry 200 passengers, 0.75 trains per day, or
one train every 32 hours could carry this load.
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Is this analysis credible? The Boston & Montreal is a Federally-designated high speed corridor, and the
present analysis is claiming that it will only carry some 150 passengers a day in each direction - fewer
than current average ridership between New York and Chicago on Amtrak's Lake Shore Limited (based
on a 18-hour one-way, non-high-speed service). Surely a Federally-designated corridor should perform
better?
In many markets, the current traffic carried by existing air service is often a good indicator of how
successful high-speed rail service could be. Air service could be fast and frequent, but is marred by long
access times in a mid-distance market. Rail service usually attract between about 20% and 500% of
riders compared to air service - for instance, between Boston and New York, high-speed rail carries
some twice as many riders as the two air shuttles combined, while between Chicago and Milwaukee, air
carries about three times as many local passengers daily as air service. The present model predicts that
in the Boston-Montreal local market, about 37,000 passengers annually would be carried by the
proposed high speed rail, or about 100 passengers per day. Examining the current airline operating plan
in that same corridor, Air Canada and Delta Airlines currently operate eight regional jet flights daily,
each carrying 40 passengers between Boston and Montreal. Assuming a load-factor of 70%, and a
typical ratio of originating v.s. connecting passengers for hub airlines of 50%, these flights carry a total
of 112 Boston-Montreal passengers per day. The Boston & Montreal will carry about as many
passengers per day as air service, according to the present model. Even if the model is based on very
simple linear functions, it predicted a number which is consistent with high-speed rail experience
everywhere. Any rational analyst would have serious reservations believing that the Boston & Montreal
would generate anything remotely approaching Northeast Corridor volumes (some 1,000~1,500
passengers daily between Boston and New York alone). By the same token, any serious analyst would
have problems believing that Boston & Montreal deserves similar levels of Federal funding as the
Northeast Corridor, even after the economic redevelopment potential is accounted for.
The current model does not take into account of induced demand, the economic development effects
that will come about as a result of the high speed rail, or even intermodal trip opportunities that will be
created by people driving from elsewhere in New Hampshire and Vermont to the high speed rail line
and taking the train into Boston. Even if we assumed that these effects combined will give us four times
the demand than the model projected, the load would still only justify three trains daily - probably a
morning train, an afternoon train, and an overnighter extending through to Washington or elsewhere in
Canada. It is unlikely that the infrastructure costs incurred in upgrading the rail line could be justified by
a grand total of six passenger trains in either direction daily.
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Boston-Montreal is a low-density corridor, unlike the Northeast Corridor, which is a high-density
corridor. The cities between New York and Washington may have owed their development to the
Pennsylvania Railroad and the Corridor, but that was a long time ago. Building a high-speed rail
through Vermont and New Hampshire will not achieve the same effect, because there is now a
formidable competitor providing transportation services in the region: the Interstate 89. There are
probably better places to spend high-speed rail money than in the Boston & Montreal corridor. It's
hardly even a corridor - nobody lives there.
There are subtle points that this model does not capture, but this model was not designed to be a
comprehensive evaluation of the possibilities of the corridor. It was intended to demonstrate the type
of problems associated with a strategy that focuses on a political planning process. The Boston-
Montreal High Speed Rail Study Group, perhaps due to the Federal designation, does not address some
fairly basic issues in project evaluation. For instance, does it make sense to simply extend the Northeast
Corridor through Boston and terminating at Manchester, New Hampshire? If the Northeast Corridor
were to be extended, is Manchester, New Hampshire the best destination? What about Portland,
Maine? If the Northeast Corridor were to be extended, how should it traverse downtown Boston? It
can go via the Grand Junction Railroad, by-passing the downtown, or the North-South Rail Link could
be built, connecting the two mainline stations in Boston. Should the North-South Rail Link go through
the airport? North-South Rail Link is an expensive scheme - does it make more sense to expend those
funds in Connecticut and accelerate the upgrade of former New Haven trackage? These are important
system design questions, which are omitted when certain corridors are given the designated status, and
institutions are created to represent the interests of specific corridors.
To answer these questions, a high-speed rail vision, or strategy, is required. The vision would define the
critical issues in high speed rail planning, and would lay out what the high-speed rail service seeks to
provide. High-speed rail service is not good at providing service to spread out areas of small demand
density; it is better at connecting points of concentrated demand density. The strategy would recognize
this and provide ways to make grand schemes like the Boston & Montreal more cost-effective. High
speed rail is much more than drawing straight lines between cities - it's about getting people from where
they are to where they want to go. High-speed rail planners should recognize that they are not
constrained by existing corridors and that they need to examine options beyond taking an already
defined corridor and determining the level of investment required to generate the ridership target they
have in mind.
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What I have provided in this section is only a screening analyses using very general data and without
consideration of important micro-effects. In the rest of the chapter, we will explore some of the
questions raised in the previous paragraph. But first, we review the high-speed rail strategy and policy
(whether inadvertent or deliberate) of other regions of the world.
3.3 How They Really Built the Shinkensen
A common myth amongst passenger rail activists is that Shinkansen is the model high speed intercity
railroad, and that if you get the speed high enough, everybody would ride the rails, the system would be
successful like the Shinkansen, and the rail line would make both a profit and economic sense. This is
clearly not true, not even in the case of the Shinkansen. The original Tokaido Shinkansen, now operated
by Central Japan Railway Company (JR Central), was essentially a capacity relief scheme. The later
Shinkansen extensions reflect political will to connect the country with Shinkansen, and resulted in poor
investment decisions that eventually bankrupted the Japan National Railway.
During the building of original Tokaido Shinkansen, a very unlikely set of circumstances occurred: (a)
The Tokaido Main Line, busiest line in Japan, was facing capacity problems; journey times were slow but
yet the trains were filled to the brim, to the extent that four-tracking the Tokaido Line was being
seriously studied as an option; (b) In postwar Japan, there was a great sense of optimism and will to
realize economic growth; (c) The existing railroad infrastructure in Japan was dilapidated and run down,
due both to the effect of the War and the narrow gauge lines were never designed to handle the traffic
volumes, tonnages, and speeds that were being asked from it (Yamanouchi, 2000).
Thus, the Tokaido Shinkansen was justified on the following basis: given the choice between four-
tracking the narrow-gauge Tokaido Main Line, versus the construction of a set of standard gauge lines
alongside the Tokaido Main Line alignment specifically for express passenger service, the incremental
benefit from halving the journey time (from six-hours to three-hours between Tokyo and Osaka) and
the performance gain on the narrow gauge lines (avoidance in having to pass high-speed express and
freight trains) was greater than the difference in costs between two extra narrow gauge tracks and the
two standard gauge tracks (see Debassay, 2003 for a detailed discussion).
The important feature to note in this case is that not even a 50% reduction in end-to-end journey time
was able to justify the cost of the brand-new alignment. In this case, the reduction in journey time was
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only able to justify the difference in cost between narrow gauge and standard gauge infrastructure, laid
down alongside the existing rights-of-way in most places by widening. Obviously, the original Tokaido
Shinkansen is an astounding success - but only because the traffic was already mature and overflowing,
and essentially no new rights-of-way were required. The original Tokaido Shinkansen was built in the
part of Japan with the least difficult terrain, and did not enter urban areas through elaborate viaducts and
tunnels; it entered urban areas by widening and realigning existing narrow-gauge infrastructure to utilize
space more effectively in the existing rights-of-way.
There are many high-speed rail schemes currently in progress in Asia and Europe. Some will succeed,
and some may not fare as well as the promoters hope. The on-going scheme in Taiwan bears all the
hallmarks of the original Tokaido Shinkansen: the existing 70mph narrow-gauge lines are capacity
constrained, especially by local commuter trains; the highways are congested, and the distances are too
short and the weather too unpredictable for domestic aviation to be a major player; the new
infrastructure will be constructed through mostly coastal farmland, especially in the southern part of the
island; the new infrastructure will half the journey time from five hours to about two and a half hours.
On the other hand, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, currently being constructed in Southern England,
seeks to upgrade a capacity-constrained 100mph line to 183mph standards by constructing a brand-new
alignment through heavily populated London suburbs. The journey time savings associated with the
new alignment is in the order of 60 minutes, cutting the London-Paris journey from three and a half
hours to two and a half. Apparently a good case for investment, it differs from the original Tokaido
Shinkansen in that people are not exactly flocking to travel from Paris to London, or vice versa. The
suburban rail congestion could be relieved with advanced signalling technologies, without resorting to a
brand new alignment. A study by Virgin Rail suggested that Regional Eurostars (from Glasgow,
Manchester, Birmingham and other cities to Paris) would only be justified with a frequency of one train
per day from Glasgow, and two trains per day from Manchester. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link is likely
to see a maximum of ten trainloads (perhaps a maximum of about 8,000 passengers) in each direction
per day, compared to the inaugural hourly service (18 trains per day) planned for the Taiwan high speed
rail, and the seven-minute rush-hour headways that currently run on the Tokaido Shinkansen. The
economics of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link pales in comparison.
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3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have illustrated a few fundamental principles of high-speed rail planning through case
studies, logic, and literature review. First and foremost is the important realization that high-speed rail
planning is a detailed exercise. Cities cannot simply be treated as nodes of different sizes, since at the
distances where high-speed rail is most likely to be competitive (i.e. under 300 miles), the access time to
and from the central station could be a significant part of the total journey time, and factors into
competitiveness against the other modes very significantly. The current status quo of designating
specific corridors to be studied as high-speed rail corridors could lead to undesirable results by allowing
a fixed-route or fixed-endpoints focus to develop, when a rational analysis of which nodes to include,
what route to take, and where to stop, is needed. Secondly, in terms of infrastructure investment, it is
extremely difficult to justify new infrastructure based on journey time savings. Proposals for new
infrastructure, new technologies, or new rights-of-way are much more likely to succeed where capacity is
a constraint. Economic analysis showed that the age-old rule of investment decision: 'buy the best you
can afford, then use it until it claps out' seems to apply to high speed rail also. The unfortunate result
for high-speed rail advocates is that quantum speed improvements are unlikely to occur unless a
situation exists where the existing infrastructure is already handling as many trains as it possibly can. In
the case where existing infrastructure is unable to attract sufficient riders to justify its operational costs,
investment in new infrastructure is likely to fail also.
A full analysis of the implication of this result on magnetic levitation technology appears in the Lu,
Martland and Sussman paper (2003) - see Appendix H.
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Chapter 5
Case Studies in
Downtown Access Design
This chapter is both a review of existing schemes for intercity rail's access to the downtown core, and an
application of the Performance-Based Technology Scanning framework (See §2.10) to designing an
adequate distribution system for a large metropolitan area with a population of more than one million.
The central idea is that when evaluating high speed rail strategies, it is easy to get carried away with
maximizing speed when the most leveraged infrastructure investment could be in the downtown,
especially when high speed rail schemes are considered jointly with commuter rail and rapid transit
improvements.
There are a number of urban distribution system designs for intercity transportation: (1) travellers could
transfer to the local public transit system; (2) travellers could transfer to local public or private transport
at a central collection point; (3) travellers could transfer to local private transport at a number of
collection points. In this chapter, we use the Performance-Based Technology Scanning framework to
demonstrate that alternative (3) would make intercity rail most competitive with alternative modes of
highway and airline. Given the same technical capabilities and amenities, alternative (3) would result in
the longest "breakeven" distance; given an origin-destination market, alternative (3) would allow lower
costs by requiring lower speeds for a given target mode share. In transit-oriented cities, (1) can appear
to be the most cost-effective solution, but the de-facto need for most target customers to make two or
three transfers makes it unattractive.
In the final part of the chapter, we review a number of actual examples where this concept has been
applied to a number of cities. While no attempt was made to survey the examples in a level of detail
required for engineering, attention was devoted to existing infrastructure and demand patterns to enable
evaluation of benefits and whether this approach makes sense for the cities concerned.
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5.1 Review of Intercity Rail Distribution Systems
As part of research carried out on the behalf of the Union Internationale des Chemins d'Fer (UIC), the
author reviewed urban rail networks in many of the world's metropolitan areas. The coverage was not
intended to be exhaustive but aimed to cover a representative subset of downtown distribution designs.
The detailed case studies were previously published in a working paper submitted to the sponsors
(Martland et al., WP-2002-02). The following is a representative summary of the relevant sections.
5.1.1 Tokyo, Japan
The non-Shinkensen rail in downtown Tokyo are integrated into the extensive city subway network, and
there is track sharing and vehicle interchange between the Tokyo Municipal Subway and some of the
regional rail operators. The vehicles are interoperable on both types of the infrastructure. Like other
subways and regional rail networks in very large metropolitan areas, Japan has a nearly totally-connected
downtown rail system. The incoming regional/intercity train will often visit a number of stations before
finally terminating at Tokyo Central. Some trains run through the city. Real estate experience over the
most recent decade suggests that other business districts have developed around rail stations that are not
in the downtown, and a substantial number of regional rail riders travel directly to their target business
district without transferring at the central station. Connecting eight of the most important business
districts within the Greater Tokyo region is a circular rail line called the Yamasaki line. Shinkensen
Expresses continue to call only at the central station.
5.1.2 London, England
Downtown distribution in London is something of a historical accident. In the era of private railways,
each long-haul railway constructed its own magnificent London terminal and transferring between lines
often required crosstown connections on the Underground network. In the downtown, tracks were not
generally shared between full-gauged mainline trains, small-gauged surface line trains, and tiny-gauged
deep level tube trains. Reaching the final destination after reaching the London terminal of the line in
question was often difficult, involving multiple transfers or a congested hackney carriage ride.
Beginning in the late 1980s, British Rail recognized the need of crosstown travellers and instituted the
Thameslink scheme which called for construction of a new elevated railway across London to provide a
North-South connexion. Additional stations were also provided. Today, two other schemes, named
Thameslink 2000 and Crossrail, are in progress to open more direct cross-town links for mainline trains.
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5.1.3 Harbin, Heilongiiang, China
The downtown distribution facilities in Harbin have historically been based on the London model,
where tracks from the South and from the North each terminated at separate stub-end termini. There
are four rail stations within the urban area, linked by a circular railroad, but two (Binjiang and
Xiangfang) are mainly loose-car freight stations, while the two passenger stations deal with diesel
(Northbound) and electric (Southbound) trains respectively. The 2002 operating plan and track speeds
do not allow the circular railroad to act as a collector for long-distance trains in a competitive manner;
passenger trains traverse round the ring mainly due to operational reasons. However, in Harbin, this is
less of a problem than one might imagine, due to the tendency towards highly compact planned cities in
former communist China. There are a number of business districts in Harbin, but the main station is
the only station close to the largest and busiest part of the downtown; the freight stations lie in industrial
areas and other stations lay beyond the main conurbations. Thus, the fact that Harbin is still a single-
node city isn't a major problem, since the population is also highly concentrated, unlike in the developed
world.
5.1.4 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Philadelphia's regional rail system has three main stations in the downtown: 30th Street, Suburban, and
Market East. Prior to 1984, the Reading Railroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad independently operated
Broad St. and Suburban regional rail stations which were not interconnected, while 30th Street was
exclusively reserved for long distance trains. The downtown tunnel, constructed for $300 million,
permitted abandonment of Broad St. and allowed access to all regional rail lines from all three stations,
including a brand-new interchange with the transit system at Market East. An indoor mall connected 8t
& Market transit stop with Market East regional rail station. Access time to regional rail service from
the downtown was greatly reduced with the tunnel. Regrettably, due to existing infrastructure and other
constraints, intercity trains continue to call only at 30t Street, including commuter trains from New
Jersey. Although reaching downtown is an easy transfer, access from other significant demand
generators in the city neighbourhoods is problematic.
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5.1.5 Boston, Massachusetts
Boston's intercity rail system has evolved much over its 150 years' history. As the cultural center of
New England, initially the London model was adopted. Major restructuring during the 1890s by the
Boston & Albany and the New York, New Haven and Hartford saw the consolidation of many smaller
stations into two stations, Back Bay and South Station, which both served all of the south side lines.
Unfortunately, the Boston and Maine kept its own North Station for the north side lines. In the Amtrak
era, a suburban park-and-ride station known as Route 128 was added. Later, two stops within the city,
Forest Hills and Ruggles, were added to the regional rail network to serve major demand generators
besides the downtown and provide transit connexions. In general, accessibility of regional rail service is
much better in Boston than in many other American cities. Currently, there are proposals to link the
North and South stations by a downtown tunnel to create a Philadelphia-like layout, and new regional
rail stations that provide transfer opportunities away from the downtown are in the process of being
created as part of the Urban Ring project.
5.2 Some Basic Concepts
5.2.1 Why is Urban Transportation Relevant to Interciy Rail Providers?
After the public takeover of urban mass-transit systems occurred on a wholesale scale during the 1950s,
there was a growing body of opinion amongst intercity carriers that local distribution was the
responsibility of the local government, and while intercity carriers' responsibility terminated at the local
access point for that particular mode of transportation, whether than be an out-of-town airport, a
downtown railhead, or a remote freeway interchange. Although the intercity carrier will work in
conjunction with the local government to provide interchange facilities, the public intercity carrier saw
little reason to enter a market in which a public monopoly was unable to operate profitably. However,
there are often tremendous economies of density in urban transportation, to the extent that certain busy
urban corridors may be profitable to operate independently of the local transit authority - a
phenomenon evidenced by the increasing independent private investment in downtown-to-airport type
shuttle buses. In this section, we argue that the intercity carriers are not only able to profit from this
type of urban distribution market, but will also enhance their mode-share in the intercity market by
providing better access to its services. These access issues are particularly important in congested cities
where demands for intercity services are high and alternatives to the rail mode are also easily accessible.
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In other words, access to the rail mode only needs to be as good as access to the competing modes such
as limited-access highways or airways.
5.2.2 Local Feeder Routes in a Metropolitan Urban Setting
In cities with a large population, many modes compete with intercity rail for travel over distances of
between 100 and 1,200 miles. Typically, at the "origin" end, a mode-choice tree in a major metropolis
such as New York City might look something like this:
Local Access
Crosstown Access
Line-haul
Walk Taxicab Private Auto I
Bus Subway Commuter Rail
Intercity Bus Amtrak Train Airline
Destination
Plate 5.1: Local Feeder Routes in a Metropolitan Setting
More importantly, each of the paths in the mode-choice tree has a utility and idiosyncratic preference
associated with them. Thus, when the traveller is making the decision with respect to the line-haul
mode, the utility associated with the "local" and "crosstown" access modes will affect their decision.
While intercity service providers seldom control local access, they should be aware of its importance.
In order to encourage patrons to choose their mode on the line-haul portion, a carrier must consider not
just the line-haul leg, but also the access legs, so that overall utility for the journey experience for the line
haul plus some combination of the "access" modes comes out to be the highest. In major metropolises,
airports are frequently easily accessible using the local transportation infrastructure, as are intercity bus
terminals. For that reason, the rail operator needs to choose a routing and stopping pattern carefully to
enable the best downtown access by patrons who may "prefer to access the line-haul mode by private
auto" or "are only able to access the line-haul mode by subway".
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5.2.3 Local Feeder Routes in a Rural Setting
Interestingly, this can be contrasted with a small town or rural area, where the accessibility to much of
the infrastructure that city-dwellers take for granted are simply not present. In these areas (such as
North Carolina in the United States), the mode-choice tree will look more like this:
Local Access Private Auto
Line-haul Intercity Bus Amtrak Train Airline
Destination
Plate 5.2: Local Feeder Routes in a Rural Setting
The key observation here is that in working to improve access to intercity rail travel, the access only
needs to be as good enough to make the overall trip experience better than that offered by the
competing modes. In general, there is much more competition in the large cities both between access
modes and line-haul modes, thus it is a much more difficult market to break into. In rural areas, the
only access mode is the private auto; thus intercity rail can attain a larger potential customer base simply
by ensuring that its stations are strategically spaced such that a drive from most points in the rural state
is less than the drive to the nearest major airport in the area, and by ensuring that the disutility of
transfer is more than compensated by the utility in travelling by train (versus driving directly to the
destination).
In many ways the rural market is a much simpler market than the urban market. In a developed
economy such as the United States, where it can be safely assumed that the majority of the rural
population have access to a car, access barriers such as "an hours' drive to the nearest rail station" isn't
really an issue. Rural population and suburban population in general accept that a longer drive and
increased disutility of access to "urban" facilities is part of the cost of living in exclusive suburbs or rural
locations. A possible reason behind the failure of railroads in developed countries to attract a significant
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rural ridership may lie with their inability to distinguish its product from driving directly to the
destination.
5.2.4 The Coupling Between Local and Long-Haul Transportation Systems
The success of intercity transportation carriers are inseparably linked to the effectiveness of the local
distribution system from the long-haul nodes. Consider Slide 15 in Appendix B. The airline community
discusses airport access in many publications (for a review, see Chapter 2), and the importance of such
local runs are extensively documented in literature dealing with intermodal freight. It appears that the
success of intercity rail may depend on the availability and quality of the local transit system and highway
access network. As noted in Appendix B, in a number of case studies and example itineraries that were
examined, provided that an intercity rail line of a medium-speed standard (about 90~1 10mph) exists, the
most leveraged investment may be to improve revenue through reducing access time by offering better
access within the metropolitan areas.
5.2.5 The Folly of the Union Station
Many transit (and intercity passenger transportation) professionals have come to believe in recent years
that a consolidating approach to intercity services is a good thing - many cite the Union Station's
downtown location (a intercity rail "hub") as a great attraction for travelling by train rather than by
private auto or aeroplane. In fact, the Union Station's downtown location is an impediment, not an
attraction, to suburban dwellers who wish to depart from their home and those who work in suburban
business districts. In contrast, the out-of-town airport offers much better access if the origin is within
the suburbs. The originating demands for intercity travel from the suburbs and the non-downtown city
neighbourhoods, when integrated across the entire metropolitan area, dwarfs the originating demands
which are within easy walking distance of the downtown Union Station. Some graphical illustrations of
the demand studies are shown in Slide 12 of Appendix B.
Although a beltway "Park and Ride" similar to Route 128 station in Massachusetts and New Carrollton
station in Maryland solves the problem for suburban dwellers who live on or near the beltway, it does
not make the intercity train any more attractive than the plane which is also similarly situated at a
beltway location. In addition, the "Park and Ride" does not make it any easier for those who work in
suburban business districts or city neighbourhoods that are not within easy reach of the downtown.
Especially in a major metropolis, getting downtown by either transit or private auto can be a major
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hassle, comparable to getting to the airport. In addition, other issues exist in congested downtown that
make the out-of-town airport even more competitive; for example, the lack of direct access via high-
performance urban expressways to the downtown rail terminal, and the lack of affordable parking at the
rail terminal, all impair the ability of the downtown terminal to serve the suburbs and some city
neighbourhoods effectively.
The simple analogy with the interstate network will demonstrate why more than one downtown station
is required. An intercity railroad terminating only at the Union Station and beltway Park & Rides is akin
to an urban interstate expressway which has only three exits - one at the eastern intersection with the
beltway, one at the downtown, and another at the western intersection with the beltway (see top of Slide
5.3), requiring the traveller to proceed through the city on slow arterial streets (akin to feeder transit
systems or feeder buses to the Union Station and beltway Park & Rides). Obviously, the nature of the
railroad technology requires the minimization of stops for through passengers to minimize the dwell
times. However, where a train is terminating in an end-of-the-line type city (such as Boston, Mass), or a
service is obviously designed for short-haul passengers (such as the Amtrak Clocker and Keystone
services), increasing the accessibility of such services through a downtown distributor can make the
service much more attractive than a point-to-point, airplane-like service (see middle of Slide 13 in
Appendix B). It is also important to note that premium express services, such as the Acela Express,
should probably not spend time picking up passengers around the loop in Baltimore, Md. or
Philadelphia, Penn.; but it should be sent around (hypothetical) distributor loops in major destinations
such as Boston, Mass.; New York, N.Y.; and Washington, D.C.
The goal of such downtown distributor is to bring the intercity train to within about 10 minutes' walk or
taxicab ride of most parts of the city, including suburban business districts and the downtown area.
Thus, the scale is important. Access time of less than 10 minutes makes a 45-minute taxicab-ride to the
airport plus an hours' waiting in line for check-in much less attractive; had we retained the downtown
Union Station, the congestion in the downtown area would probably make airport and Union Station
access time similar in a taxicab from most suburban locations and city neighbourhoods.
5.2.6 Advantages of the Downtown Loop
The downtown loop also allows the large mega-city to be converted from a stub-end stop to a through-
stop which has certain operational advantages. Decreased platform occupancy times allows more
effective platform capacity utilization in an area where additional platforms may be an expensive
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proposition, in addition to allowing large preparation yards to be moved out-of-town where land (and
possibly labor too) is cheaper. Conceivably the through services, shown in deep blue, will simply travel
once around the loop, adding about 20 minutes to the through journey time (which is a lot better than
the one-hour usually allowed for cross-London transfers), whilst terminating services will go around the
loop before reversing at a siding or simply continue via a wye back towards the origin having completed
loading and unloading at a number of intermediate stops. In the latter case, all train preparation will
occur at the other end of the line, or in a yard situated in a rural area between two mega-cities. This is,
in a way, the merry-go-round concept in coal transportation as applied to passenger service.
Decentralized
Terminals Design
(Service Pattern)
Plate 5.3: Decentralized Terminals Service Design
Aside from the operational and access benefits, the downtown ring has an additional benefit over other
possible layouts to enhance access. Instead of building a number of lines that independently cross the
city center, a ring can effectively channel traffic from any direction through the city without incurring
the expense of connecting all lines to every other line. To be precise, if there are more than two
connectors through the city (i.e. more than a single North-South link and a single East-West link), the
ring can provide an alternative with less mileage and nearly the same through journey time and access
time for those who live in the metropolitan area.
5.3 Results from The City of London Study
To illustrate the concept of better rail access for intercity carriers operating to major metropolises, a
scheme was designed around the City of London to evaluate the potential benefits and feasibility of
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applying such an idea in an actual situation. The access scheme designed involved constructing a
circular heavy-rail alignment which would connect most of the intercity terminals in downtown London.
In this study, the following questions were addressed:
" What are the estimated journey time savings for connecting and terminating passengers?
" Is a double-track ring railroad sufficient to carry all the trains arriving during the off-peak hours?
" Are reasonable turn-around times for intercity trains attainable?
This is purely a hypothetical scheme, intended to demonstrate the concept and illustrate the scale of the
ring in question. Of course, there are many constraints on London's radiating intercity lines which will
prevent interlining between them, at least in the short term. However, as a long term proposition, the
idea has some potential.
A draft diagram showing the proposed route of the scheme, which in fact closely mirrors London
Underground's Circle Line, is shown on Slide 18 of Appendix B. The existing Circle Line alignment is
unsuitable for use by intercity trains due to its restrictive loading gauge and other elements of
infrastructure geography. The costs are thus based on a new-build scenario.
Many assumptions are necessary to complete the preliminary study:
* Thameslink and other cross-town schemes (e.g. LUL Met Line) do not exist.
" Transfer passengers must disembark at downtown London terminals, transfer via the Tube, wait
for the train at the originating terminal for an "average" length of time.
" Average wait time is half the expected headway.
* Expected headway is the number of trains per hour divided by number of branches served by
the downtown terminal. (e.g. London King's Cross serves the Cambridge Flyer (half-hourly),
Peterborough Local (half-hourly), Leeds Intercity East Coast Train (one per hour) and
Newcastle Intercity East Coast Train (one per hour), thus the average headway is six trains an
hour divided by four destinations = every 40 mins).
" Walking times between Tube stations and Train Platform are Railtrack's official figures, to
include waiting time on LUL during daylight operating hours.
" Walking between mainline stations is permitted, and walking times are used where possible.
* Transfer times include the walking time, Tube time, and expected waiting time for the mainline
train.
The most important assumption is that crosstown schemes do not exist, since the crosstown links are in
fact a part of an expensive solution that a ring-railroad would be attempting to avoid. Given that all
lines are interconnected through the city, it makes the case for a ring railroad weaker. In many cities
(such as Chicago, London and Boston), the lines from north side and south side are not in fact fully
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connected. In this study the base case of having none of the lines connected (except by transfer to a
local transit system) is evaluated against building a downtown distributor to connect more stations.
5.3.1 Methods and Resultsfrom Running Time Anaysis
To calculate a set of transfer times across London, it is necessary to calculate the amount of time it will
take for a terminating intercity train (or indeed run-through intercity train) to travel around the inner
ring railroad. In addition, running time analysis allows us to determine whether the amount of vehicle
time spent in sending the train around the ring results in a saving over the turn-around time at a stub-
end terminal. If the time spent around ring were significantly longer than the turn-time at terminals, it
would be hard for intercity operators to justify tying up their productive asset for what is effectively a
service enhancement that may or may not generate significant additional revenues. Also, if the time
spent trundling around the ring is slower than what can be offered by local transportation options, the
exercise becomes pointless since the added convenience of a one-seat ride will be unlikely to offset the
additional time-cost of travel for many travellers. Thus, for the idea of a ring to be viable, we must
fulfill the following market (competitive) and cost (operational) constraints:
* Journey Time faster than local transportation options (which may involve waiting and transfers,
but will almost certainly take a more direct route)
" Running Time around the ring faster than turn-around time achievable at stub-end terminals
* Sufficient capacity on the ring to accommodate trains from most important destinations
To calculate the running times, distance around the ring was measured and an average speed achieved
between any two station-stops was calculated based on a formula which took into account of the
distance between stations. The formula was roughly calibrated to those sectional running times that are
achieved by the London Underground's Circle Line, taking into account the added station stops served
by the LUL trains but also the better acceleration and low-speed characteristics. Station dwell time at
each terminal were assumed to be one minute - the stations would have to be designed as through-
stations with either a center platform or two platforms with center express tracks and outer local
tracks/sidings to minimize station dwell times (See Exhibit 5.4 below).
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Ring Railroad
Turnback Siding
Island Platform Local & Express Tracks
Mainline
Plate 5.4: Station track layouts suitable for downtown ring railroads
The main result in this case study was that it was impossible to stop at all of the BR London terminals
yet maintain a sensible running time around the ring. However, if limited-stop service was introduced,
overall journey time savings are possible and the majority of passengers would still be able to make a
same-platform or cross-platform transfer to a service departing in a different direction, and most parts
of Central London remains directly accessible from the stations at which the intercity trains stop. In
particular, the running-time for an intercity train around the loop was calculated at 51 minutes for the
all-stop scenario, and 30 minutes for the limited-stop scenario (including schedule padding and time
taken for crew changes). The current London intercity operators schedule between 40 and 50 minutes
for servicing at their London terminals, although it can be accomplished in 15 minutes if an incoming
train were to arrive late. The limited-stop schedule would suggest that no extra vehicle costs will be
incurred by any operator if they were to send the trains around the ring; on the other hand, if the
incoming arrival is more than about 20 minutes late, a decision could be made to terminate and turn the
train at the operator's own London terminal in a stub-end platform.
Using the existing Train Service Database information maintained by Railtrack, and running times
around a hypothetical ring, the train services' arrival times at King's Cross station was calculated and
schedules created using King's Cross as a timing point. The result of this analysis demonstrates that at
off-peak times, theoretically, most of the long-distance arrivals at the London terminals could be
handled with a single-track ring-railroad, although obviously with a single-track loop the traffic would
only be able to travel in one direction. If three-minute headways were to be maintained at King's Cross,
minor adjustments of up to 6 minutes is required on some line-haul schedules, but the majority of the
trains would receive a train-path on the ring. Although the practical capacity is likely to be much lower,
the idea of sending most long-distance arrivals around a ring appears plausible in London provided that
a double-track ring is equipped with signalling for about 20 trains per hour, roughly the limit of current
technology.
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5.3.2 Methods and Resultsfrom Transfer Time Model
The transfer time model is fairly straightforward. Basically, the three components of a cross-London
transfer time were added together, using Railtrack recommended values. Some of the values were then
changed to reflect the presence of a ring-railroad. The three components of the transfer time are:
* Walking time to and from the station platform
" Expected waiting time plus running time on the London Underground (the Tube)
" Expected waiting time for the next mainline train to your final destination
The expected transfer times from all nodes to all other nodes (including cross-platform transfers at the
same node) was then calculated in a matrix. The expected transfer times were then averaged across all
possible combination of nodes and this is known as the average cross-town transfer time. Although this
methodology is not totally watertight (for instance, it fails to account for the fact that some transfers are
heavier than others in terms of passengers, thus should be weighted more), it gives a good indication of
how long one may expect to spend on an average cross-town transfer in London. Due to the difficulty
of obtaining detailed transfer details, no modelling was attempted in this area. The resulting access
times between every station pair are presented in Table 5.1, and summarized below:
BEFORE
" Average cross-town transfer time between major downtown terminals = 58 minutes.
" Best average access time* from any one major downtown terminal = 52 minutes
(from King's Cross and St Pancras to all other stations).
AFTER
* Average cross-town transfer time between major downtown terminals = 47 minutes.
* Best average access time* from any one major downtown terminal = 40 minutes
(from King's Cross and St Pancras to all other stations).
* To all other stations, with equal weighting. The time can also be considered indicative of average transit
access times from locations within the North Circular Road beltway - the walk time and wait time at the
mainline station remains constant, while the Tube time and walk time from residential/business location
to nearest transit stop is comparable to the walk time from stations and the Tube time.
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Cross-London Journey Time [6] W 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Station Tube Stop
WWalk [1] 12 12 12 15 17 15 18 15 9 10
I Anglia 12 25 25 25! 28 59 30 37 33 48 40 Liverpool St Uierpool St
2 ECML 12 30 30 30 30 55 32 39 35 52 56 KingsX KGX/St Pancras
3 MML 12 40 A 40 40 65 42 49 45] 62 66 St Pancras KGX/St Pancras
4 WCML 15 28 25 25 25 50 24 31 27 58 56 Euston Euston Square
5 M40 17 74 65 65 65 40 66 761 83 73 76 Marylebone Baker St
6 Great Western 15 30 27 27 24 51 25 29 25 68 65 Paddington Paddington
7South Western/ Ports outh 1 8 37 34 34 31 61 29 25 26 48 60 WaIteroo Waterloo
8 Brighton 15 38 35 35 32 73 30 31 30 64 60 Victoria Victoria
9 Kent Coast 9 56 55 55 66 66 76 56 67 33 60 London Bridge London Bridge
10 Southend (LTS) 10 55 66' 66 71 76 80 75 70 67 40 Fenchurch St Tower Hill
Table 5.1: Cross-London Journey Times between all Mainlines, with hypothetical Ring Railroad
Because some of the minor mainline terminals are not included in the London Inner Ring Railroad
scheme, the passengers arriving at those stations will continue to have to rely on the Tube for cross-
London transfers. Most stations excluded were stations designed to serve only commuters. Because of
this, the actual benefit realized for long-distance intercity travellers would in fact be higher than the
result of 47 minutes would suggest. Although it is disputed as to whether long-range commuters or
long-distance intercity passengers are the more leveraged area of the market, since this study mainly
concerns intercity passengers, the assumption is made here that long-distance passengers generate more
revenue per train for the railroad industry. It would not be difficult to simply substitute the set of
intercity trains which we choose to send the ring with a set of long-range commuter trains, should the
latter turn out to be the case.
For a conservative estimate, we shall consider the transit time from a location inside Central London to
be half of the transit time between stations. We know that the access time to a Central London
business/residential location is between half and one times the transfer time between London
Terminals.
5.3.3 Simple Benefit Anaysis
The simple benefit analysis evaluates the benefits to riders, taking only into account of the time saved
for those who are already travelling by the rail mode. The actual benefits are likely to be higher as
people switch to rail for its increased convenience.
Typical daily weekday flow at King's Cross = about 77,000 pax/day (Calculated using a simple model
based on average load factors on the intercity expresses and their seating capacity). Since King's Cross is
an average station (e.g., Paddington, Euston and Victoria are all busier than King's Cross, while St
82
Pancras, Fenchurch St, and Marylebone are quieter), if we assume the typical weekday flow is an average,
the typical weekday flow through London is thus approximately 930,000 pax/day.
Commuters are likely to be in high-paying jobs, thus average value of time is assumed to be L1O per
hour ($15 per hour). Calculating the average value of time spent in access after an outer-suburban
commuter rail or intercity rail ride, using the following passenger mix:
0 25% Cross-London Transfer pax (including Commuter Rail Transfers)
* 55% Downtown London Terminating pax
* 20% Non-CBD Terminating pax (requiring a Tube ride)
Sum saved per weekday (in terms of access time) = $1.34 million per weekday (or $350m per year). This
is sufficient to support a project costing about $3.5 billion over 15 years. Some of the detailed analyses
supporting these claims are shown in Slide 18 in Appendix B.
We are not trying to build a business case for the Inner London Ring Railroad. There are many external
benefits which are not explicitly accounted for in this model, e.g. greater mode-share due to better
accessibility, and possibility of deferring capacity enhancements on the London Underground. A closer
examination of the costs and the local conditions would be needed before any firm conclusions could be
drawn for London. The ring railroad is likely to more generally remain a viable option as a way to
reduce access time and through journey time for any city with more than about two million population.
5.4 Application of Performance-Based Technology Scanning
How could the Performance-Based Technology Scanning (PBTS) framework be applied to designing a
distribution for the core downtown? The two critical ideas in the PBTS framework are: (1) Different
types of technological improvements or infrastructure investments may result in very different changes
in journey experience; these changes could be evaluated with suitable assumptions regarding values-of-
time; (2) Investment should be targeted in areas where the maximum return could be obtained for a
given investment. Because of the complex nature of transportation systems, it is likely that the most
effective investment would comprise of a package of moderate improvements rather than maximization
of a single variable such as speed or accessibility.
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Some emerging technologies will affect the cost-base of providing the service directly, while others will
affect the revenue potential directly. Some technologies will enable service designs that were previously
uneconomic to be operated -- this is a very subtle effect, which could be termed the second order
impact of technologies. In this section, we design a downtown distribution system to increase revenue,
which may or may not be profitable. Then we ask the question: are emerging technologies able to
reduce the costs to the extent that this design becomes economic? Various answers are possible.
Perhaps no new technologies are necessary, or perhaps the technological advancements required are
beyond even the most optimistic current projections.
In the remainder of this chapter, a conceptual model is presented to support what was demonstrated
through examples and case studies in the earlier work.
5.4.1 Assumptions of The Model
In developing the model, a number of simplifying assumptions were made. The simplifying
assumptions were necessary for two reasons: (1) to keep the model tractable and implementable without
specialized programming tools; (2) to retain some generality in the model, such that the results will be
applicable to a wide range of metropolitan with roughly similar structures. With the necessary resources,
it is possible to extend the model to cover a wider range of modes, better spatial resolution, and more
detailed consideration of any or all aspects of the many variables.
There are three modes available for intercity travel: Rail, Air, and Auto. Other possible modes for an
extended version of the model are: Rental Car, Intercity Bus, Air via Hub, and Auto via State Highways.
There are two modes available for access to terminals: Auto and Transit. Other possible modes might
be: Walk, Bicycle, Taxi, Express Bus.
5.4.2 Structure of The Model
The metropolitan area is divided into a number of quadrants of equal sizes (25, in the case of the
experimental model), and the central business district is located in the middle quadrant. The terminal
locations for each of the modes are then identified. In the case of air, the airport may be within a
quadrant far from central city; in the case of rail, the union station may be in the quadrant containing the
central business district. In an intercity rail system with a downtown distributor (MetroFlyer style, see
Appendix B), three stations may be located in different quadrants of the metropolitan area. For each
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intercity mode, the locations of terminals are entered into a two-dimensional array (5*5, in the present
set up), and the terminals are given an unique identifying number. Quadrants without terminals are
assigned a value of NULL. For the auto mode, each quadrant is a terminal.
Terminal Locations (Rail) 'Terminal Locations (Air) Terminal Locations (Auto)
2 3 4 5
6 7 8i 9 10
2 12 13 l4 15
3 W6 18, 9 2
121' 22t 23' 24 25
Plate 5.5: Model Spreadsheet, Part 1
Using a simple algorithm, the nearest node to every quadrant in the metropolitan area was then
determined, storing the results in a separate array. Using a shortest path algorithm based on distance,
the shortest paths between each quadrant and the nearest node is calculated. The result is stored in a
linked-list using an array of pointers. This array of pointers would later be used to calculate the access
time.
Congestion Factors
In most metropolitan areas, significant auto congestion occurs in the downtown at most times during
the period when intercity travel is most likely to take place. Even if actual congestion does not occur
(i.e. when vehicle density exceeds critical density), it is likely that in the downtown area, private autos will
achieve a lower average speed than in the suburban areas, due to a mixture of factors such as higher
density of traffic lights, lower lane widths, speed limits, and higher probability of pedestrian interference.
To accurately assess the access time, these factors need to be taken into account. If the degree of
congestion (between zero and one) was assumed to be inversely proportional to the distance from the
city centre, the following array of congestion factors are obtained:
Conge tion Factors (0 freefIow)
0.25 0.25, 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 M05 S O.e 0,25
0.25 O.5 \ 0.51 0.25,
0.25 0 . 0.3 'O., 4.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2"0251
Plate 5.6: Model Spreadsheet, Part 2
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If the freeflow speed of private autos on arterials were assumed to be 40mph, and the quadrants were
assumed to be four miles in length (giving a total metropolitan area of about 20 miles in diameter), the
access times from each quadrant to the nearest node using the shortest path is calculated for each mode.
Perhaps of crucial importance at this point is the need to stress the obvious fact that the access times are
not directly comparable for the different modes from the same origin, since the location of the terminals
may be different. The result from this part of the model is a set of arrays, one for each mode,
containing the access times from each quadrant to the nearest terminal, using the private auto as an
access mode.
For transits, the freeflow speed is similarly assumed to be 25mph (clearly achievable with high-quality
heavy-rail transit or high-quality bus service on uncongested highways). For simplicity, a generic transit
network of two core rail trunk lines radiating from the city centre in an X-shape was assumed, with bus
feeders serving all other quadrants. The number of transfers required to reach the central rail station
and the airport was then manually calculated, based on the assumed transit network. The results are
stored in an array. Again for simplicity, it was assumed that in a multi-station configuration, all travellers
using transit will depart using the central rail station and the main airport. This assumption is reasonable
since the majority of American cities have hub-and-spoke type transit systems which will usually result in
minimum access time if travellers departed via a city centre location. Using the freeflow speeds,
distances, number of transfers required, and an assumed delay per transfer (12 minutes), the access time
to the intercity terminal was calculated for each mode from each quadrant. Some example results are
shown:
Transfers Required (Transit to Air) Acces5 Time (Transit to Air, hrs)
I 2 2' 1 0 1.04' 0.88 0.52 0.16
2 F 1 1 1.2 0.84 0.68, 0.32 0.52
2 0 2 .2 0.84 0.48 0.68 0.88
2 0 2 1.2 0.64 0.84 0.84 1.04
0 2 2 21 1 0.8 1.2: 1.2 1.2 I
Plate 5.7: Model Spreadsheet, Part 3
Note that transit access time along the Northeast-Southwest diagonal is particularly good, consistent
with the assumption of the X-shaped trunk rail network, and an airport located at the extreme Northeast
corner of the metropolitan area. Although these results are clearly for an arbitrary city, because the
model captures in an impressionist fashion all the common features of a metropolitan area that are likely
to drive mode choice, the results that are obtained may be generally applicable.
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Assessing Transit Access Time
Using the access time matrix, it is possible to calculate the transit mode share for each cell. It is clear
that the transit mode share would be different for each cell, and for each line haul mode. Since cell (1,1)
lies on the subway line that serves the downtown union station, transit mode share for rail passengers
from that cell would be particularly good; however, to reach the airport from the same cell, the
passengers must transfer at a centre-city transfer point, resulting in lower transit mode share relative to
the private auto.
The data in the analysis captures the key features of some typical transit network designs: the airport is
served by one diagonal subway line, while the railroad union station (and satellite stations, if any), are
served by a different diagonal subway line, and in most part of the city the population must reach both
the airport and the union station by making one or more transfers, either subway-to-subway, or bus-to-
subway. The features described applies in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington (although
modal transfer specifics might be different, e.g. Philadelphia airport is reached only by regional rail
service). These assumptions are not intended to be accurate depictions of any city in particular or of any
transit system designs. Of course, with a specific city in mind, much more detailed models could be
developed; however, it is hard to imagine a transit system where significantly more people (cells) would
have a one-seat ride to the union station. Sensitivity analyses could show to what extent the transit
mode-share changes with number of transfers. In calibrating this model, the average transit mode share
across the metropolitan area for trips to the airport was assumed to be around 15% -- not unrealistic for
transit-oriented cities with heavy-duty transit infrastructure and good intermodal connexions (Horowitz,
2003).
Line-haul Mode Share
Having obtained the access modal split matrix, it is then possible to calculate the line-haul mode split
between the three modes under discussion. However, this has to be done for each cell, since each cell
has a different access time, thus a different total trip-time, thus a different mode share. The critical
concept here is that the accessibility of the line-haul terminal (be that the airport, or the rail station),
affects the total intermodal journey time and thus the line-haul mode share. This reflects the argument
that high-speed rail advocates have often used to promote high-speed rail -- that it brings you right to
the heart of the downtown. By calculating the mode share for each cell, and integrating the demand
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density across the metropolitan area, it is possible to quantify the extent to which this downtown
advantage plays a role in attracting traffic, and how much traffic is actually coming from the suburbs.
The most recent numbers in intercity travel surveys show a vast majority of the traffic (more than 90%
in most markets) is captured by the highway mode (American Travel Survey, 1995). Thus, potentially,
enhancing the access for collective carriers could apply both to the airlines and intercity rail. Indeed,
airport access has already been identified as an issue constraining the growth of domestic aviation,
although it is not clear that the airport access research has focused on reducing the access time to airport
as an airline growth strategy (see Chapter 3), instead it has focused on moving as many people to the
airport by mass-transit as possible. The argument that aviation technology is inherently constrained by
the long access time, due to its massive land requirements, is not often heard, but is potentially
important to the passenger rail industry.
Rail Mode shares, by cell lAir Mode shares, by cell Auto Mode shares, by cell
0.37 0.35 0.34 0.31 029 0.4 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.2
0.37 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.391 0.4: 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21
0.38 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.38, 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.22
0.37 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.39, 0.41 0.41 0.4 0.42 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22
0.35 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.4 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23
Plate 5.8: Model Spreadsheet, Part 4
While calibrating this model, it was discovered that there is an unexplained tendency for the current
population to congregate towards the private auto. A likely explanation for this is that auto dominates
for more than one person trips, and the majority of intercity travellers travel in parties of two or more.
Although a collective transportation market share of up to 25% is possible in cities with good transit
infrastructure such as New York City, the majority of intercity trips are still made by the private auto.
The auto mode shares predicted by this model seem unrealistically low. There are a number of reasons
for this. The model in question only considered utility of time, and did not consider two important
mode-choice drivers: the actual costs of making the trip, and the perceived out-of-pocket costs of
making the trip.
The distinction between actual costs and perceived costs are important: most consumers, when choosing
the private auto, consider only out-of-pocket gasoline and toll costs; the ownership costs, maintenance
costs, insurance costs, infrastructure costs and other costs not directly associated with the trip are
attributed as 'cost of living' and thus sunk costs. When choosing a collective mode, these 'hidden' costs
are charged up front by the carrier. Thus, the auto trip appear so generally attractive that in many cases
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consumers do not even consider other modes as a viable option. The other issue is that the consumers
are making a constrained optimization decision given that the sunk costs associated with the auto (often
in the form of a car loan and pre-paid insurance) is a commitment they cannot retract from. This
explains the popularity of the auto in intercity markets even though rationally it seems to be a terrible
choice for one individual.
5.4.3 Results and Sensitiviy Analyses
The model initially predicted a 35% mode share based on the input assumptions that were made, with
three stations distributed in a linear fashion within the metropolitan area. By removing two of the
stations and leaving the downtown union station, the model suggested that the rail market share will fall
to 33%. Significantly, with the single station, it was necessary to upgrade the average line-haul speed
from 90mph to 100mph to bring the market share back to 35%, recovering the market share 'lost' when
the number of stations were reduced.
The result may seem somewhat obvious, and could have been found simply by trading off average
access time and line-haul time. However, many in the transportation professional community still focus
on speed more than access or total travel time.
There are a number of problems with this model that preclude useful sensitivity analyses. When testing
sensitivity to distance, the model gave the result expected: that better access for shorter corridors created
more impact than better access for longer corridors, since the high line-haul speeds of the air service
became relatively more important as the length of the corridor increased.
5.4.4 Discussion
The small changes observed in this model could easily be dismissed as noise. However, these are
important noise. This model suggests that simply by opening two new access nodes, along the
alignment of an existing right-of-way, could have as much impact as upgrading the entire 250-mile line
to achieve an increase in average speed of 10mph. The 2 % (or less) market share changes are not
significant, against the backdrop of 80% or more of intercity trips completed by private auto.
The important question here is, where else in the transportation network, could you add two nodes, to
achieve such dramatic impact? This is an operating environment in which hundreds of million of
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taxpayer dollars could be justified to re-open a commuter rail line which will carry a measly 12,000 trips
per day - something like a 0.24% market share increase in daily commuting trips.
As will be examined in the next section, these extra nodes (and perhaps new urban rights-of-way) could
bring important benefits for the city, if the right-of-way could be shared between urban and intercity
transportation.
5.5 Analysis of Alternate Technologies
The application of Performance-Based Technology Scanning (PBTS) in this case, would pit a number of
alternatives against one another. The utility resulting from shorter access time and minimization of
transfers would be traded off against incremental speed improvements, amenities enhancements, and
deployment of new e-commerce technologies. The methodology used is one of systems analysis: instead
of focusing too closely on a specific geographic situation, with its specific nuances, the situation is
simplified to give a general idea as to which areas are the most promising. Having identified the likely
mix of technologies required, detailed engineering analyses for a specific corridor could then be carried
out to robustly demonstrate a business case for a specific enhancement package.
Base Assumptions
The base case is a 200-mile corridor connecting major population centers, with three intermediate stops
and competitive highway and air access between the metropolises. The current air service provides an
in-vehicle time of 75 minutes, plus access time from out-of-town locations and extra terminal time for
security clearance. The current highway access is provided by high-capacity urban expressways through
the middle of all population centers en route, and the current rail access is provided by a traditional-style
rail service that provides a service at an average speed of 75mph, stopping at all downtown areas. Not
surprisingly, the rail carrier is finding it difficult to attract any customers. The government has mandated
$2 billion to be spent on rail infrastructure in this corridor, to bring it up to standard. The question is,
how should we spend the funds?
The High Speed Rail Proposal
The high speed rail advocates have tabled a proposal which would spend the $2 billion exclusively on
right-of-way enhancements to bring the maximum track speed up to 150mph, a modern standard.
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Engineering analyses has shown that in this particular corridor, an average speed of 110mph is
sustainable if all intermediate stops were removed, and $2 billion were spent on right-of-way
improvements in the most cost-effective manner, including the use of tilting vehicles.
The e-train Proposal
The electronic commerce advocates and the business community have advocated a proposal which
would install high-speed wireless internet service points along the right of way which would turn the
train into a mobile office. Computer power-supply points would be provided in the train, and the trains
would be refitted to provide space for working, including a limited number of public terminals which
could be used by patrons without laptop computers. The wireless service points will also ensure high-
quality, low-price cell phone calls, for those equipped with the suitable cell phone plans. Together, this
package of improvements will cost $2 billion in new vehicles, telecommunications infrastructure, and
other equipment. The wireless service will also create positive externalities (worth $30m annually) by
providing cheaper wireless communication for the residents adjacent to the rights-of-way.
The Hotel Train Proposal
The vacation travellers have suggested that the $2 billion could go towards subsidizing luxury cruise
trains between the two metropolises to bring luxury rail fares in line with current airline levels. $500
million of the funds would be spent on station improvements at either end, to institute such features as
walkways to the downtown tourist centers and resorts, as well as setting up concessions in and around
the stations to create a transit-center mall; another $500 million could be spent on new luxury railcars;
while the $1 billion remaining would be invested, and its proceeds used as a fare-stabilization fund that
will keep the fares at affordable levels.
The Downtown Proposal
The neighbourhood groups from one city has presented a plan for expending the $2 billion on a new rail
alignment downtown which would move the rail alignment into a more affluent part of the city. $1
billion of the funds would be expended in creating two new Park & Ride stops and other urban
neighbourhood stops that did not previously exist, while the remaining $1 billion would be expended in
constructing a tunnel to by-pass a congested freight rail yard in the city, resulting in a 5-minute journey
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time saving. The new by-pass will also serve as a subway alignment that creates positive externalities
(worth $60m annually) by providing transit in an area that did not previously have heavy-rail transit.
Benefit Analyses
Given the fixed-cost nature of this analysis, it is possible to simply consider the benefits in each of the
proposals, and presumably the scheme with the most benefits is the best scheme. This does not
necessarily mean that scheme should be chosen - whether the scheme is viable would depend on such
matters as the opportunity cost of funds, which are outside the scope of this analysis. The application of
the PBTS framework is intended to demonstrate that such completely different benefits and proposals
could be evaluated with a utility analyses framework.
Distance
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Access Time (at)/hrs
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Externalities/m
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Plate 5.9: Model 2 Spreadsheet 1
Using this very simple framework, coupled with an equally simple set of assumptions, the downtown
access package was found to be the most beneficial. Interestingly, the high speed rail option was found
to benefit the riders the most, while the downtown access and e-train proposals have significantly
positive externalities.
Other Possible Analytic Improvements
The analysis performed here is simply an example, and contains many assumptions which may or may
not be justified. It is very simplistic, but it serves to illustrate the gamut of issues that a project evaluator
or public funding body must consider when contemplating investment. A private company would
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obviously only be interested in benefits they are able to capture; in the case of high speed rail, if rail is a
price-taker in the market, perhaps none of the journey time advantages would actually be captured in the
revenue stream. On the other hand, in the e-train exampline, it may be possible to capture these non-
transportation benefits by offering the wireless telecommunication services to the abutters, at a fee.
To form a defensible analysis of technologies, each of the values of benefits must be substantiated either
through a revenue model, or other methods of evaluating consumer surplus. As detailed in another
paper, Lu & Martland (2003) investigated the cost-effectiveness of a number of high-speed rail
technology options: (a) dedicated right-of-way high speed rail; (b) magnetically levitated ground
transportation; (c) a number of incremental retro-fit methods, including an adaptation of maglev
technologies to conventional rail lines. The study found that, on the basis of infrastructure investment
cost per minute saved over typical terrain in the United States, conventional route improvements (such
as minor realignments of existing rail rights of way) were about equally cost effective as the incremental
maglev method, where guidance magnets are retro-fitted to existing infrastructure to enable curving at
higher speeds. The benefit of incremental maglev over conventional route improvement is that it is able
to achieve much more journey time reduction than small-scale realignment. Both of the approaches
frequently advocated by high-speed rail lobby groups, new conventional HSR link, and new maglev link,
was less than half as cost effective, even though a new maglev link could potentially achieve many more
minute savings. There is thus a diminishing return effect with respect to time saved. Those who are
interested are encouraged to read that paper.
Geographically-based analyses, which can be carried out by dividing metropolitan areas up into cells and
calculating journey time from each cell to the nearest access point, will give us a much better idea as to
how much access time can be feasibly saved. Multimodal mode-spilt analysis will tell us how much the
access is likely to affect existing highway and airline patrons. The positive externalities could be subject
to a much more rigourous analyses than is presented here. The utility of time and of time-saved could
be disaggregated into different market segments and other such detail. For instance, in Slide 5.4, we
demonstrated that an average time saving of 20 minutes per passenger trip was possible if London rail
terminals were directly connected with each other.
Computer simulations could be used to calculate the loci of influence of introducing a new rail terminal,
as detailed in Slide 12 in Appendix B. The mode-shares were predicted using a simple nested logit
model, involving two choice phases: the mode-choice for the access mode, that subsequently affects the
mode-choice of the line-haul mode by altering the total trip time that includes the access time. By virtue
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of the short total trip time, airlines can dominate an entire metropolitan area from one single airport,
unless rail access in a locality is extremely good. This suggests that introducing extra stations in the
metropolitan area will have a very positive benefit for the rail carrier.
The Track Capacity Studies, shown in Slides 9 and 25 in Appendix B, used an operations-planning
simulation model implemented in Excel to calculate the likely positive externalities by introducing an
intercity rail tunnel through the downtown and some city neighbourhoods. The operations planning
simulation showed that track sharing is indeed feasible given operating discipline, while the ridership
model showed that, especially on low-volume intercity corridors, the most significant benefit of an
intercity tunnel is through carrying the city population while the tunnel isn't being used by an intercity
train. The high-speed rail option in the present analyses assumed fairly high ridership volumes of 4
million annually; if that number were lower, the external benefit of the downtown upgrade begins to
look much more significant against the rider benefits of having a faster train.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have demonstrated an important methodology with which high-speed rail schemes
should be evaluated. Firstly, the issue of access to high speed rail services has to be taken seriously, if
high-speed rail advocates wishes to be considered as a viable voice in promoting mass intercity
transportation. Secondly, to demonstrate that a high speed is really necessary, the speed enhancement
must be explicitly traded off against other possible enhancements in a utility framework.
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Chapter 6
High Speed Rail Route Planning
for Overnight Services
This chapter reviews a Swedish study on overnight train service (Troche, 1999), and our own study of
overnight train service, carried out independently in 2002. Our study is roughly based on the
Performance-Based Technology Scanning framework, while the Swedish study came from a carrier
operations planning perspective. The central thesis is that, given the general principles of: (1) shared
traffic rights-of-way, (2) market-oriented service planning, (3) no 'subsidized' competition, in certain
markets overnight rail service can actually be a lucrative proposition. Corridor proponents often
incorrectly see overnight service as 'the enemy'; whereas the two services actually complement each
other, and both have their own strengths and problems.
The main problem with corridor service is the service frequency that is needed to compete with other
transportation options such as the private auto, highway, air, or even buses, which carry much smaller
number of passengers per vehicle-formation. In very high density corridors, high-speed, high-
frequency, short-distance service has carved out a niche; however, to support that type of service, great
demand density is required. In longer and lighter density corridors, rail service should exploit a different
niche -- a service that operates a few times daily overnight, offering a comfortable journey and the
opportunity to wake up at the destination with a full business day ahead. While overnight services have
higher vehicle and infrastructure costs, they requires much lower frequency and are likely to carry far
higher load factors due to temporal-consolidation. Operationally speaking, it is somewhat more
cumbersome and must be managed in a different way - however, efficiently run, the economics should
work in at least a number of corridors.
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6.1 Review and Discussion of the Swedish Findings
Gerhard Troche has done the intercity rail community a service by issuing his working paper on
overnight services. He addresses issues that are poorly understood by those who have little experience
with night-train traffic -- which is a strange combination that falls somewhere between the expertise of
the freight transportation, regional rail, and hotel management communities. The overnight service is
like a freight train because it is a 24-hour operation and typically uses loose cars; it is like a regional rail
because it transports people and is important for it to arrive on time; it is like a hotel because amenities
and service are a very important part of the package. Thus, the issues are: (1) railcar interior design; (2)
trunk service design; (3) connection with day trains. These may sound like familiar issues, but they
require a different kind of thinking than those in the parts of the transportation industry who are seeking
to minimize journey times are used to. Unfortunately, with the demise of overnight ferry services in
Europe, and the demise of the streamliners and much of the rail cruise industry in North America, much
of this expertise has been lost.
Plate 6.1: Overnight Services do not have to rely on fully depreciated assets
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Economic Issues
Troche paints a very negative but realistic picture of night-train economics. Intercity buses, airlines, and
the private auto have all become much more formidable competitor since even the 1980s. An issue
unique to Europe is the added complication of the need for cross-border cooperation. Due to the
generally increasing speeds of rail services, overnight trains are travelling over increasingly long distances
and thus have a higher probability of crossing national boundaries. Troche asserts that even though the
day-train market had been growing and night-train market shrinking, this is because there had been
major investment in day-trains but no comprehensive effort to coordinate night-train traffic. Despite
the increasing prominence of the day train, the night-train is not 'just a niche market' -- it is an important
area of the passenger rail core business, especially if the full network benefits of multi-national high-
speed networks are to be realized.
Troche asserts the night train suffers from high costs and poor utilization. A simple analysis of
available-seat/bed-miles (ASM) per vehicle shows the regional day train to be four times as productive
as the night train, and the high-speed train to be six times as productive. In addition, there are
additional crew costs associated with the night train. These are accurate characterizations, except that in
regions of low day-train demand, analysis of revenue-passenger-miles (RPM) will tell a different story.
Using Boeing's Decision Window Model, the following temporal-demand prediction for an eight-hour
trip is obtained:
Allocated Time of Day Demand (8.000 Hour Delta-T)
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Plate 6.2 Allocated Time of Day Demand (8.000 Hour Delta-T)
This demand curve suggests that for an eight-hour trip, the majority of the people would prefer to
depart some time between 7am and 1pm, arriving between 3pm and 9pm, although there is a sizable
minority who would choose to catch the 'red-eye' and arrive the next morning. A few caveats are
important here: (1) this demand curve assumes airline passengers, who had no other ways of getting
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there; (2) this demand curve assumes the effect of journey time is unimportant: the time-of-day demand
being driven entirely from the path with the shortest journey time, thus demand allocation sensitive to
both journey time and departure time is not possible to capture with this model.
Using Boeing's model, six paths were created: one was the overnight train, leaving at 10pm and arriving
at 6am with AEM-type equipment. The remainder are bihourly express trains (that also take eight
hours), using Acela-type equipment. This timetable is typical of Northeast Corridor services between
Boston, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C. The model shows that that the night-train captures
16 .4 % of the traffic with 16.7% of the resources (one out of six trainsets). Interestingly, the Morning
Congressional leaving at 6am to arrive at 2pm actually only captures 8.7% of the traffic!
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Plate 6.3 Decision Window Path Preference Model (Time Model)
This is obviously an overly simplistic assessment of the situation. However, it is clear from this example
that corridor daytime trains can be resource heavy because of the requirement for frequent service. If
service went from bihourly to hourly, the night-train turns out to be the most effective at capturing
passengers (14 .20/), using 10% of the resources (one trainset out of ten) -- more than the maximum of
13.4% captured by the 9am departure and 13.2% captured by the 10am departure.
The other issue not considered here is the effect of airline competition. As previously mentioned, the
demand curve is for all passengers. In corridors where airlines are operating, the temporal-demands are
actually split by the carriers based on both journey time and time of arrival and departure. The demand
curve are likely to be driven at least partially by the equivalent 2-hour journey available via air. The
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shape of the curve is likely to depend on complex factors such as purpose of the trip, and itinerary
planning. Day-trippers who can do so are likely to fly both ways; day-trippers or vacation-makers
preferring no loss of sleep are likely to travel one-way by overnight train and fly the other way. The
temporal-demand is at least partially driven by the choice of mode. Given an institutional framework
that allows free-choice between overnight train and flights, with no financial penalties and any
combination of air and overnight train, many more people may choose to take the one-way overnight
train.
The problem for overnight trains with the current set up is that travellers often are constrained to
choosing either a round-trip airfare or a round-trip train fare. The key innovation here is for the
computer reservation systems (CRS) algorithms to smarten-up when planning itineraries: when pricing a
round-trip between night-train served cities, rail-air combination ought to show up alongside day-trip
flight combinations. Willingness-to-pay pricing could then be applied at this point, extracting the same
consumer surplus, whatever combination of modes the passenger happen to choose.
None of this work is intended to discredit the current Amtrak timetable. The reason for the 6am Acela
Express departure from Boston is related to day-tripping New York passengers, not those wishing to
arrive in Washington between 1pm and 2pm. In any case, the Boston to New York passengers give rise
to a much higher yield than the longer-distance passengers. The additional complication with high-
speed trains is that, unlike airlines, trains stop en-route thus a train-path is not necessarily the same as a
passenger-path.
The day-train appears much more lucrative and productive as the schedule is designed for the day train
vehicle to criss-cross between regions of very high demand density, compared to the market that night-
trains operate in. If the day-train vehicles were used to offer locals along the route of the night-train, it
is likely that the night-train is likely to achieve much higher productivity and load factor. The core issue
here is that the 600-mile market has always been a much less lucrative market for rail -- and the key is to
time night-trains such that arrivals can also serve peak daytime demand as the trains travel into town
early in the morning. The creative tweaking approach is needed in such markets; abandoning such a
market may be a management response to focusing on the most leveraged market segment.
There is a research need for an integrated intercity demand model which is sensitive to mode-
preferences as well as schedule-preferences. It is conceivable that with shared right-of-way with other
corridor trains and freight trains, the overall system costs could be reduced by carrying some of the
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current airline passengers who are flying in the morning peak in overnight trains instead, at the same
time improving the passenger utility by allowing passengers to avoid waking up early for a flight. Part of
the problem is that airlines and railroads have never cooperated to this extent, and airlines often don't
understand that the highest fixed costs are incurred during the peak hour. The integrated system may
well become impossible to manage due to its complex nature involving many modes, but the idea
represent an as-yet untrialled transportation system configuration.
Further Investigation of Time-of-Day Demand Curves
Using Boeing's Decision Window Model, an attempt was made to assess the amount of traffic that
could be captured with an overnight train that is equivalent to a two-hour flight either in the morning or
in the late evening. Using airline demand data for two-hour air journeys, it was found that 79 % of
demand occurs between arrival times of 11am and 10pm, a time-period when overnight trains are not
competitive. The demand curve showed three peaks: a morning peak, presumably from business
travellers travelling to a mid-morning meeting; a midday peak, presumably predominantly from vacation
travellers, and an evening peak, presumably from business travellers heading homewards after work or
meeting.
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Plate 6.4 Allocated Time of Day Demand (2.000 Hour Delta-T)
It is not clear to what extent this demand curve, which is based entirely on airline passenger surveys,
would be affected by the availability of overnight services. Using a simple model developed in Excel, a
hybrid demand curve was created from the temporal-demand prediction for an eight-hour trip, and that
from a two-hour trip, based on considerations of overnight services competitiveness for demands that
occur within a specific departure time window. Based on this line of reasoning, the overnight services
competitiveness depends on one key variable: to what extent overnight services are able to capture the
airline demands that occur during the periods when airline services and overnight services are reasonably
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substitutable? Consequently, this key variable also affects to what extent the demand curve would be
affected by the overnight services: if overnight services can capture most of the traffic, then the demand
curve would have a much more substantial late-evening peak centered around 10pm; if overnight
services captures very little traffic, the demand curve would be very similar to the one shown above for a
two-hour trip. Hereafter, this variable would be referred to as the overnight services base potential
(ONSBP). Using ONSBP of 50%, the following time-of-day demand curve was obtained:
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Plate 6.5 Combined TOD Demand, OSNBP = 50%
From this graph, it is fairly clear that overnight services would not have a major impact on the time-of-
day demand curve -- since ONSBP of 50% is perhaps unrealistically high, at least for a market that isn't
particularly mature. Based on the British Rail experience, where in corridors such as Glasgow-London,
overnight services captured something like a 6% market share of daytime trains (where daytime trains
achieved a roughly 50% market share of total traffic), ONSBP really should be something more like 3%!
However, these numbers can be misleading, since overnight services in the Glasgow-London corridor is
not well-developed and certainly British Rail's continual active effort to kill it between 1980 and 1994
has contributed to the low market share. As Troche notes in his report, overnight services have never
particularly suffered from the lack of demand -- it's the high operating costs that is the problem! As
previously discussed, the apparently high operating costs may have resulted from corridors that are not
long enough to justify overnight services.
Thus, in a corridor where overnight services can potentially be justified (a market like New York to
Chicago), we can perhaps expect overnight services to capture about 20% of market share available
during the target periods. Sensitivity analyses gave the following results:
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Plate 6.6 Sensitivity Analyses, OSNBP v.s. Rail Market Share
From this study, it is evident that the breakeven point for a large market requires an ONSBP of about
20% -- not unachievable, but not easy. For instance, in Italy, where the overnight services network is
very developed, 43% of all travel takes place during the night (Troche, 1999). The initial study (Lu &
Martland, 2001) overestimates the potential demand in overnight capacity, as it did not consider the
effect of portions of trips that occur during the time window when overnight services are competitive.
The current study suggests that daily passengers volumes of at least 4,000 and an OSNBP of 20% is
required for operation.
However, this is not to suggest that overnight services are not an important product. With ONSBP of
20%, the largest markets could support at least one train daily; smaller markets could be consolidated,
since overnight train is able to "pick up" in many cities before embarking on the long overnight journey,
a point discussed in more detail in the Swedish report.
Given the above quantitative analysis, it appears that the many advantages of overnight train are
overshadowed by the fact that air travel is a lot faster, and could take place during the day without too
much intrusion into the traveller's schedule in the 800~1,200 mile market. Where overnight services are
available, and effectively marketed in conjunction with air service, overnight services may offer an
attractive alternative to travellers wishing to make their journey time "disappear" while they sleep. How
the market will respond to this kind of trip-based multi-modal marketing is anybody's guess, as airlines
around the world have never marketed overnight rail services as an alternative to early morning or late
evening flights in an integrated sort of way.
6.2 Review and Discussion of the Initial Study
The initial study (Lu & Martland, 2001) was primarily based on the author's experience while working
with a train operating company responsible for operating the Anglo-Scottish Sleeper service in Britain.
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Previously under British Rail, Britain boasted one of the most extensive overnight train services
anywhere in the world, with services resembling a totally-connected network between most important
origins and destinations. During the sectorization in the late 1980s, overnight services were singled out
as a business sector that generated heavy losses. As train speeds increase on day time trains, journey
time between most major population centers broke the four-hour psychological barrier, resulting in
heavy cut-back of overnight services. As of 2000, only Anglo-Scottish overnight services remained, and
overnight service to the north of Scotland was continually under threat.
The initial study examined ways in which the overnight service concept could be made profitable in
North America, where urban centers are much further apart compared to those in Britain, and high-
speed daytime train infrastructure much more lacking. As part of the study, many of the issues
surrounding the overnight rail service design and infrastructure cost sharing with proposed high-speed
daytime corridors were explored. In this section, the results of the initial study are compared and
contrasted with those from the earlier Swedish study, which is predominantly aimed towards connection
from Scandinavia to continental Europe. Potentially, the same findings could apply to connections from
Britain to continental Europe, as the Scandinavian peninsula bores much resemblance to the British
Isles in terms of their relative location from the major European population centers.
In the initial study, the Capitol Flyer scheme is suggested as a strategic solution to North America's
high-speed rail problems. Local high-speed corridors could be planned in such a way as to
accommodate long-distance overnight services, which provide an alternative to airlines both as
redundancy and to provide travel options. In developing the initial study, focus of attention is devoted
to capital costs as rebuilding the passenger rail infrastructure at vast capital expense would be necessary
before either high-speed corridor or overnight rail would become competitive.
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Plate 6.7 The Capitol Flyer - Legacy of the B&O
(and successful overnight high speed rail proposal - by joining existing corridors)
Market Segmentation
The Swedish makes a very important observation: that night-trains must be rolling hotels and youth
hostels at the same time (Troche, 1999). In the airline industry, market-segmentation has been achieved
through restrictions on ticket flexibility -- with the results that airlines were able to build a network that
served both business and leisure passengers. The airline model works, as long as there are no low-price
entrants. The low-price entrant builds a smaller network serving only the most profitable flows,
resulting in the loss of cross-subsidy between routes and service levels. In the overnight rail market,
market segmentation through ticket restrictions can be difficult to achieve since the traffic volumes are
low, and the advantage of the overnight service (i.e. avoidance of an early morning or late evening flight)
is insufficient to extract high willingness-to-pay from high-margin market segments.
The strategy suggested earlier of introducing multimodal, trip-based pricing may solve some of these
problems. With control over both the rail and airline links, the carrier is able to price in a way which
extracts most of the consumer surplus; in essence, the overnight rail will no longer compete directly with
the early morning flight, but instead the price is simply based on competitiveness of other airlines, the
overnight bus, and the private auto. Given the consumer's typical utility function, it is likely that
overnight rail would be used to an extent much greater than the status quo if the competing airline trips
were priced differently.
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As it stands, it is not clear that either airline, rail, or highway costs reflect a fully-allocated costs of
providing transportation; both air and highway modes have Federal capital subsidy, and increasingly rail
carriers are accepting infrastructure subsidies from the Federal government. Permitting joint-pricing (or
collusion) between air and rail carriers may actually induce more rational choices on the part of the
consumer as to how they plan their trip. As demonstrated in the last section and concluded in the
Swedish study, the lack of demand is not much of a problem in the overnight market; while the
overnight rail costs are more than an early morning flight for the same travel distance, it also generates
much more utility. If distorted market conditions in the short-run did not exist in the airline industry
(i.e. infrastructure subsidies, sunk cost in expensive fleet), and costs were fully allocated, overnight rail
could fit better with many consumers' travel schedules and plans.
In short, subsidy of air and highway travel has led to over-consumption of these modes that cannot be
rectified in the short term due to the problems of long-lasting assets. As a result, from a strictly utility
point of view, consumers are consuming less overnight rail travel (and more airline travel) than is
optimal. Thus, market segmentation, airline-style, is not possible, as overnight rail has no pricing power.
Service Planning Issues
The Swedish study distinguished between three types of night-train markets: (1) evening departure,
morning arrival; (2) departure after work, morning arrival; (3) departure after work, late morning arrival.
Each type of night train service also served markets of a particular distance (although the distance
should be regarded as an upper bound, as it is always possible to operate the trains at a lower speed to
enable a shorter distance to be covered by an overnight service. In terms of service planning, Troche
observed that night trains are most competitive where a population center remains relatively isolated
from a number of others (e.g., there is at least 625 miles between Stockholm and most large European
cities). In those circumstances, the night-train could be an attractive alternative to airline service where
direct service to most cities could only be sustained a few times daily.
Applying the concept to North America, it is conceivable that with trains operating at 90 mph,
Washington is a city where this idea could perhaps be successfully applied. At 90mph, a number of
important population centers are reachable overnight: Boston, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo,
Cincinnati, Atlanta, and the Carolina coast. A similar concept could perhaps be applied to Chicago.
However, part of the problem is that with smaller number of population centers and a more dispersed
pattern of economic activities, flights with regional jets or simply the private auto may remain a cheaper
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way to achieve roughly the same objectives. Because of the high capacity of an overnight train consist, it
is likely to replace some four to eight daily flights, while many cities can only justify one to two flights
daily to each destination.
In terms of operating principles, Troche discussed the concept of the CityNightLine philosophy. Night
train would make a series of stops between 8pm and midnight, and travel non-stop between midnight
and about 6am, before dropping passengers off until perhaps as late as 10am. The concept has been in
practice on the Deutsche Bundersbahn network for a number of years. The concept was independently
explored in the initial study (Martland & Lu, 2002), using Scotrail's Sleeper services and a hypothetical
American service as examples.
Troche explored in detail the concept of designing routes with many detours, making the important
observation that while journey time is an important drive in day traffic, in night traffic the arrival and
departure times are more critical. As a result, day trains often have a trunk section with many
connecting branches, while overnight trains can take circuitous routes and 'drop-off' long-distance
passengers in a polycentric region like a local.
In the initial study, this concept was applied to North America geography, while attempting to minimize
costs of right-of-way since high-quality, high-speed passenger railroad network is not readily available in
North America. The initial study introduced a novel way of serving long corridors such as the
Northeast Corridor with overnight services. Instead of having a single train which must pick-up from a
range of cities along a corridor between 8pm and midnight, two trains could be used to cover a longer
corridor. Thus the first section of the train would leave from the northern end of the corridor, while the
second section would leave from the middle at the same time, thus shortening the pick-up window.
Cars could then be exchanged as the southern portion stops and wait for the northern portion to arrive
at a predetermined location. In the morning, the two trains could head off to different destinations (or
different sections of the same long corridor) to perform drop-offs. (See discussion on Cumberland
Sleeping Sidings, Lu & Martland, 2002). This method of operations can be somewhat similar to today's
package-express freight operations. The crucial feature of this operating plan is that the customers are
not disturbed by the need to change trains in the middle of the night.
Railcar Interior Design
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This topic is discussed extensive in the Swedish report. Troche has collected a comprehensive set
documentation of existing state-of-practice and new ideas in terms of how to lay out an overnight
railcar. His recommendations centred on a design that would combine both daytime and overnight
traffic in the same vehicle, so that effective use could be made of the vehicle during the day.
Given the comprehensive coverage in the Swedish report, this topic will not be covered in this thesis. It
is conceivable that more effective use of space could be made than the current Viewliner and Superliner
designs, but given the paucity of intercity passenger services currently in North America, it is unlikely
that railcar interior design would be a driving factor in making North American overnight rail services
more viable.
Other Issues in Overnight Services
Attention was drawn to the fact that market expectations of transportation services in Europe may be
markedly different from that in North America. In particular, some issues that have been raised with
respect to adapting a proposed overnight service to the North American environment:
" Americans like theirprivate space more than Europeans: One issue that has been raised in the Swedish
report is the poor utilization of space in an overnight services car. If the seating density could be
increased, the cost of overnight services would fall dramatically. The problem here is that to
increase the seating density will necessarily require some sharing of space by fellow passengers, who
may be total strangers. In Russia, overnight cars exist in which a single large compartment is shared
by six travellers, none of who may have met previously. As an European, I do not find this strange,
although apparently in the American culture such proposals are considered unsafe and unacceptable
to most people. This may also explain in part the American's obsession with the private car, which
offers a private space during travel not offered by mass transit. Certainly, security and privacy
concerns are cited by non-transit users as reasons for not using transit.
* Americans like larger space than Europeans- Staying in a hotel may be preferable to staying on an
overnight train simply because the hotel offers more space. In Europe, due to a number of practices
that have been in place for a number of years, including traditionally higher costs of transportation
and energy and more conservative zoning practices, the population are much more used to living
within smaller spaces, which resembles a train more than it resembles a hotel room.
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* Americans wake up earlier In Europe, the business day starts at around 9am, although the practice
varies from region to region and some regions of Spain has business schedules that calls for a mid-
day break. In North America, because of the traditionally longer commute and earlier start of
business day in some regions (8.30am in New England, 8am in Chicago), the attraction of the
overnight train may be reduced because the barrier to waking up early for an insanely early flight is
reduced. Although on a macro level, this should not make any difference, the author's experience
suggests that business practices in Europe tended to rely much more on arriving at around 10am if
intercity travel is involved, whereas in North America, because of the larger geographic area, people
are much more used to scheduling later meetings. Thus, comparatively, the attraction of overnight
services are eroded.
6.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, a novel way to ascertain demand in the overnight rail market is demonstrated, with
inconclusive results. Although it was not possible to show that a certain level of demand for overnight
services exist, it was shown that the level of demand is not zero and that a significant consumers ought
to prefer overnight services if cost is not an issue and that the service was marketed jointly with air
services.
The overwhelming conclusion of this investigation that the problem facing overnight services is the
current institutional structure which puts air carriers at odds with rail carriers, and commuter, corridor,
and freight rail carriers at odds with long-distance rail carriers. Because commuter services affect a large
number of people, while air services have up to recently been considered for-profit propositions, there
has not been any real effort to integrate air and overnight rail services, while efforts to improve it has
been sparse compared to the amount of attention and public funds devoted to commuter rail and other
travel options, such as highways.
An important point to note is that expertise in overnight services management still exists at least in one
segment of the professional community. Regions (such as Sweden and Scotland) that have traditionally
been isolated from major population centres have developed considerable expertise in operating
overnight services and making them work. While overnight service will probably never become the
most leveraged portion of rail operations, if implemented wisely and coupled with existing high-speed
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corridor infrastructure, it could be a much more formidable competitor than previous experience and
studies have demonstrated.
Overnight rail is not an inherent loser. Overnight services possesses inherent advantages that cannot be
matched by either daytime rail services, the private auto, or the airlines. It is up to managers of
overnight services to exploit these advantages. Management of overnight passenger services is a
separate discipline, distinct from management of daytime corridor rail services, freight services, or hotel
business. Recognizing this unique position of overnight services management, railroads that have them
should be establishing overnight services as a separate business sector and instituting a separate
management team for such services that have special requirements and represent an unique facet of
passenger rail operations.
Consumers may be willing to pay the increased costs associated with overnight services if true marginal
pricing is instituted for all modes (or indeed, fully-allocated costing is instituted for all modes). There is
currently no data to support or refute the claim of overnight services' poor economic performance, as
the current poor economic performance of overnight service could be explained by other factors such as
less-than full cost allocation on competing modes, or simply a lack of strategic management on the parts
of some overnight services operators.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
Metropolitan access in today's large and sprawling metropolitan areas plays a vital role in rail
transportation - both in terms of its competitiveness against other modes, and in terms of cost-
effectiveness of investment alternatives in delivering customer satisfaction. This is generally true in all
the market segments analyzed: commuter rail, regional rail, intercity rail, and overnight services.
The objective in intercity transportation is to deliver customers from their actual origin to their ultimate
destination - and not from the nearest intercity transportation facility (such as an airport or a downtown
union station) to the facility nearest to where they are going. Although a proportion of intercity trips are
likely to originate from the downtown core, many more intercity trips today are likely to be originating
from the suburbs or city neighborhoods and destined for the suburbs or city neighborhoods in a
different metropolitan area. The designer of the intercity transportation system must consider both
types of demands when designing a system.
This result has important implications in development of next generation high-speed rail technologies.
The need to make multiple stops en-route mean that the ability of rail vehicles to accelerate from a
standing stop would be an important technical attribute - an equally important one to the vehicle's
ability to sustain long periods of high speed running. Many high-speed rail proposals (whether
technological or project-oriented) have focused on constructing a beeline from one city center to
another city center to provide the fastest point-to-point journey time. In fact, the vehicle's ability to
negotiate 'classic' curvaceous infrastructure is likely to be as important if not more so than the need for
sustained high speeds on unconstrained infrastructure. The reality of today's urban planning is that
unconstrained infrastructure is almost impossible to retrofit, and even if it were possible, it would not
serve the largest demand generators - ones that are dispersed throughout the gentrified inner-city
neighborhoods. Such neighborhoods are reached through classic infrastructure that led to their
development in the first place, and do not usually lie along a perfect straight line from the city center.
Just to reiterate this important concept, missed by many high-speed rail enthusiasts: the integral of
demands throughout the city neighborhoods far exceeds the demand from the downtown core, even if
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the downtown core remains the busiest node on the whole line. High-speed approaches that calls for a
hub-and-spoke network based on a downtown hub through interconnection with the municipal transit
system cannot be successful if the access time to the downtown hub is so abysmal as to rule out intercity
rail as a viable option against driving directly to the destination.
The types of technology that are likely to be successful in future intercity rail markets are backwards
compatible. Backwards compatibility allows the new technology to be deployed incrementally, avoiding
high up-front capital costs and preserving network effects. It also allows sharing of high infrastructure
costs with other modes such as commuter rail and urban transit. Retrofits of existing 'classic' corridors
are likely to generate less objections and disruption to existing urban fabric. Technologies that build
upon current steel-wheels-on-steel-rails guidance while enhancing its performance (particularly its
performance on constrained 'classic' infrastructure) - such as flange lubrication to reduce L/V ratios,
and magnetic guidance to allow higher superelevation (cant deficiencies) through twisting curves, will be
far more important, cost-effective, and leveraged than proposals to construct brand-new rights of way.
Magnetic levitation technology could be used in an incremental fashion by providing guidance alongside,
and not instead of, steel-wheels-and-steel-rails. These hybrid concepts leverage the inherent value in the
existing infrastructure, and is much more important than 'shiny-go-faster' approaches that focusing on
relaxing the constraints through sledgehammer-like, environmentally insensitive engineering.
These findings have important implications for transit properties around the country. Transit property
should realize that sharing infrastructure costs with intercity carriers could substantially reduce the cost
of providing transit. Instead of seeing the intercity operator as the 'competition' and requiring them to
interchange with the local carrier only at designated points, the transit property ought to see the
development of a new intercity corridor as an opportunity to provide transit service to another section
of the city. Intercity and transit providers should work together to allow new intercity infrastructure to
create new transit corridors. New corridors should not be constructed alongside existing corridors, but
instead should be constructed such that easy interchange is accomplished with radial lines running in all
directions. Not only will that design provide maximum connectivity, it will also enable the intercity
carrier to tap into important business centers all over the metropolitan area and not just the downtown.
The new corridor could also serve as a crosstown transit corridor.
Not one solution would work for every city. Depending on the location and condition of the existing
transit and intercity infrastructure, and the economic geography of the metropolitan area, different
layouts of metropolitan access infrastructure (or if you prefer, terminal district infrastructure) would be
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necessary. Above all, transit properties and intercity carriers need to demonstrate a willingness to work
with one another in generating a good design from the customer's perspective - regardless of who will
carry the passenger. There should never be a single 'interchange point' where one carrier's responsibility
ends and another takes over. The issues such as: who will pay for the infrastructure, who will manage its
construction, and who will own the tracks, are independent from how one might design a good
transportation network. Once the network has been designed to give the best possible customer utility
for the largest number of origin-destination pairs, those institutional issues would likely be resolved
more easily. Links that carry predominantly intercity passengers would be paid for and operated by the
intercity carrier; links that are common facilities would come under joint control, and perhaps even
shared ownership - just as the union station brought together bitter rivals in 19t century railroading, the
union terminal district network should bring the transit property, the intercity carriers, and perhaps even
the freight carriers together to design a layout that will work for everyone.
7.1 Analysis for Specific Market Segments
7. 1. 1 Commuter Rail
Commuter rail represents a market segment in which customers make trips daily - and decision about
commuter rail ridership generally represent a long-term commitment. Demand pattern is generally
concentrated in journey-to-work trips, comprising in the morning rush of pick-up in low-density
suburbs and drop-off in a high-density downtown business district. However, in today's dispersed
cities, the historical downtown is no longer the only location of concentrated business activity: firstly,
downtown business districts have expanded into adjacent neighborhoods and can sometimes can be as
large as three miles long; secondly, some inner city neighborhoods may have gentrified and represent
significant business activity.
One design of commuter rail system would call for an easy transfer from a central dispersal point to the
municipal subway, sometimes necessitating 'backtracking' to get to the traveler's eventual destination.
Another approach allows all incoming commuter trains from any direction to call at multiple number of
'union terminals', enabling walk access to most centers of business activity, at the expense of perhaps
not following the most direct route from the suburbs to the downtown. When transfer time, terminal
time and buffer time are fully considered, most travelers would prefer the latter approach. In addition,
by providing a one-seat ride, the value-of-time on-board the commuter train is increased - which can
translate either into higher willingness to pay for the service, or higher social benefits.
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There is much empricial results supporting this analysis in current heavy-rail transit experience: more
recent systems such as Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) Red Line, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) that have a
commuter-rail like character have matched their station spacing to demand density, and designed their
system such that many parts of the downtown core could be reached directly. These systems would
probably not have been such a runaway success if a transfer to a bus or a streetcar had been required to
reach the outer fringes of the downtown after an incoming ride from the suburbs.
Plate 7.1: Boston's Commuter Rail serves both the commuter rail and regional rail functions,
but the two downtown terminals make cross-metro area journeys difficult.
Access time at the downtown end of the trip is particularly critical. Suburban commuting decisions are
usually driven by long-term choice of residential location and not employment. Frequently, one
household may have more than one commuter rail rider who is able to share an auto at the suburban
end of the trip but not the downtown end of the trip. Requiring suburban commuters to make a second
transfer onto the subway before walking to their final destination could make other arrangements such
as carpool drop-off (either at place of work or at a Kiss-n'-Ride transit terminal) much more attractive,
and would diminish both the social benefit and the political support for commuter rail. Commuter rail
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ought to be seen as a limited-stop subway for auto-welding suburbanites who wish to reach a variety of
locations in the city - just as an urbanite could travel from an urban neighbourhood to a variety of
destinations served by a trunk line subway. The difference is that a suburbanite would drive to their
transit access location while an urbanite would walk or take a bus. The 'commuter rail terminates at
union station and serves the center of downtown travelers' paradigm is no longer tenable in all but the
most compact and dense city centers today.
7.1.2 Regional Rail
The definition of regional rail is not always clear. For the purposes of this discussion, regional rail could
be one of two types of services: (1) longer distance exurban commuting services which are unsuitable
for daily use, but generally allows day-trips by business travelers - examples would include the Keystone
and Empire corridors in the Northeast; (2) services that transcend the metropolitan area from one
suburb to another, achieved by either a connection or a run-through train in the downtown - for this
type of journey, the commuter rail schedule is often so constraining that daily commute is not a
possibility except for the most determined employee. This definition allows regional rail to describe a
different market from commuter rail, even if travelers from both markets may travel on the same
physical trains. The needs of the two types of customers are very different, and serve to illustrate the
importance of considering all customers in systems design.
Because of the lower demand density at both origin and destination for the crosstown regional rail rider,
it is a practical impossibility to provide convenient access through the rail mode. However, it is likely
that the leisure travelers in this market will be able to arrange a pick-up, as the motivation for travel is
often to visit a friend in a different suburb. The need for regional rail customers is the ability to transfer
easily once they reach the downtown.
Although the 'union station' design could potentially accomplish an easy transfer, several practical
problems generally prevents that arrangement from being satisfactory. Firstly, the existing infrastructure
in large cities is usually such that there are more than one union terminals, constructed in the late 191
century by different railroads. For crosstown travel, frequently a short transfer in a taxicab or the urban
transit system is required. This two-transfer solution is a poor alternative compared to driving, and is
unlikely to create the type of competitive atmosphere where regional rail is considered an alternative
other than for the autoless suburban poor. Secondly, there are usually good operational reasons for
central stations to be decentralized in a large city - such issues as platform capacity, parking availability
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and engine terminal location usually prevent a true 'union terminal' to develop for a large metropolis.
Boston has two 'union' terminals for the North and South side commuter lines, while Chicago has four
commuter rail terminals.
The solution for a true regional rail system is likely to involve decentralizing the union terminal - both
such that the commuter rail market segment could reach a greater number of activity centers directly,
and to allow regional rail riders to make an off-on same platform transfer. The design also happens to
circumvent the platform capacity issue by requiring all terminating trains to run-through the downtown
terminal district, making only 'intermediate' stops and looping back or departing on a different 'spoke'
to lay-up in an outlying or suburban engine terminal.
The 'loopback' design is already widespread amongst today's high-density transit operations: Boston's
Green Line has a loopback at Government Center and multiple access points along the Central Subway;
Chicago's 'el' terminates and run around at the 'Loop'; Philadelphia's Regional Rail system embraces the
run-through philosophy. Interurban rail systems that still operate on the push-pull philosophy out of a
number of independent downtown terminals are relics of the 20t century and will find themselves
unable to service the increasingly decentralized suburb-to-suburb and suburb-to-city-neighborhood
transportation demand effectively.
7.1.3 Interciy Rail
Intercity rail, the primary subject of this thesis, is essentially justified on an incremental basis. The
capital cost required to create a system of access points in the busy downtown and adjacent city
neighborhood activity centers that have gentrified could never be justified by the millions of passengers
per year that travel in even the busiest intercity corridors in the United States. Cost of these terminal
infrastructure run in the billions, thus have annuities in the region of hundreds of millions of dollars.
The convenience of access is simply not worth the extra potentially $100 each passenger would need to
pay to have dedicated facilities constructed to enhance intercity access.
However, given how important distributed access is to the commuter rail system, the intercity rail
operator simply need to reach agreement with the commuter rail authority to stop trains at key access
locations in the city to benefit from the terminal district infrastructure. In drafting such an agreement, it
is important to realize that commuter and intercity operators have different priorities and contribute
towards the cost of such infrastructure in different ways. The commuter operator is likely to be most
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concerned about the capacity at the rush-hour, while the intercity operator is probably far more
concerned about getting departure slots that are on-the-hour or some other such easy-to-remember
number. It is likely that an agreement that calls for shared ownership based on revenues, with
provisions that enable the commuter rail operator to take charge of dispatching in the rush hour, while
the intercity operator handles the off-peak, would be a sustainable situation in the long run. Any
attempt for one party to insist on total control or absolute priority for all trains is likely to fail miserably.
One issue that is likely to occur in intercity rail is the need for exurban Park-n'-Ride lots. The current
lots tend to be commuter rail oriented, and is structured to cater towards day-return demands with rates
to match. Park-n'-Ride is key to intercity rail's outreach to suburban areas, and the status quo must
change when intercity services are extended to more of these facilities.
Another side benefit for having run-through capability in the downtown is that it enables an intercity
passenger departing due south to board the train in a northside suburb, ride through the city while the
train picks up originating passengers, and depart due south without either having to transfer or drive
through the congested city to reach a downtown terminal. The run-through capability is far less critical
to the commuter rail market segment than to the regional and intercity rail market segments. However,
it is likely that any design that enables access from most of the activity centers in the downtown and
inner-city neighborhoods could easily accommodate run-through capability.
7.1.4 Overnight Rail
Once the commuter and intercity infrastructure is in place, accommodating the handful of overnight
trains per day is simply a matter of service planning. The driver in service planning in overnight trains is
that it must depart within a narrow time window, either between about 9pm to 11pm when passengers
are likely to want to begin getting ready for bed, or between about 6pm and 8pm when passengers could
board a dinner-and-overnight train. This is less of a problem than at the destination, where the
overnight train will by definition arrive in the middle of the morning rush, and will compete for terminal
district access slots with commuter rail arrivals.
One way to handle this potential conflict might be to schedule the overnight train much more robustly
(say by using the 95f percentile running time) than other trains, or to schedule their arrival towards the
end of the morning rush when their impact would be minimal if they were delayed en-route. Needless
to say, the passenger from another metropolitan area would need to be delivered to a variety of
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destinations, and not just the central city - thus the metropolitan access idea is crucial to all market
segments.
When dealing with long-distance trains, there is a temptation to cut down the number of stops -
especially stops within the same urban area, to minimize running times. This is likely to be a failing
strategy. The key driver in the ridership of overnight trains is not the overnight running time, since
most passengers would be sleeping and within reason, don't really care how long it takes. The more
important factors are departure times, and how many passengers the train can pickup within the narrow
time window in which overnight trains could begin. The train may have to stop at a number of
suburban or downtown stops to pickup just a handful of passengers, but to require these passengers to
travel to a central collection before proceeding is likely to add about an hour or so to their total journey
time. Significantly, this hour is far more important than an extra hour overnight - since it is a precious
evening hour that the passengers could spend enjoying the city. The likely impact of cutting those extra
stops is that those handful of passengers would likely make other travel arrangements. This example
demonstrates the importance of customer-centric utility analyses, based on different values-of-time for
different parts of the trip and different time-of-day.
7.2 Summary of Important Results
This thesis is a very general and very broad attempt at refraining the high-speed rail debate in the United
States. It demonstrates that models are just tools with which the transportation professionals study
transportation systems. Just as "Do-Re-Mi and so on are only the tools we use to build music... you can
sing a million different tunes by mixing them up", building a transportation system will involve an
element of design, and models can serve to inform the impact of different designs on different market
segments but should not be the driving force behind choosing certain designs.
Designs are done by artists who take many qualitative factors into account and bring about a vision,
while modelling is done by engineers who quantitatively evaluate the impact of the design decisions on
passenger utility, project cost, and other indicators that matter. Sometimes, it would be necessary to
override the search for an optimum design if other factors such as equity and marketability results in the
need to make the system suboptimal in order to serve a broader segment of the population, or achieve
other design objectives. By the same token, the fact that a system does not turn a profit is not
necessarily an excuse to seek the lowest cost design; in some circumstances a higher cost design will
reduce losses by increasing revenues more than the costs.
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7.2.1 Modelling Methodologies are Flawed
In Chapter 2, a variety of current approaches to modelling intercity transportation demands are
reviewed. The review revealed that even though current methodologies do a good job of predicting
incremental changes in passenger demands in response to operating plan changes, addition of new links,
and other such minor adjustments, the models do a terrible job of explaining why such changes occur.
Consequently, the current models are poor tools with which to inform designers of systems how the
system could be altered to both make better use of existing infrastructure and to enhance the customers'
intercity travel experience.
Trying to design an intercity transportation system with models of today is like trying to reproduce an
elephant by measuring its skin perturbations with a sliderule. The sliderule is unsuitable for the job on
two counts: (a) it examines the object with such a coarse resolution (i.e. a straight edge) that it misses
subtleties of the elephant, such as the texture of its skin; (b) it examines the object on such a small scale
that it fails to realize the right angle at the end of an elephant's belly is part of its leg and isn't because
the elephant has been subject to folding action like a piece of paper. Current methodologies, in general,
(a) examines the value-of-time too coarsely to appreciate that passengers prefer in-vehicle time spent
reading the papers and drinking the coffee to in-vehicle time spent crowded out in a subway car; (b) fails
to acknowledge that changes to other parts of the system (such as the addition of a highway link) could
affect the part of system under study (such as air travel demand). Although the models are extremely
sensitive to aircraft gauge, aircraft schedules, and perhaps even pricing strategies, they are no good for
creating strategic visions and answering questions such as: should we widen the interstate highway or
connect the high-speed rail to the airport and the suburbs? To answer these questions, a total logistics
approach that calculates the total passenger utility by adding all constituent components, similar to the
state of practice in freight carrier choice decision support, is required.
7.2.2 MakingJourney Time Disappear
It is possible to make journey time "disappear" during long intercity trips. Through of a number of
theoretical constructs and review of explicit references to differences in consumer values-of-time while
engaged different activities, Chapter 3 demonstrates that it is possible, at least theoretically, to make
onerous journey time "disappear" during long intercity trips. The journey time disappears in the sense it
does not contribute to the disutility to making the trip. Under certain circumstances, such as when the
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travellers are sleeping, eating, watching television, or taking part in other household activities that would
normally be assigned a zero value-of-time at one's own home, the traveller is indifferent to a longer trip,
as long as one would continue to choose to engage that activity and isn't constrained by the limited in-
vehicle amenities available. In essence, when boredom sets in, that is when disutility shoots up through
the roof. These differences in values-of-time explains the different values-of-time found in studies
conducted on otherwise similar people.
Regular users of long distance services have already learned how to make journey time disappear: they
chat, bring a deck of cards, or bring reading materials and refreshments. This result borders on stating
the obvious, but it is under-appreciated by those who seek to reduce line-haul journey time at the
expense of access time. The objective of the high-speed rail advocate should be both to reduce travel
time and to make time disappear - and not simply to increase operating speeds.
7.2.3 State Rail Plans are Flawed
In Chapter 4, review of current high-speed rail planning exercise revealed that the planners are
examining a gamut of variables that are too narrow. State Rail Plans, or even Federal high-speed rail
designated corridors, sometimes define parameters that are too narrow for planners to design a good
system. The very act of designating a corridor to be studied could encourage an engineering-approach
where the planners come to believe the objective is to find the path of least cost to connect two ill-
defined arbitrary end points, such as Boston & Montreal. Firstly, both Boston and Montreal are large
metropolitan areas - where is the high-speed rail heading to and from? Secondly, is Boston & Montreal
the most logical corridor in the area - what about Boston & Maine, or simply a connection to
Manchester Airport? Thirdly, are there other enhancements in the area that would benefit the locality
more than a high-speed rail - what about the North South Rail Link, or simply a number of intermodal
passenger terminals coupled with medium-speed rail service? These are issues needing to be addressed
in system design, and do not seem to have been addressed in the high-speed rail plans reviewed.
7.2.4 Metropolitan Access is Vital
In Chapter 5, this activity-dependent disutility framework (or total passenger logistics-utility) was
extended to model a series of rail terminal locations, layouts, and service designs in large metropolitan
areas. There are two main results. One main realization was that not only does the activity drive the
value-of-time, the distribution of time available for activities are also important - simply by changing the
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mix of times can reduce "logistics costs", or disutility, for many passengers. Another finding is that
improved access can be an effective way of reducing total trip disutility - making the trip faster by
cutting transfer time, and also more productive and more comfortable.
The first result largely reflects the idea that people do not like to be interrupted from their task, whether
it is work- or leisure-related. Contrary to conventional wisdom in transit environments, a one-seat-ride
could be an important factor in intercity mode choice. Each segment in an intermodal intercity itinerary
or a longer commute tend to be of a length where productive work is possible, the passenger would
have a stronger preference for uninterrupted time than a transit-rider.
Applying a version of the logistics-utility model, the City of London case study shows that investing in
better access to the downtown core could save much more time for passengers than investing in
increasing the speeds of commuter lines radiating from London. In the scenario studied, average
journey time savings (for all origins on the former Network Southeast system) could be as much as ten
minutes compared to a transfer to the London Underground Circle Line. The results are highly
intuitive: journey time reductions on the line-haul segments tend to help the outer suburbs, where the
demands are low, whilst enhancing access to the core help the inner suburbs, the outer suburbs, as well
as crosstown passengers. Again, those who focus on one single origin-destination pair or one single
corridor often ignore these important results. Intercity rail is a network, even if the corridor may seem
as simple as a beeline between one city and the next - there is always a cluster of metropolitan
neighborhoods that need to be connected with another cluster, and any evaluation must consider all
origin-destination pairs.
Applying the total logistics-utility model to services between two smaller cities resulted in a design that
calls for an intercity line that winds around the city to collect passengers from multiple neighborhoods in
a linear fashion. This is the MetroFlyer concept, introduced in Chapter 5. In smaller cities, where there
are insufficient demand density to justify a totally-connected network from every neighborhood to every
other, it is possible to construct such a line to achieve better access before heading out towards another
city or the suburbs. This type of infrastructure, which can sometimes be constructed out of abandoned
and pre-existing rail lines, can benefit the city in a number of ways: (1) more city neighborhoods will
receive regional and intercity rail access, (2) new corridors are created where a subway-like service may
relieve capacity problems on the existing transit system, (3) intermodal and intramodal connections
could be made at multiple nodes or multiple 'union stations', which will alleviate the congestion and
parking problem typically associated with union stations.
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The total logistics concept for passengers gives rise to an important methodology with which high-speed
rail schemes should be evaluated. Firstly, the issue of access to high speed rail services has to be taken
seriously, if high-speed rail advocates wishes to be considered as a viable voice in promoting mass
intercity transportation. Secondly, to demonstrate that a high speed is really necessary, the speed
enhancement must be explicitly traded off against other possible enhancements in a utility framework.
7.3 High Speed Rail Planning Synthesis
7.3.1 Regarding the Value of Time
The logical consequence of acknowledging the activity-dependent disutility of in-vehicle time is that the
standard model of disutility equals the product of time and value-of-time will no longer apply. Instead,
the disutility should be modelled as the integral of values-of-time over the entire trip, from the moment
the travellers leave their point of origin until they reach their destination. Access time, terminal time,
buffer time, in-vehicle time are all included, and the values-of-time in each category would still require
careful evaluation - for instance, terminal time spent browsing through the concessions has a different
value from terminal time spent standing in line waiting for a security check-in. These are factors that
designers of intercity transportation systems must pay careful attention to. Once the infrastructure is
built, the users may have already been trapped into a suboptimal path from the point of view of total
trip utility.
Amenities may be expensive to provide from the carrier's perspective, but they are part of the carrier's
competitive arsenal. Highway amenities are provided by independent businesses on a commercial basis,
and airport amenities are provided by concessions. Rail carriers can do well by explicitly recognizing the
link between amenities and value-of-time en-route. While it is not necessary to provide free amenities,
they should be provided at a cost comparable to similar amenities at airports or highway rest-stops, to
encourage the travellers to make their own journey time disappear.
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7.3.2 Regarding High Speed Rail Planning in General
* Current models in intercity transportation often consider only one aspect of the broader intercity
transportation problem. Airline demand models may deal with such issues as carrier choice and
schedule choice, but do not address issues such as local access and terminal amenities -- nor were
they designed to. Strategic planners in intercity transportation should not confuse the need for
transportation systems design with short-term operations planning models that were essentially
designed to evaluate incremental costs and benefits of improving the operating plan.
* Most of the important concepts in designing an intercity transportation system already exist in the
literature. Total logistics costs as appled to freight transportation, mode-choice methodologies as
applied to urban transportation, and even explicit considerations of customers' value of time, are all
concepts that can assist the evaluation of different designs of intercity transportation systems.
However, the existence of modelling methodologies does not alleviate the need for design. Design
is a separate craft in which the professionals gather inputs from multiple stakeholder groups and
combine them in such a way as to make a functional transportation system.
" By the same token, designing a transportation system is not a simple process, and may not relate to
available transportation technologies as strongly as often suggested. The availability of a new
technology will influence the design process, since new technologies may cater to certain users and
stakeholders' interests better than older technologies. However, designing a good system is more
than simply taking a new technology, building and calibrating a model to show an instance where the
new technology would work better than the old. Only when much thought had been devoted to
how best to utilize the new technology and how it affects role of the older technologies, should the
whole system be evaluated using a model to show that the deployment will benefit many different
stakeholders. In particular, it is important to avoid situations where new technologies may do well at
the expense of an older part of the system -- good design would put existing infrastructure to good
use while allowing the new technology to serve a useful purpose.
* In essence, a demand model that demonstrates that there is sufficient demand to justify financially
the operations of a new corridor, a new technology, or some piece of new infrastructure, is not
necessary and sufficient to justify its construction. A vision, a design proposal, coupled with a
systems evaluation of what the new infrastructure will do to the users and the non-users, is much
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more important than a narrowly focused study that simply claims 'new stuff is needed here, and it
will make money'. This may seem obvious, but many state rail plans and other strategic plans for
intercity rail or airports appear to overlook the need to examine the transportation problem on a
systems level.
" Much expertise has been developed in urban transportation systems design. The Boston
Metropolitan Transportation Plan (1972) captured the essence of the kind of design considerations
that were needed. The plan integrated for the first time a proposal for new highways, new subways,
and other transportation facilities in the area. When part of the plan was implemented, new housing
was built along the new subway alignment to create a 'livable neighbourhood'. This type of
attention to detail, and systems approach to planning, is needed in intercity transportation planning.
" The systems approach to transportation planning often calls for intermodal transportation
connexions. Intermodal connexion is only one of many ways to achieve a systems vision.
Integration of airports, commuter rail, and intercity rail can be important, but should not rule out the
possibility of constructing infrastructure in such a way that a service can transcend many different
modal roles. For instance, in the terminal areas, an intercity arrival could turn into a commuter train
as it approaches an urban area; local trains should travel by different routes from intercity trains
where possible, to provide maximum connectivity; airlines should focus on what they do best --
service isolated cities, and provide an ultra high-speed service for those who are willing to pay for it.
These conclusions are somewhat broad. An immediate possibility is to re-evaluate some of the
proposals currently in progress in light of the metropolitan access findings, taking into account total trip
time for all likely customers, and try to evaluate the value of time. It is likely that some changes will be
needed to bring the proposals to a stage where it better benefits the regional transportation system as a
whole, instead of being an isolated corridor.
7.4 Recommendations and Future Work
As indicated throughout this thesis, much remains to be done to develop a framework for planning
intercity rail transportation systems. The current institutions involved in intercity transportation have
tended to be modal-specific, sometimes resulting in mal-coordinated systems. In urban areas, because
of the massive amount of public subsidy that has been poured into public transportation, methodologies
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have been developed for coordinating the services provided by different modes, and catering for the
different needs of the urban market though joint-planning and regulation. Although deregulation of
intercity air carriers was hailed as a economic success, it has resulted in reinforcement of the modal
mentality - only in the case of one carrier, has the issue of joint highway-air service been considered
seriously. There is now a great need for each metropolitan area to examine their intercity service
facilities: are the passengers getting from their origins to the destination city by the most efficient route
through the urban area? The chances are that most passengers are taking a geographic detour because
they have to travel to the airport, and may even be suffering time penalties in the case of shorter-
distance origin-destination markets.
In terms of analyzing the economics of schemes such as MetroFlyer, and other urban distribution
systems for intercity carriers, location specific studies are needed to examine the costs and benefits
associated with alternatives for a specific location. The problem with some state passenger rail plans lies
in not examining all possible alternatives, either because the MetroFlyer alternative is not initially
obvious, or other factors are preventing it from being considered. If the systems analysis presented in
this thesis is even halfway correct, in many metropolitan areas it will be demonstrated that improving
access to intercity and commuter rail facilities will benefit more passengers (and save more passenger-
minutes) than simply improving speed for a specific origin and destination.
Plate 7.2: Considering the MetroFlyer alternative would not only help cities like New York,
but also regional cities that could justify a trunk distributor through the metro area.
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7.4.1 The SpeedAssumption
If there were a moral to this thesis, it would be to avoid the 'speed assumption' in future work in
intercity transportation planning. To demonstrate that a high speed is really necessary, the speed
enhancement must be explicitly traded off against other possible enhancements in a utility framework.
Speed, like any other amenity, requires justification with sound project evaluation. Frequently, speed
could be justified at the margin - like in the Tokaido Shinkansen; in many cases however, a lot could be
accomplished with sound service planning and by exploiting synergies with parts of the public
transportation system with much higher ridership, such as the commuter rail.
Currently in the United States, higher speed rail is necessary in many cities for rail to stay competitive,
but highest speed rail is probably neither cost-effective nor necessary. Instead, each scheme for
increasing line-haul speed should be judged, using the total logistics-utility framework, against a series of
alternatives to improve access to locations of large demand density as well as options that help to make
time disappear. In the same vein, more accessible rail offering shorter access time from all points in the
city is more and more important in today's sprawling metropolitan areas. However, the most accessible
rail (such a streetcar) that calls at every street corner, have little role in interurban transportation.
Demands for speed, accessibility, amenities, and other upgrades that improve the customer utility must
be balanced against each other. The results from the customer utility studies should be used to inform
intercity transportation system design, to create a system that works in harmony to move people.
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1. ABSTRACT
Carriers in intercity passenger transportation markets employ a different set of technologies with diverse
characteristics. Potentially, the ease of access is an important competitive advantage for rail carriers. In
major metropolises, the downtown business district is physically too large to be served effectively with a
single station. Thus, a series of stations are required for effective rail service, just as an urban expressway
requires more than a single exit downtown to be effective. The local distribution mechanisms can be an
important driver in intercity mode choice, since it affects the utility of the overall "trip experience",
especially in a competitive situation where the overall origin-to-destination time for a selection of intermodal
itineraries are similar. A loop is an effective layout for servicing the demand and for operational reasons,
although in some cities other layouts are more effective. The conventional wisdom of concentrating
passenger operations at a union station is misleading since in the typical city of more than two million
population, much demand originates from suburban business districts and homes - where the airport is
more accessible. Case studies show that effective downtown rail loops may reduce origin-to-destination
journey times on the order of 15~20 minutes, which is roughly equivalent to increasing average line-haul
speed from 120 to 168 km/h (80mph to 105mph) over a 160-km (100-mile) segment. Effective downtown
access may be much more leveraged than increasing maximum permissible speed.
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2. INTRODUCTION
Intercity Passenger Transportation is, at best, a limited commodity market. Carriers employ various sets of
technologies - railroad, highway, aviation, hovercraft - each with different characteristics and addressing the
needs of a different market segment. Besides speed or cost, there are a multitude of performance measures
all of which can be turned into a competitive advantage for a given mode or carrier. This paper examines
the circumstances under which the accessibility to a given mode can become one such advantage.
Specifically, how can the layout of railroads and location of intercity stations within the high-density
downtown area contribute towards the railroad's ability to compete for intercity passengers?
Traditionally, intercity trains have departed from a single downtown 'union' station while airplanes have
departed from an out-of-town airfield. The inherent technological constraint in aviation is that while they
offer low end-to-end journey times, much land is required for a terminal and thus it is impractical to site
them in high-density areas. The consolidated downtown terminal offered good access for high-density
central business districts in large cities of up to perhaps 1 million in population. However, with the
development of suburban business districts and multi-clustered downtown centers in major metropolises
such as Tokyo or Los Angeles, the downtown terminal may be unable to realize the full market potential.
There is widespread recognition within the industry that access to the city-centre can be an important part of
any high-speed rail scheme. In Britain, it is documented (1) that upgrades to the "classic" lines which
provide access from the downtown to new high-speed cut-offs are an expensive but necessary part of the
passenger rail vision. What is not widely recognized is that a large proportion of intercity trips originates
from the greater metropolitan area, thus urban distribution can be just as important as downtown access.
Traditionally, urban distribution has been left firmly in the domain of local transit authorities and private bus
operators. This institutional divide often led to counter intuitive routings by public transportation, making
the do-it-yourself private auto approach much more attractive than it otherwise would be.
Already, airports are taking advantage of the sheer size of some cities to provide a distributed service.
London's Gatwick, Heathrow and Stansted airports all feature services to Edinburgh, and those residing
north of London are more likely to fly via Stansted than those residing in the south. Distributed rail
terminals in a congested city may be provided by railroads in a variety of layouts: lines travelling through the
city independently, lines joining an inner urban ring, or a combination of both. Ultimately, the constraining
geographic features in a city and the distribution of densely populated areas will determine which scheme is
the best, although the ring railroad concept offers good performance for relatively low cost. This is not a
suburban ring - the ring must have a small radius. The inherent advantage of downtown access to rail
terminals disappear if the stations on the ring are not within walking distances of the densely packed city
centers. Station amenities are critical - luggage stowage, taxicab services, stores and restaurants are available
at most airports. Multiple full-service downtown stations are needed.
In the suburban "non-walkable neighbourhoods", there is insufficient density for effective rail service (2).
Thus, strategically-located Park & Rides (parkway stations) are more important. Parkway stations should be
located such that they are closer to the demand generators than the airport, even if it means detouring the
rail line. Car-hire and car-sharing facilities are needed. Conceivably, an argument could be made that every
city with a relatively high urban density and a population of more than two million should have a downtown
rail distribution mechanism - a ring railroad, or simply a series of stations on one common trunk route
through the city.
Effective local distribution mechanisms are a leveraged area with respect to performance of intercity
passenger systems. Experience with the South Shore Line in Indiana demonstrates that decreasing terminal
accessibility (elimination of street-running and local drop-off) can have dramatic negative impacts on
intercity ridership (3). Conversely, despite longer journey times, the North Shore Line remained competitive
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against the Hiawathas as it offered much better access to downtown Chicago via the elevated loop (4). As
with overnight services, the vehicle costs are insignificant when compared with the infrastructure costs (in
many cases the service plan would utilize turn-around times in the existing fleet). Thus, the leveraged
technologies are infrastructure related. New construction methods are needed to allow cheaper tunnels and
elevated rail lines with lesser environmental impacts, so that infrastructure could be retro-fitted to congested
downtown areas. New rolling stock technologies, such as distributed power & brake, higher power-to-
weight ratio, and lower emissions from diesel power plants may allow intercity express trains to perform
better in start-stop runs and underground. High-performance switches and crossings could allow greater
stability and higher speeds in highly constrained geometries, e.g. a novel method of vehicle guidance over
turnouts, such as a third contact point or a non-contact system. Cheaper and more reliable train-control
technologies will allow increased train-densities on congested downtown distributor lines. Rapid-transit type
signalling principles adapted for compatibility with the traditional railroad systems may hold promise.
On the marketing side, enhanced decision-support and data-collection systems can assist service design and
analytically determine optimal stopping patterns for local and express trains. Seamless ticketing technology
for intermodal trips will allow easier transfers, making high-speed rail an integral part of the wider
transportation network. Finally, innovative door designs and luggage handling facilities will minimize
station dwell times - which will become increasingly important due to the additional station stops the
intercity passenger train would make on a loop.
3. COMPETITIVE UTILITY ANALYSES - HOW TO BEAT 'EM AT THEIR GAME
Before embarking on a detailed utility analysis, it is useful to conduct a strategic analysis for each type of
intercity passenger transportation technology. Given a reasonable "high-speed" intercity rail system with
average speeds between 144 and 200 km/h (90mph and 125mph), it is clear that in the corridor market
(320-960 km, 200-600 miles), the aviation industry will always have a speed advantage, while the private auto
will continue to be more accessible. How can rail operators defend its market position?
Table 1 catalogues the historical development of urban railroad layouts throughout the 20th century and
beyond, and compares the competitiveness of rail service against the state of the art in other modes. The
union station is largely a product of the pre-war era, when the only effective competition was the electric
interurban. Against present-day auto and air, it has little advantage. As the railroads progressed towards the
parkway station concept, shorter access time for those living near the parkway station resulted, gaining a
competitive advantage for a limited market segment.
Technology changes that will reduce the airplane's advantage in journey times are likely to be very expensive,
but rail can succeed by attacking the technology's inherent weakness of requiring a large airfield by
advancing towards a multi-hub network. The enhanced accessibility for rail also happens to reduce the
private auto's strength in offering convenient access. Although the intercity train will never be as
convenient as the auto, an intermodal solution based on short-distance feeder limousines can reduce the
auto's advantage to virtually nothing. Then, with the interstate highway system (both autos and buses), rail
is able to compete on the grounds of lower overall journey time and comfort; while competing on the
grounds of cost and accessibility with the aviation industry.
3.1 In Vehicle Time Versus Out-of Vehicle Time
It has long been known in transit demand modelling that in-vehicle time is preferable to out-of-vehicle time,
especially where the terminal amenities are either nonexistent or excessively expensive (5). In an origin-to-
destination trip analysis for an intercity traveller, the trip may involve many modes and multiple transfers. If
some of these transfers and the associated waiting times can be eliminated, the utility of the intercity trip
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(and thus the competitiveness of the mode) could be dramatically improved. In addition, allowing the
passenger to board the "line-haul" mode closer to the origin reduces the total trip time. Recent professional
testimony suggested that the concept of one-seat-ride in Commuter Rail has a dramatic positive impact on
ridership (6). In addition, there are intangible effects of providing a sense of presence for the railroad,
which can induce changes in trip generation and mode choice (7). In short, better access for intercity trains
offers a way for undesirable access time to be converted into more desirable in-vehicle time and reduces
overall journey time.
3.1.1 The Base Case
Consider a typical leisure trip from an outer suburban home to an inner suburban destination in a nearby
city (160~480 km, or 100~300 miles away). With a traditional, TGV-style point-to-point service, the typical
trip would involve a drive (or a transit-ride) to a downtown union station (between 30 minutes to 11/2
hours), some buffer time for access unreliability, a point-to-point ride (one to three hours), followed by a
cab or transit ride from the rail terminal in the destination city (30 mins to 1 V2hours). For trips of less than
300 miles, the extra time required for checking in and security screening offset the higher speed of the
airplane. Here, the accessibility of rail and air are roughly equal. The airline has a slight advantage for
origins and destinations closer to the airport (and the lesser-congested suburban areas), and the railroad has
a slight advantage for origins and destinations closer to downtown (and the more congested city
neighbourhoods). Most of the competition takes place on the line-haul leg, and customers make their
mode-choice based on line-haul time and amenities offered. In this situation, rail technology is
disadvantaged due to the high costs of infrastructure required to attain line-haul speeds competitive with the
aircraft. The same argument also applies to a business trip from a suburban business office, even if the
destination is close to downtown.
3.1.2 Whj is Non-Stop Rail Competitive atAll?
Why is rail competitive at all in those circumstances, as demonstrated by such flows as London-Edinburgh
and Paris-Lyons? (8) The reason lies with different values of time associated with different modes (9).
Although rail takes longer, the greater degree of comfort offered by rail and the lower price-per-mile in
some cases mean that a number of people will choose rail. In addition, crucially, rail allows the time spent
on-board to be used productively; a business traveller can in fact generate value during this time, potentially
giving rise to a higher utility despite the longer in-vehicle time. For the leisure traveller, this argument is less
compelling, although most passengers ordinarily classified as "leisure" travellers for their lower willingness-
to-pay are actually able to utilize the time productively. For instance, a college student may choose to review
course materials, and a person visiting a friend may choose to write a letter or read a book en-route. All of
the above activities may be preferable to making many transfers, waiting up to half-hour for each transfer,
and spending time standing in line to clear security at an airport.
3.2 Parkway Stations and Their Impact
Parkway stations, usually located in the suburbs featuring drop-off drive-thrus and ample parking, was rail's
first attempt to capture suburban travellers. Situated conveniently on an interstate beltway, the parkway
station enlarges the market reach for rail out towards the suburbs on one side of the city. The parking is
easier and cheaper (in terms of opportunity cost of land consumed). Certain parkway stations also serves as
interface for the local transit system to reduce journey times for certain trips by allowing an outbound transit
connection, rather than forcing everyone to connect through the downtown hub. This is the first step
towards a decentralized network of stations to serve a large and congested metropolitan area.
3.2.1 Parkway is Quicker than the Base Case
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Reconsider the trip discussed in the base case. Instead of having a difficult and possibly time-consuming
drive (or transit ride) downtown, some travellers choose to drive along the beltway to the parkway station,
avoiding downtown congestion and utilizing high-performance expressways, resulting in time savings. In
addition, the line-haul journey time would be shorter because of reduced distance to travel. For its target
market, parkway stations reduce access time, in-vehicle time, and may provide a better quality service on the
access leg. (Table 2) It is therefore likely to expand the market reach of the intercity train.
However, from the perspective of utility analyses, the parkway station does the exact opposite of what we
want to accomplish. The parkway station (out of town) exchanges comfortable line-haul time in a traincar
for uncomfortable driving time. The total journey time is not reduced significantly except for a small sector
of the metro area close by. With a taxicab, it can increase out-of-pocket costs considerably, due to increased
mileage. The loss of the haul between the city center and the parkway station represents a lost business
opportunity for the railroad. Had the railroad been more accessible from the origin, a longer haul and
potentially more revenue could be attained (realizable from the decreased length-of-haul in the taxicab or
the private auto, and thus less out-of-pocket costs for the traveller). Ideally, from a competitive standpoint,
the nearest parkway station to every destination in the city should be more accessible than the nearest
airport, to the extent permitted by the railroad alignment. Parkway stations offer airport-type ground access
to those low-density parts of the city that could not be effectively served directly by rail. Nonetheless, many
parts of megacities besides the downtown can support direct rail service, and this represents a business
opportunity for the intercity rail carrier.
3.3 Accessibiliy of High Speed Rail in the Downtown Area
Many large cities1, especially those with extensive commuter rail operations, have already realized that a
single downtown terminal per line is insufficient to serve the diverse range of possible destinations for
travellers. Consolidating rail travel demands at a single union station results in less competitive access times,
except for a small market segment whose origins or destinations happen to fall within a relatively small
radius of the downtown rail station. On the other hand, by having several downtown rail terminals, not
only does the rail operator provide a larger geographic area with direct high speed rail service, it also remove
some of the problems traditionally associated with a concentrated terminal - e.g. parking shortages and
vehicular access congestion. Instead of merely providing intermodal transportation through connections to
the local transit system, high speed rail may remove the transfers altogether and offer near door-to-door
service in large cities with high demands. This is particularly important in the "walkable" neighbourhoods in
the downtown area (10). Although there are additional costs associated with providing multiple full-service
union-style stations, there will also be higher revenues.
In a sense, the idea of making high speed rail more accessible in the downtown by installing additional
stations is not new. The basic proposal is to match the supply of rail stations to the demand for rail stations
by opening additional stations where the demand is concentrated, and closing stations where the demand
isn't significant. The innovation lies with the realization that the conventional wisdom of consolidating
demands for intercity travellers can cause more problems than it solves for rail. While the aviation industry
is limited by the nature of its technology to consolidate demands from a metro area to an airport and a
region to a hub, the railroad is not subject to the same limitations, and rail ought to exploit this competitive
edge to the maximum extent possible.
4. THE RING RAILROAD (AND OTHER DOWNTOWN DISTRIBUTORS)
I Examples include Boston South Station and Boston Back Bay Station; Edinburgh Waverley Station and Haymarket Station
(Scotland), Philadelphia 3 0th Street, Suburban, and Market East stations.
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Why is downtown distribution important? Many transit (and intercity passenger transportation)
professionals have come to believe that a consolidating approach to intercity services is a good thing. Many
cite the union station's downtown location (an intercity rail "hub") as a great attraction. The downtown
location is actually an impediment, not an attraction, to suburban dwellers and suburban business travellers.
In contrast, the out-of-town airport offers much better access. Some business trips have non-downtown
destinations, e.g. hotels and business parks. Moreover, the originating demands for intercity travel from the
suburbs and the non-downtown city neighbourhoods, when integrated across the entire metropolitan area,
dwarfs the originating demands within easy walking distance of the downtown station. Although the
downtown remains a significant demand generator and requires direct service, it is no longer dominant.
A simple analogy with the interstate highway network demonstrates why more than one downtown station is
required. An intercity railroad terminating only at the union station and beltway parkway is akin to an urban
interstate expressway with only three exits, requiring the traveller to proceed through the city on slow
arterial streets (akin to feeder transit systems or feeder buses). Services designed for shorter-haul passengers
using a downtown distributor makes the service much more attractive than a point-to-point, airplane-like
service.
The goal of such downtown distributors is to bring the intercity train to within about 10 minutes' walk or
taxicab ride of most parts of the city, including suburban business districts and the downtown area. The
scale is extremely important. Access time of less than 10 minutes makes a 45-minute taxicab-ride to the
airport plus an hours' waiting in line for check-in seem much less attractive. With just one downtown
station, the congestion in the downtown could make airport and union station access time similar in a
taxicab from most suburban locations and city neighbourhoods.
4.1 The Inner Ring Railroadfor Interciy Trains
The inner ring railroad is a particularly efficient layout for providing access to the downtown area. An
"inner ring" is a smallish ring with a diameter between two to five miles with up to about six stops, designed
to be traversed by a high speed train in less than about 30 minutes (inclusive of the station dwell times).
The goal of such a ring is distinct from suburban ring transit schemes which have recently become
fashionable. Instead of aiming at transit-dependent neighbourhoods to build ridership, the intercity ring
aims at serving commercial and business districts as well as affluent parts of the downtown to maximize
convenience for those who are likely to afford intercity travel. The ring will offer station spacing of between
one to three miles - within comfortable walking distance for most, and a less-than-10 mins taxicab ride away
for everyone in the city center.
The ring provides better access downtown, and serves distant city neighbourhoods and some suburban
areas better than other layouts (Figure 1). The relatively small diameter of the ring results in less
construction costs and relatively little additional mileage for trains leaving the city. Where many radiating
lines converge, the ring offers an alternative to constructing independent "crosstown" tunnels for each line,
potentially avoiding a huge expense while offering a better level of service. In addition, the ring is the only
layout to guarantee a single cross-platform or same-platform transfer connexions between any lines. It allow
departures to virtually any direction from any station, removing the need to navigate to a specific line for
suburban auto travellers; they simply traverse the suburb, and board a train to go through the downtown to
their intercity destination directly. The most congested and difficult to navigate neighbourhoods for the
private auto are often the most pedestrian friendly, encouraging walk-up riderhsip. The railroad, with its
exclusive right of way, is much less susceptible to congestion. If travellers are headed "back out" passing
their residence, the total trip time would be shorter than a transfer at the union station in the heart of
downtown (Table 2). Alternatively, they could elect to use a parkway station. If the travellers are heading in
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a different direction, the in-vehicle time is lengthened, but this can result in more productive work done
compared to driving downtown, and there is still an overall trip-time reduction.
Consider the trip discussed in the base case (3.1.1). With a suitable parkway station, rail becomes
competitive for a sector of the metropolitan area. However, with a ring, an auto-rail or cab-rail intermodal
trip can potentially become competitive in most of the suburbs, except for the neighbourhoods immediately
adjacent to the airport. Those neighbourhoods tend to be lower-income, and not a major originator of
intercity travel. Instead of driving 15 to 40 minutes through the downtown or round the beltway, the
driving is now no more than twenty minutes from any suburb. The element that varies, is the productive in-
vehicle time, depending on the locations of the origin and destination relative to the downtown.
4.2 The London, England Case Study
How can the idea of an inner-ring railroad be applied to an actual situation to benefit local and transfer
passengers? To illustrate the concept, a scheme was designed for the City of London to evaluate the
potential benefits and feasibility:
" Estimate journey time savings for connecting and terminating passengers.
" Is a double-track ring railroad sufficient to carry all the trains arriving during the off-peak hours?
" Are reasonable turn-around times for intercity trains attainable?
This is purely a hypothetical scheme, intended to demonstrate the concept and illustrate the scale of the ring
in question. London is of particular interest because, like Chicago, it is a national transportation hub and a
large metropolis. A significant number of intercity travellers arriving in London will need to make a short-
haul interurban trip to reach their final destination. Of course, there are many constraints on London's
radiating intercity lines which will prevent interlining between them in the short term. However, as a long
term proposition, the idea has potential. The proposed route closely mirrors London Underground's Circle
line, linking all of London's mainline stations. Importantly, the line will be constructed to mainline railroad
standards, and will thus permit intercity through-trains. A key assumption is that the ring replaces all
crosstown railroads, current or proposed.
4.2.1 Running Time & Capaci Analysis
The amount of time it takes for an intercity train to travel around the ring was calculated using a formula
calibrated from existing run-time data and other infrastructure assumptions. The distance around the ring
was estimated and an average speed achieved between any two station-stops was calculated. This running
time analysis also determines whether the vehicle time spent traversing the ring results in a saving over the
turn-around time at a stub-end terminal.
It was impossible to stop at all BR London Terminals yet maintain a reasonable running time. However, if
skip-stop service was introduced, overall time savings are possible and the majority of passengers could still
make an effortless transfer to an interurban or commuter service. Most parts of Central London remains
directly accessible from the ring. The run-time around the ring in the skip-stop scenario was 30 minutes.
Using the existing Train Service Database information maintained by Railtrack and the running times, arrival
times for all services was extrapolated to King's Cross station to determine if a capacity shortage would
occur on the ring. The result demonstrates that at off-peak times, theoretically, most of the long-distance
arrivals at the London terminals could be handled with 20 tph signalling on the ring. During peak hours,
some trains would be refused access to the ring and short-turned at their terminal.
4.2.2 Transfer Time Model
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To calculate the cross-London tranfer time under different scenarios, the transfer time was broken down
into different components, populated using current Railtrack data, and then altered accordingly to reflect the
hypothetical ring-railroad. The three components of the transfer time are:
" Walking time to and from the station platform
" Expected waiting time plus running time on the London Underground (the Tube)
" Expected waiting time for the next mainline train to your final destination
The average cross-town transfer time with a London Underground connexion was 58 minutes. The ring-
railroad reduces that time to 47 minutes (11). The reduction in access time for certain passengers are much
larger (up to 25 minutes is possible), despite London's transit-orientation. Time savings would be even
more dramatic in a congested city without transit. Many of these passengers would be likely to choose rail
for intercity travel, even without line-haul time reductions. Table 3 shows a typical sample of actual
journeys, along with estimated access and in-vehicle times. The majority of journeys show a decreased total
trip time, and a greater % of in-vehicle time.
A simple benefit analysis assuming a value-of-time of $15 per hour, a passenger mix of 25% transfer, 55%
downtown terminating and 20% metro-area terminating passengers suggest such a scheme would generate
$350 million per year of consumer surplus in access time saved alone. There are much external benefits not
explicitly accounted for in this model. This case study simply serves as an illustration that the ring-railroad
can be a viable option to reduce access time and through journey time for some cities with more than about
2 million population.
4.3 Is an Inner Ring RailroadAlways Necessary?
In certain cities, the city neighbourhoods have grown in such a way as not to lend itself easily to the
planning of an inner ring route. Local geographical features are usually the reason. In Boston, the densest
and most affluent neighbourhoods happened to wind through the city in an U shape, roughly following the
banks of the Charles and Mystic Rivers. The lower-income neighbourhoods filled the gap on the South side
and the Northeast, and the very low density suburbs are towards the West (12). Thus, a reasonable
alternative to an inner ring would be a "trunk distributor" roughly following the U-shape (11), similar to
previous proposals (13). Although the journey time for through-trains would be increased due to additional
mileage, it is not a major concern as Boston is a stub-end city with most intercity destinations to the South
or the West. Also, in Boston, the walkable downtown is not sufficiently large to justify a complete ring, and
the more affluent neighbourhoods are already covered by high-quality rail transit with convenient
connections. Thus, the trunk distributor may be better than a ring.
In a city such as Cleveland, where the through traffic is as important as the originating traffic, segregation of
through and originating/terminating traffic would be necessary. Many passengers are inconvenienced if
every through train went around a ring. The segregation can be accomplished with smaller, modular trains.
In a hypothetical New York-Cleveland-Chicago corridor, the westbound express trains may call at Cleveland
Heights, where it will drop off a small high-speed EMU (e.g. 127-seat Metroliner) before proceeding around
a by-pass and continuing towards Chicago. The Metroliner would traverse the ring in Cleveland to
distribute local passengers, and continue to Columbus and Cincinnati. Demand-driven fleet allocation
models similar to ones used in the aviation industry could benefit operations by calculating optimal fleet size
and vehicle schedules.
Critically, with longer in-vehicle time, the on-board amenities becomes comparatively more important than
the terminal services. The Pennsylvania Railroad's Metroliner owed much of its success to an
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unprecedented level of on-board service, despite a moderate service speed (14). The comfort is an
important part of the rail advantage. Although terminal amenities are less important, they must remain
competitive with airports. An underground island platform is clearly insufficient.
The ring is not for every city. In older cities such as New York, there may be implementation issues arising
from local opposition and the lack of suitable space. However, multiple access points remains a central
need; unfortunately, the glory days of Penn Station are no more.
5. ARE AIRLINKS ALWAYS A GOOD IDEA?
Airlinks appear to be an extension of airlines to the downtown. Non-stop rail service from downtown is
distinct from a transit connection; obviously aimed at the affluent downtown clientele, it is specifically
designed to erode point-to-point high-speed rail's downtown advantage. The schemes were often designed
with the airport as a goal - a destination in itself, with the associated retail and hotel operations, rather than
simply a transit hub where transfers take place. As previously demonstrated, the alleged "downtown
advantage" may not be all that significant and is based on the probably mistaken popular notion that high
speed rail service has to follow a point-to-point, airplane-like business model. In the context of integrated
intercity rail service, airports can be logical stations in some, but not all, circumstances - depending mainly
on the competitive threat of air shuttle services.
5.1 High Speed Rail Connection to the RegionalAirport
Airport rail links have become increasingly popular, with a variety of different schemes proposed and
implemented by cities worldwide. Most schemes had been local in nature (15), built to enhance the airport
access from the city center (and sometimes from the metropolitan area). They are often sponsored by the
airport authority, and charge a premium to recover the likely loss in revenue from airport parking. In some
locations in Europe, such as Amsterdam Schipol and Frankfurt, the airport has indeed become a center of
commerce. There, the local transit system would of course connect the airport the same way it would any
other centers of activity in the metro area (16). In other cases, despite strong retail developments, the
airport remains mainly a transportation facility, e.g. in Chicago and in London Heathrow. Then, the
decision to construct a high-speed rail link must be based on commercial considerations, and strict
intermodal utility analysis, to create an efficient transportation system with the airport playing an appropriate
role.
5.2 The Distinction between Shuttle Airports and RegionalAirline Hubs
In a non-hub city airport, where the traffic is predominantly local shuttle flights to airline hubs or nearby
destinations, it may not be in the interest of intercity rail carriers to enhance access to the airport. Rail has
an inherent advantage in collecting passengers from the metro area; these passengers would generate the
most revenue by travelling long-haul. Collecting passenger efficiently then delivering them to a local airport
is giving the store away! With a shuttle flight, the passengers would still be saddled with the need to clear
security, board the aircraft, and subject to any airside congestion effects at the connecting air hub or a
popular shuttle destination. Despite the shorter journey time, the air shuttle may result in higher disutility
than travelling by rail directly to destination (17). Here, the intercity rail carrier and the air shuttle operator
are in direct competition and better rail-air access should not be promoted. Removal of short-haul
passengers from the air carrier's network could increase its overall network revenue by allowing it to focus
on longer-haul passengers with the limited airport capacity available. Institutionally, the two operators do
not necessarily have to compete - the air shuttle operator and the high speed rail operator could be jointly
owned by the same transportation company.
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In a regional hub airport, where the traffic is mostly transcontinental and international flights, direct access
to the airport from a high-speed rail corridor is vital. Rail cannot generally compete in transcontinental
markets, thus it should focus on delivering passengers from the region and the metro area to the hub. More
airport capacity could then be released for transcontinental flights. The key is for rail to act as 'spokes' on
the regional scale, and not just a metropolitan mass-transit system, delivering passengers to a truly world-
class air hub rather than the nearest airport. For the vast majority of passengers making the local city-to-city
trip, accessible direct high-speed rail represents a much more attractive option than an auto-air-transit tri-
modal trip.
6. WHY EXPAND THE MARKET REACH? (IS HSR REALLY A NICHE PRODUCT?)
There are good reasons for high-speed rail to expand its market reach. Although rail had recently been
marketed as a niche product in specialized point-to-point corridors, the fact remains that rail technology
enjoys enormous economies of density. The airline industry has long discovered that in a given origin-
destination corridor market, the carrier that provides the larger frequency share gains a disproportionately
larger market share (18). Since rail often operate in such corridor markets where travel is generally
unplanned, it is doubly important for rail to offer extremely frequent service. Rail needs to reach out to the
mass market with a Southwest-like business model. Enlarging the competitive areas covered, with trains
perhaps as small as 200-seats, can help to justify more frequent service. A critical ridership must be reached
before rail will be truly competitive or cost-effective. A seat departed empty is a full-fare revenue loss, and
the marginal cost of adding seats by adding vehicles is low. With an effective revenue-management system,
rail may stimulate highly elastic discretionary travel demand much better than an air shuttle. Fares
competitive with bus carriers could easily be offered on night-time corridor trains, while daytime walk-up
fares would be more in line with airline fares. All of these suggest the rail carrier ought to focus much more
on better, multi-point metropolitan access rather than the traditional point-to-point approach hereto
adopted by the Japanese Shinkensen and the French TGV.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In the past thirty or so years, high-speed rail has pursued a limited-stop express business model. There are
good logic behind this:
" Customers prefer not to stop en-route.
" Short point-to-point times are required to compete with the airlines.
" High speed rail is perceived as a niche product serving the downtown-to-downtown business travel
market.
Such a business model has not generally proven to be profitable without government subsidies. Some of
this must change in future, to ensure a more sustainable basis for intercity passenger rail. Rail technology,
by nature, enjoys greater economies of density, scope, and scale (in seats per vehicle, number of stops en-
route) than air technology. Thus, it is in the rail advocate's interest to serve the mass-market, recovering
capital costs through Ramsey-pricing.
Better downtown distribution is one way to expand rail's market reach and market share, while realizing
potentially cost-saving economies. Having multiple rail terminals in the walkable neighbourhoods of large
cities is not only a good competitive response to cities with multiple airports, it is also a good way to serve
the large suburban population currently in a better position to access the out-of-town airfields. A
downtown railroad loop happens to be an effective layout for servicing the demand and for operational
reasons, although other layouts are possible. The main emphasis should be matching the supply of rail
terminals to the originating travel demands within the immediate locale, enabled by technology changes over
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the last century (Figure 2). Ideally, the "nearest rail terminal" should always be more accessible in any part
of the city except for the communities immediately adjacent to the airport. The rail depot could then once
again return as the focus of the community in an urban landscape, in a way that airports simply cannot - in
addition to providing good transportation services.
The detailed analysis demonstrates that in principle, a ring-railroad or a semi-circle with multiple stations
around the downtown centre can decrease access time for travellers originating from the city and combat
congestion at a single downtown union station. The London and Boston case studies show that a practical
routing could indeed be designed to give a total journey time reduction. A downtown ring may be less
expensive than many through-routes which criss-cross the city, but deliver similar benefits. Thus, a
downtown ring railroad is something that the passenger rail industry ought to study closely as an option for
enhancing its performance in terms of access time thus the overall customer utility of the journey
experience. The rail industry must seize this opportunity to regain its prominence as a part of the passenger
transportation system.
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Figure 1: Location of an Inner Ring Relative to City Neighbourhoods
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Figure 2: The Evolution from a Supply-Driven to a Commercially Focused, Market-Driven Railroad
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Table 1: Competitive Analysis of the Intercity High Speed Passenger Travel Market
Market Segment: Intercity Corridor Rail (320-960 km, 200-600 miles)
Rail Station Type Union Station Parkway Station Multi-hub/Ring
(1900's) (1980's) (The Future)
-0-- 4+ -0i--0~- 4+
Stations per Metro-Area One 2 to 3 Many
Mode
Private Auto
Strength Easy Access No Transfer
Weakness Long Journey Time Long Journey Time Long Journey Time
ScheduledAir
Strength Short Journey Time Short Journey Time Short Journey Time
Weakness Longer Access Time Longer Access Time
(local effect) (citywide)
Interciy Bus/Electric
Interurban
Strength Low Cost Low Cost Low Cost
Weakness Long Journey Time Long Journey Time Long Journey Time
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Table 2: TypicalJourney Time Estimates by Urban Railroad Layout and Market Segment
Union Station
Origin/Market Segment Access Buffer En-train
Urban Dweller
(Downtown Office) 0:10 0:05 2:00
(Ciy Residence,
Central Neighbourood) 0:15 0:05 2:00
(C0 Residence, Transit-Accessible
Neighbourhood, Rigbt-side) 0:25 0:20 2:00
(CiG Residence, Transit-Accessible
Neighbourhood, Wrong-side) 0:25 0:20 2:00
Suburbanite, Offpeak
(Right-side) 0:35 0:10 2:00
(Offside) 0:35 0:10 2:00
(Wrongside) 0:35 0:10 2:00
Suburbanite, Rush Hour
(Right-side) 1:00 0:30 2:00
(Offside) 1:00 0:30 2:00
(Wrongside) 1:00 0:30 2:00
Parkway
Access Buffer En-train Total
(use Union Station)
0:15 0:05 1:45
0:30 0:10 1:45
0:45 0:15 1:45
0:30 0:15 1:45
0:45 0:20 1:45
1:05 0:25 1:45
Multi-hub/Ring
Access Buffer En-train
0:10 0:05 2:05
0:15 0:05 2:05
0:15 0:15 1:55
0:15 0:15 2:15
0:10 0:05 1:55
0:10 0:05 2:05
0:10 0:05 2:15
0:20 0:10 1:55
0:20 0:10 2:05
0:20 0:10 2:15
Multi-hub structure impacts journey times in the following way:
0
0
0
0
0
Increase journey times by 5-minutes for city-center travellers
Decrease journey times by 20-minutes for some connecting passengers (from transit)
Decrease journey times by 5- to 15- minutes for off-side and wrong-side suburbanites in the off-peak
Decrease journey times by 15- to 30- minutes for off-side and wrong-side suburbanites in the rush hour
Increase journey times for right-side suburbanites, who may choose to use the parkway station instead
Note: Off-side and wrong-side suburbanites are in fact the majority, compared to the right-side
suburbanites. Although some journey times from the city center have become worse, running non-stop
expresses from the downtown at periods of peak intercity travel demand can mitigate the impact.
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Table 3: Projected Journey Times, Before and After a Ring-Railroad is Constructed around London
Origin/Destination
Local
Access
Time
Tube E,,pWait
Time
Before
Lsne-
haul J
Time -
Urban Dwellers
Big Ben/ Westminster to
The North East (Newcastle) 0:10 0:38 0:15 2:35
Imperial College (Paddington) to
Scotland (Edinburgh) 0:20 0:24 0:15 3:59
Heathrow Airport to
The Angia Region (Cambridge) 0:15 0:59 0:15 0:45
HeathrowAirport to
The Angia Region (Cambridge) 0:32 0:34 0:15 0:45
Harrow-on-the-Hillto
The South (Southampton) 0:25 0:29 0:15 1:25
Suburbanite, Offpeak
Hen/y-on-Thames to
Scotland (Glasgow) 1:24 0:34 0:15 5:15
Hen/y-on-Thames to
Scotland (Glasgow) 1:24 0:36 0:20 5:24
Chelmsford to
The South West (Pymouth) 0:47 0:43 0:20 3:54
Portsmouth to
The North West (Manchester) 1:44 0:33 0:20 2:46
After
Access Exp. Line-Routing Time Wait haul
Time Time
Circle Line/East
Coast Mainline 0:20 0:15 2:50
Hammersmith &
City/East Coast 0:20 0:15 4:11
Piccadilly Line/
Cambridge Flyer - - -
Heathrow Express/
Cambridge Flyer 0:32 0:15 0:57
Chiltern/Bakerloo/
South West Trains 0:44 0:15 1:46
Thames Trains/
East Coast 1:24 0:15 5:27
Thames Trains/
Virgin West Coast 1:24 0:20 5:33
Great Eastern/
Great Western 0:47 0:20 4:11
South Central/
Virgin West Coast 1:44 0:20 3:01
Routing
Victoria BR/Ring/
East Coast Mainline
Paddington BR/Ring/
East Coast Mainline
Paddington BR/Ring/
Cambridge Flyer
Bakerloo/Ring/
South West Trains
Thames Trains/Ring/
East Coast
Thames Trains/Ring/
Virgin West Coast
Great Eastern/Ring/
Great Western
South Central/Ring/
Virgin West Coast
* Local Access Time is the time to get from origin to a London BR Station, including any buffer time, etc required for
any transfers.
* Tube Time is the time taken to make the cross-London transfer from the inbound London BR Station to the
appropriate London BR Station for outbound travel, including the expected wait time for the London Underground
train.
* Expected Wait Time is half of the headway on the outbound services from the London BR Station. For longer
distance journeys with lower headways, this is decreased to reflect some planning.
* Line-Haul Time is the advertised trip time between the outbound London BR Station and the final destination.
Geographical Notes:
Westminster is the seat of the British Parliament in Central London, on the banks of the River Thames, at the Big Ben.
Imperial College is a nationally-renowned technical college of the University of London.
Harrow-on-the-Hillis an affluent neighbourhood of Greater London.
Henley-on-Thames is a town in the affluent Berkshire/Buckinghamshire/Oxfordshire suburbs (known as Thames Valley), where an
annual regatta takes place on the River Thames.
Chelmsford is a medium-sized city in the industrial Essex suburbs, where many people commute to London.
Portsmouth is a port city on the South Coast of England, within reasonable commuting distance of London.
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The Modern Day Oympian Hiawatha - a 'Limited" - at Glenview, Illinois.
Wouldn't it be wonderful if this train, like the North Shore Line, also made stops on the Loop?
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THESIS
- Enhancing access is more important than reducing journey time.
- 110mph is a reasonable top speed for most demographics.
- Three hours of in-vehicle time between major origin-destination pairs is a reasonable trip length.
* Three hours of access time from door-to-door is unacceptable!
- Carriers can compete more effectively with other modes if it controlled the local access.
OUTLINE
" North America is a suburban sprawl - getting to the train station or airport is more difficult than getting
between train stations or airports!
- Customers would rather sit on the train (and relax or work) than fight traffic on urban highways.
- The objective of the carrier is to maximize passenger utility, not to minimize in-vehicle time.
- Modern technology enables track-sharing, making high-cost urban infrastructure more cost-effective.
- Intercity Rail is not a transit! Customers are not captive, and customers want to be happy. Intercity carriers
are selling an experience, not just transportation.
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TRAINS ARE NOT PLANES
Why is a train not a plane? The nature of air technology is such that airports requires large amount of land
mass and intensive capital investment to support a limited number of take-offs and landings. Once airbourne,
infrastructure requirements are relatively modest. The nature of rail technology is completely different - the
terminal footprint is small but infrastructure costs rise approximately linearly with distance. Thus, planes are
good for long-haul point-to-point trips, whereas trains are good for pick-ups and drop-offs along a corridor.
Limited Stop
Network Design
Lower per-route-mile costs
High terminal costs
Dispersed demand generators
Focused generation at each node
Zone Express
Network Design
High per-route-mile costs
Lower terminal costs
Clustered demand generators
Demand generation not focused
The Future of North American Intercity Transportation...
Which would you choose?
High line-haul speed compensates
for longer access time
Photo: Ryan Tam, MIT Center for Transportation Studies.
This Depends on Economic Geography -
Where the Activity Centers are, and How Clustered they are.
Monday, January 13, 2003.
Shorter access time compensates
for lower line-haul speed
Photo: Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation Studies.
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U.S. ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
North America has a Distributed Economy. Some of the major U.S. economic and population centers are
separated by more than 600 miles. In such long-distance markets, air will dominate, since the line-haul speed
and the resulting shorter door-to-door trip time drives mode choice.
North America is a Suburban Sprawl. However, access to the airport within a metropolitan area will never be
particularly efficient. The high cost of the airport means that the densities in most metropolitan areas are
insufficient to support separate airports for each neighbourhood. In fact, airports generate significant
externalities and are not welcome in most neighbourhoods. Thus, aside from megacities like New York which
are able to support multiple airports, the access to the airport will remain poor for most part of the metropolitan
area. Consolidation of demands will necessarily occur, leading to long access times for those who do not live
near either conventional high-speed rail's downtown "union station" or the airport.
Here lies an Opportuniy for Rail Carriers...
Activity centers in North American metropolitan areas are sufficiently dispersed that a rail carrier can take
advantage of the inherent nature of rail technology to serve many more flows much closer to the point of origin
than an air carrier can practically do so without transfer. Since suburb-to-suburb travel is expected to dominate
intercity travel in North America in the foreseeable future, it is conceivable that strategically placed rail stations
will make high-speed rail service much more auto-competitive on shorter trips (50~150 miles), while making it
much more air-competitive on mid-length trips (150-400 miles).
Only lar e metropolises like Boston, Massachusetts, can support a busy
airport with many international and transcontinentalflights.
Photo: Ryan Tam, MIT Center for Transportation Studies
Limited Stop
for longer trips (More than 600 miles)
Demand from a large metro area is
consolidated to a "high speed access
point" such as an airport for the highest
possible port-to-port speed.
riowever, many -imertcans ave in me suourma afee -arpers Fery, west
Viyinia, and don't like to go downtown for intercioy transportation..
Photo: Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation Studies
Zone Express
for mid-length trips (150-400 miles)
Demand from a large metro area is
consolidated onto the same vehicle,
which makes multiple stops, to avoid
the long access time required by local
transportation.
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WHY ARE THE LIMITEDS NO MORE?
Today's Urban Areas are Different to ones that existed in the Golden Age of the Railway. The limited-
stop express business model is simply not applicable anymore. In the days of the famous Limiteds and Zephyrs,
metropolitan areas were much smaller and much more concentrated. Intercity travel were dominated by city-
center to city-center flows, and the railroad was the quickest practical way to travel overland. Thus, it made
sense for the fastest service to depart from the downtown union station (then a "high-speed access point") and
consolidate demand from the smaller metro area with streetcars. The consolidation was relatively efficient since
the access portion of the trip remained fairly manageable with smaller cities. Today, the fastest service is the air
service, and the "high-speed access point" is the airport; the railroad must find a new niche to survive.
Broadway Limited
Super Chief el Capitan
Rail is the fastest
Small metropolitan areas
Streetcar suburbs
Travel between city-centers dominates
Auto use not widespread
Interstate Highways not yet built
Acela Express
Virgin 'Pendelino'
Rail is most comfortable
Large metropolitan areas
Automobile suburbs
Travel between suburbs dominates
Small carless population
Interstates free and convenient
But... What new niche?
That New Niche, is Comfort and Accessibility.
Today, rail faces tough competition from two sides.
The automobile is ubiquitous, have very low up-
front, incremental costs per passenger and per trip,
and have very good access (especially in the suburbs
where parking is a-plenty). The leisure air fares are
affordable, the service is frequent, has much lower
journey times than most modes; despite the
difficulty of access, it is nonetheless a formidable
competitor even in rail's "home stretch" of
150~400 mile journeys. The intercity coach
continues to dominate the low-end of the market
with its very low cost of production. Passenger rail
will survive and thrive, if it exploits the competitors'
weaknesses; passenger rail will remain a curiosity of
the bygone era, if it continues to attempt to emulate
its competitors and pretend to be the fastest, the
most convenient, or the cheapest mode.
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Slow Fast
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WHY IS ACCESS IMPORTANT?
Access for Service. First and foremost, customers would like better access. While seasoned commuters may
not find transfers daunting or inconvenient, these are not our target customers when seeking to expand the rail
market share. Evidence from the airline industry suggests that direct flights are preferred by non-regulars,
especially those new to flying. Evidence from commuter rail suggests customers with high values of time dislike
transfers because they interrupt work. Commuters may be willing to pay a premium for facilities that will
eliminate transfers - for instance, Pennsylvania's elimination of Manhattan Transfer through the Hudson Tubes.
Access for Ridership. Secondly, public officials who are concerned about airport capacity and the negative
externalities that the airports generate understand that short-haul flights are an inefficient use of airport capacity
and would like to see more short-haul trips on rail. Providing better rail accessibility would encourage people
who would have never considered rail as a viable mode (perhaps because they live far away from downtown) to
use rail at least some of the time. This may reduce airport congestion significantly, since short-haul flights are a
significant proportion of total take-offs and landings at hub airports in large metropolises.
Access for Competitive Advantage. Last but not least, intercity rail carriers in Europe and North America,
many of whom struggles to make a profit without subsidies, would love to find a lesser capital-intensive way to
expand market share and revenues. Instead of investing in a faster railroad with infrastructure subsidies, perhaps
enhanced access would offer a lesser capital-intensive way forward.
Access is a Vin-Win-Win proposition:
There are no losers.
Higher Maximum Speed
Existing Customers
- faster trip, shorter journey time
Potential Customers
- service not really much different
Public Officials
- more infrastructure subsidies
Intercity Passenger Rail Carriers
- more maintenance costs
Transferring value from government to
consumers is-politically popular...
\-Ny
Better Access
Multiple Stations
( D Existing Customers
- service not really much different
Potential Customers
- shorter access time
friendlier local service
Public Officials
- reduced congestion & externalities
Intercity Passenger Rail Carriers
- larger market reach
Providing a service for which consumers
are willing to pay is good business.
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WHY DO CUSTOMERS WANT BETTER ACCESS?
(IS TEN MINUTES REALLY TEN MINUTES EVERYWHERE?)
Rail can Reduce Travel Time through Urbanized Areas. Rail is the most efficient mode with which one
could travel through heavily congested urban areas - this is widely confirmed in Japan and Europe. Rail has
small right-of-way footprint and high carrying capacity, compared with buses, private auto and airlines. Thus,
the leveraged portion of the intercity rail trip is the first ten miles and the last ten miles. By substituting rail for
auto or subway for the "access" leg of the trip, externalities (highway or subway congestion at peak hours) are
reduced, while the traveller saves valuable time.
Even if Travel Time is the Same, the Passenger is Better Off. Instead of an intermodal trip comprising of a
45-minute subway leg, 15-minute transfer time, 30-minute check-in, 1-hour air leg, 15-minute transfer time, and
another 45-minute subway leg, the passenger is able to replace the fragmented idle time with 3 hour 30 minutes'
of comfortable and perhaps productive time onboard a train to relax, work, or simply enjoy the scenery. If the
subway legs are necessary to reach the downtown rail union station, rail's advantages are lost. In Europe, many
high-speed rail riders are captive riders who don't have uncongested roadways to drive on! One study has shown
that travel time in the air has a twice the disutility of travel time in a railcar. The accessible rail replaces onerous
terminal time and access time with comfortable in-vehicle time - unlike the limited-stop high speed rail, which
erodes the in-vehicle time in favour of longer access times.
Customers don't like to Get Up and Walk!
Access
Access Access
Time
Saved
Buffer Buffer
(Wau--) B uff., svecd
Line-
haul
Equivalent
Line-haul
Time Saved
Equivalent
Line-haul
Time Saved
Line-
haul
Additional
Line-haul -
Time
Buffer Buffer
Access
Access Access
Time
Additional
Line-haul
Titne
Equivalent
Line-haul
Time Saved
Total
Equivalent
Line-
haul
Time
Saved
Equivalent Line-haul
Savings can be Substantial
Because Terminal, Buffer and Access
Times are particularly onerous, trying to
cut access time is a much better goal
than trying to cut in-vehicle time.
Generally access time is valued at twice
the equivalent in-vehicle time. Line-haul
time is much more comfortable.
Frequent Service will cut Adjustment Time
Schedule Coordination will cut Transfer Time
Reliable Access will cut Buffer Time
Terminal Shuttle will cut Access Time...
Enhanced Metropolitan Access
will cut All Of The Above!
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DO YOU LIKE NEXTBUS? Da
Somerille,
How does NextBus Work? Nextbus works by exchanging Mass.,you
uncomfortable terminal time (waiting at a bus stop) for more couldgrab a
comfortable adjustment time (waiting at home, at work, or in a coe wile
caf6), so that the passengers may arrive in time to meet the the bus
vehicle. The fact that many transit authorities are spending not inte
insignificant amounts of money on this technology suggests that pfall
air, if you
the value of time at a terminal, compared with the value of
"adjustment time", is clearly different. When studying intermodal the bus
itineraries, it is therefore critically important that the modeller would
should make clear distinctions between in-vehicle time, terminal Photo: Lexcie
- Lu, MIT
time, adjustment time, access time, and access time aboard Cee or
Transport-different modes and different vehicle/service types. a'o es
It's the Value of Time, Sir.
How does MetroFlyer Work? MetroFlyer works by exchanging uncomfortable terminal time and access time
(taking the subway downtown, then waiting for the intercity train to depart) for more comfortable in-vehicle
time (the quiet surroundings of a luxurious intercity train is much more comfortable than a taxicab sitting in
traffic or the noisy subway). In many cases, the total trip time is actually reduced. Even in the cases where the
trip time is not reduced, the quality of the trip is still much better since a greater proportion of the trip is spent
on-board a comfortable intercity train.
NextBus
Stay at Home for Longer
- staying at home is better than
standing at the curb
Know your Connexions
- reduces buffer time, since real-time
information enables tighter connexions
Know when the Bus will Arrive
- reduces waiting anxiety, disutility of
transfer time reduced
MetroFlyer
Stay On-board for Longer
- riding a long-distance train is better
than standing in a bus or subway
Know you will Make the Connexion
- reduces buffer time, since access is
shorter and subject to less variance
Reduces Transfers
- less need for schedule coordination;
shorter adjustment and transfer time
Monday, January 13, 2003.
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MODERN TECHNOLOGY ENABLES TRACK SHARING
Rail Infrastructure Offers Opportunities for Smart Growth. With today's intercity rail technology, there are
little reasons why infrastructure should not be shared between intercity, commuter, and urban rail operations.
Creating a dedicated rail right-of-way within the city (or reusing an old right-of-way) for the purposes of intercity
rail is not only beneficial for intercity travellers, but for neighbourhoods en-route which will receive an economic
boost, and also creates a corridor for urban regeneration. Intercity and Commuter trains, which may depart
every 15-minutes, can share tracks with FRA-compliant urban electric trains which will utilize the remaining
corridor capacity to deliver a subway-like service. Sharing of the right-of-way in congested areas is critical and
will create economies of density in infrastructure utilization otherwise not possible with commuter rail or subway
alone. Higher cosmetic standards would be required than a typical subway installation, but such investment will
also encourage more choice riders than otherwise possible.
Intercity Rail is an Opportunity for Transit Authorities...
... to offer Additional Subway Service with Spare Track Capacity
Downeaster to
Portland, ME
Commuter Amtrak
Rail
Exeter, NH To Portland, Maine
Exeter Exeter
Haverhill Nashua/Route 3 Haverhill Haverhill
Lowell Bradford
Regional Rail to Andover Lowell Xing/495 Lawrence
Lowell, MA and North Billerica Andover
Nashua, NH Wilmington Ballardvale
North Wilmington
Anderson 
Wilmington
Mishawum, MA Anderson
"Subway" Mishawum/128 Mishawum/128
Winchester
Winchester Medford Mystic Wedgemere
West Medford Medford Hillside West Medford West Medford West Medford
Ball Square Medford Mystic
Conr sStation Gilman Medford Hillside
Back Bay Assembly Square
BrooklineBall SquareGilman
Needham Heights Arborway Boston, MA Assembly Square
South Station
Hyde Park North Station North Station 
North Station
Congress St. Congress St. Congress St.
Route 128, MA South Station South Station South Station
Boston M etroFl Back Bay Back BayBrookline Brookline
Canton jct. New York, New Haven, Boston & Maine (NYNHB&M) Arborway Arborway ArborwaySRoslindale Hyde Park
Sharon Bellevue
Mansfield Roxbury Highland Route 128 Route 128
Attleboro West Roxbury
South Attleboro Hersey Cantonjct.
Pawtucket Needham Jct. Mansfeld
Needham Center
Providence, RI Needham Heights Attleboro
Regional Rail to South Attleboro
Providence Airport Pawtucket
Providence Providence
Intercity Rail to Providence Airport
New York & To New York &
Washington Washington, DC
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WHAT SPARE TRACK CAPACITY?
Modern Technology and Disciplined Operations allow High Track Capacity. On many modern transit
systems, headways as low as 90-seconds are routinely maintained. Current moving block signalling technology
allows headways down to the 75-second range. However, such headways are not routinely sustainable. Instead,
most manually operated transit systems regard 24 trains-per-hour (tph) as the maximum practical limit. Using
the hypothetical Boston MetroFlyer example, we found that a feasible operating plan could be created to cater
for combined operations of a 12tph Subway, a 4tph Commuter Rail, and a 3tph Amtrak over the same double-
track right-of-way - with reasonable margins for recovery should a disruption occur. (The signalling system was
assumed to allow trains to follow each other every 90 seconds.) Highly disciplined operations, combined with
modern signalling technology, will allow urban infrastructure corridors to be used to the maximum extent, and to
cater for trains of varying speeds.
Although the operating and maintenance costs of an FRA-compliant
subway will be higher, these costs are smaller than the cost of
providing separate rights-of-way through congested urban areas.
Assumptions: Sidings for same-direction passing at West Medford
(MFDW), Boston South Station (BOSX), and Brookline (BKLN),
with four tracks in the immediate vicinity of South Station. Subways
trains may have unscheduled delays of up to 72 seconds due to
congestion effects. Points can set-and-lock or reset-and-lock within
36 seconds. Photo: Joe Testagrose, New York City Subway Resources (hti //www.Vfudbwajor/)
Boston MetroFyer - Operating Plan
SUBW R/R AMTRAK
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EXRX
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BRFD
LWNC
ANVR
BLVL
NWMT
WMTC
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M128
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MFDW
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'ASMB
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HOW TO PROVIDE DOWNTOWN ACCESS & DISTRIBUTION
Multiple Union Stations. The basic idea for enhancing downtown access and distribution for intercity
passengers, is to extend the concept of the "union station", invented by North American railroads in the early
20' century to facilitate interline transfers and to reduce costs. The union station was an appropriate concept of
its time, since the smaller cities allowed a single terminal to be conveniently sited for most parts of the city.
However, as business district expanded, the important economic activities within a metropolitan area are no
longer within walking distance of the union station. Providing a number of union stations (where all terminating
trains call) within the metropolitan area will dramatically improve the access to high-speed rail services.
Can you resist the Ubiquitous railroad?
City Neighbourhooods have Different Character. When designing one of the many "union stations", it is
important to consider how it would be used. In the walkable downtown, business travellers are likely to walk to
the station, thus station spacing should be no more than about 1 miles. In the suburban areas, where densities
are too low to justify a "union station" for every neighbourhood, the stations should be designed as intermodal
transfer facilities featuring parking and mass-transit access. In many cases, one single union station with Park &
Rides on the beltway may be the correct answer. For some cities, a number of downtown access points are
clearly needed, especially where the walkable areas of downtown is more than about 1/2 mile in diameter.
It is also extremely important to pay close attention to both the needs of the locals and the through-travellers. If
the number of stations required to adequately serve the originating local riders is too high, a through by-pass
should be considered.
Ten Minutes to the Train
- the ubiquitous railroad WaterfrontNeighbouthoods
Multiple Union Stations
- allows convenient access from
all parts of the downtown
Multi-Purpose
Neighbourhood Stations
- by putting some of the union stations
close to the edge of the walkable downtown,
they could become multimodal
access points for the inner suburbs
Park & Rides
- provide accessibility for the outer suburbs
and edge cities, but these will not be
union stations since the time penalty
of detour for all trains would be significant
10 Minutes to the Train
fmm Anywhere in the Downtown..
central
Ek . Business .
District
Walkable City E3I
Neighbourhoods
Convenient Departures
from Any Suburb, to Any Direction..
No Congested City Driving!
,,ies
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CONNECTING THE DOTS
Different Layouts are Possible. Having determined the number of stations, these stations would need to be
linked such that as many of the terminating trains as possible call at as many of the stations as possible, while
minimizing the amount of new infrastructure required. In some cities, this is simply a question of changing the
service design using existing infrastructure. In other cities, perhaps new spurs or wyes would be required, or
"missing links" (because of historical oversight) would have to be built from scratch. Evaluation would be
required on a case-by-case basis, where project evaluation techniques could be used to calculate the expected
costs and benefits. Popular layouts to consider include: (1) East and West Park & Ride with Union Station, (2)
Trunk Distributor, (3) The Inner Ring Railroad. Other layouts are possible, depending on the local situation.
As a counterexample, consider the Penn Station in
Baltimore, Maryland. The station never realized its
full potential since it was sited on the edge of the
downtown and not particularly accessible. The
single union station downtown is as accessible to
the affluent suburbs as Baltimore Penn Station is to
the city!
j In Tokyo, a former suburban ring railroad has been
adapted as a downtown distributor for commuter
and regional interurban rail arrivals as the central
There are many ways of connecting stars toform constellations - and many ways to connect urban business district grew larger and became distributed
stations to form a metropolitan access network. Constellations are constrained by ancient Greek over a large area. Some Shinkensen is already
mytholog, while urban rail networks are constrained by existing infrastructure, available funds, and
planning mytholog(?) making edge city stops to facility transfers to these
Photo: Celestial map of the constellations from Elijah Burritt's CelesfiatAtlas (1835). distribution facilities.
Trunk Distributor Layout
Ring Railroad Layout suitable for riverfront or
suitable for inland hub cities, seaboard cities,
e.g. Atlanta, London, Montreal e.g. Halifax, Miami, Rotterdam
The ring is theoretically most efficient, in terms of ratio of catchment area to track mileage required. However,
there are operational issues associated with the ring, and most cities do not have downtown rights-of-way which
can be readily connected to form a ring. Thus, a ring can be a good alternative in a city in the early stages of its
development (perhaps in the developing world), whereas trunk distributors may be more realistic in busy cities
where new construction is difficult and expensive.
From the Limiteds and the Zephyrs to the 21st Century MetroFlyerAlex Lu
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DEMAND & MODE SHARE STUDIES
More than a One-Seat Ride. The purpose of enhanced access to intercity rail is not merely to provide a one-
seat ride for intercity riders. Most intercity riders would still need to transfer to a different mode to connect the
office or the home to the neighbourhood union station - those who are downtown would need to walk or take a
cab, and those in the suburbs would need to drive. The most important aspect of enhancing access is its eefect
on mode split. To illustrate this, we used a very simple utility model, based on the methodology discussed in the
Performance-Based Technology Scan paper (TRB 03-2545), to show that adding terminals will in fact give
intercity rail a big advantage over airlines - possibly more so than spending equivalent amount of money on
upgrading the right-of-way and increasing line-haul speed. The mode share projected is based on a decision rule.
Before - Single Union Station
Rail Dominates in the City Center
- rail has a significant advantage in the region
coloured blue.
Airlines Dominates the Rest of the
Metropolitan Area
- more than about two miles from the union
station, the rail advantage disappears.
Throughout the metro area, air is the preferred
mode because the shorter line-haul time
compensates for the access time, which become
more similar as the origin moves further away
from the union station.
New stations Signficantly affects local mode share...
After - Multiple Access Points
Rail Dominates
around Access Points
- the area of the blue region almost doubles,
depending on the location of
the new access point.
Air Domination is Decreased
- airlines continue to dominate in areas not
covered by rail terminals, but hopefully these are
areas of low demand.
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WHY WAS THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SUCH A BIG HIT?
For a moment, we would like you to image a possible world in which urban
interstate highways were built with just three interchanges in the major cities,
and one interchange for the smaller towns. This in fact represents a major
saving on construction costs, since finding the land within urban areas to
build large and complex interchanges can be a major part of the expense of
building urban expressways. However, would the interstate system have been
so successful for intercity passenger traffic if it had been built that way?
It's hard to imagine an effective interstate system where exits are constructed
every 40 or so miles in the rural areas, and cars would proceed on arterial
streets to the downtown before joining an expressway. The current high-
speed rail apparently operates on this business model.
16
0.*A
1 20
o 5 10 15 20 miles
20.
The current interstate system have effectively become a predominantly
commuter facility. True "interstate" usage on the interstate highways remains
very low - as evidenced by the continuing attempts to widen interstates close
to urban areas, but not the line-haul portions over the Prairies. Access is the
key to the urban expressway's success - both for attracting commuter traffic
and encouraging auto use for intercity trips, partly through the convenient
provision of the local-portion.
The Interstate is a Commuter Highway...
Equity Arguments for Scarce Urban Infrastructure, when framed in the context of serving a greater number
of people with transit than intercity and commuter rail, is valid. However, when pitted against the funds
continuing to be expended in upgrading urban and suburban expressways and airport access infrastructure to
benefit a small proportion of travellers, incremental investment in intercity rail transportation looks socially just
and wise. Most captive transit riders from the city do not drive on interstate expressways, either.
Other Methods of Addressing Inequities
* Differential Intercity Rail Pricing
- Ticket restriction based (market segmentation based on likely travel
purpose, and thus ability to pay)
- Time-period based (allowing off-peak fares close to marginal cost)
- Accommodation based (utilizes commuter vehicles in between peaks)
- Explicit Rail Discounts for Low-Income Users
- Congestion Pricing on Urban Highways
How many people here are real engaging in Interstate
Commerce? Even ifyou removed the commuters, would
Providing the service at the lowest common denominator is many people be driving to New Hampshire instead oftaking the train if the on# exits were downtown and at
not a way to ensure equity - it encourages the rich to dive. Route 128?
Photo: Dan "SPUI" Moraseski, MIT
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RAIL UPGRADE COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
Rail Upgrade Strategies. Invariably, when evaluating rail upgrades, the cheaper (or more cost-effective)
options are usually exercised first, followed by more expensive ones, up to the point when the combined values
of public benefits and rail operator revenues exceed the fully allocated costs of the upgrade. Thus, there is a
point of diminishing return. In many cases, you can achieve the majority of the benefits (say 80%) by investing a
little (e.g. 2 0%), but to achieve the maximum benefit you must invest heavily.
If you accept this hypothesis, then it is possible to conceptualize a graph correlating the cost-effectiveness of
upgrades (measured in perhaps cost per average minute saved) against the maximum speed achieved or the
method with which journey time reduction is achieved in the quest for speed. Obviously, some methods of
increasing speed, such as constructing a new right-of-way, are more expensive than others, such as increasing
superelevation by tamping. Increasing accessibility is a totally different way to reduce the trip time, and therefore
comes with its own cost-benefit tradeoff. The first station opened apart from the union station would be most
effective, and the incremental benefit from each additional station decreases as the number of station increases.
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Interestingly, it is the commuter and low-speed interurban carriers that have generally understood the
importance of access, while flagship trains like TGV and Shinkensen tended to terminate at a union station. In
evaluating further upgrades, additional stations ought to be considered as an alternative to achieving higher
maximum speeds - if the maximum speed is already more than about 110mph, often the more effective
investment would be in accessibility and not in further raising the speeds.
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WHY DO INTERCITY CARRIERS
LOSE MONEY?
Where is the Value in this Network? Consider the telecoms
network shown. The Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) have direct
access to customers, and are a monopoly element of the business.
The economies of density in local connections result in a natural
monopoly, making competition amongst rival LEC's extremely
difficult. The customer is captive to the incumbent LEC.
The Inter-Exchange Carriers (Carriers A and B) on the other hand,
are afforded no such protection. Since the number of exchanges are
limited, there is no natural monopoly. Depending on the regulation,
it is also possible for the LEC to influence competition between
Carrier A and B substantially, by choosing to route its traffic
differentially.
I e moon giows twrougp a cloua banl, J3an L'eg, ao7na
Photo: Joe Klein (http:Isychasersnet/ioeklein.him)
Carrer A 
Local Exchange Carrier
Thus, the value of the network is in the LECs - even if there were specific regulation allowing end-customers to
choose between different long-distance carriers, competition is likely to reduce long-distance rates to close to
marginal costs. On the other hand, the LECs have substantial pricing power. If LECs were permitted to enter
the long-haul business, it would have a substantial competitive advantage.
.
Long-haul
CarrierA
Carrie B
Truckig Lanes
In the freight industry, the local access carriers (trucking firms) are
indeed permitted to enter the long-haul business. Truckers have
substantial advantage over the railroads, due in part to their
control over the customer interface - and the natural monopoly of
urban highways. In effect, the truckers have only passed to the
railroads the traffic which is uneconomic to truck - such as
container flows over 1,200 miles.
Discarding the Value. Not surprisingly, in the passenger rail industry, even the premier trains of Europe and
Japan are not profit-making propositions when fully-allocated infrastructure costs are taken into account. By
going head-to-head with the airlines and not focusing on access issues, the high-speed rail has effectively turned
over control of the customer interface to transit or highway authorities! High-speed rail technology will simply
not win against the airlines on speed alone. In effect, the traditional high-speed rail has discarded the value in
the business by competing where it simply cannot win - on the line-haul portion of the trip.
Capturing the Customer. The MetroFyer concept exploits the
inherent advantages of rail transportation and captures the customer
interface at the local level (and with it much of the value in the
business). Rail is most effective in congested urban areas, while
airline and auto are least effective. In much of Europe and heavily
populated parts of the United States, the population centers are
often close enough to allow rail's inherent disadvantage in line-haul
to be overcome by much, much shorter access time.
Private Auto, o
Airline
TGV, Shinkensen
Transit, Auto, Regional Train
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Some Hypothetical Case Studies
Reali is the Dreams of our Forefathers.
(Norfolk Southern freights passing at Toledo, Ohio, on the former New York Central mainline.)
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METHODOLOGY FOR CASE STUDIES
In determining the access requirement for a given city, there are three major considerations:
- Demand Pattern
- Existing Infrastructure and Geography
- Routing
These can be described as something similar to a three-step process.
Demand Pattern. First, the demand pattern is established, using
a combination of local knowledge, census data and perhaps
limited passenger surveys. The census data at either the census
tract, traffic analysis zone or even block level can be very useful,
since it carries a wide variety of information. Median household
income is a fairly strong predictor of intercity travel demand, since
intercity travel is mostly a discretionary activity. Very-high income
neighbourhoods should be avoided, as with very-low income
neighbourhoods. High-speed rail's target customers lie within the
middle income bracket. This enables us to determine the
approximate location of the stops. This type of micro-analysis is
vital in building an effective local distribution system.
The notion of "teleport" is a useful one to consider at this stage.
For the average rail journey of two-hours in duration, if it is
possible to save an hour in access time for our target customers, in
terms of utility, high speed rail effectively becomes a teleport,
since the access time has twice the disutility of in-vehicle time.
Thinking about "teleports" also allows the planner to focus merely
on the access issues, and not worry about how to route the train -
at least, not at this stage. A usual question to ask is: "If you had to
plant five intercity teleports in this city to maximize ridership,
where would you put them?"
Demand Pattern Estimation
Where would you 0
build teleports in
your city to
maximize ridership? 0
Connecting the Dots
How would you link 0
the stations? Do you 0
need to change the
locations? Are there
existing infrastructure? 0
Determine Routing
Where would the
services begin and
terminate? Would it
serve all stations, or
just some?
Connecting the Dots. Having determine the location of the "teleports", the planner then attempts to connect
them in a logical fashion, keeping in mind the need to maximize the utilization of existing infrastructure and
corridors, and the local geographical constraints. At this stage, the locations of the teleports may need to be
moved. The extent to which they can be moved will depend on whether it is designed as a walk-up or a drive-
through access point. Walk-ups tend to be very sensitive to the exact location to within 1/4 mile - thus deviations
should be kept within that number.
Determine Routing. Finally, the planner determines the routing by making a service plan - given the routes
that will operate through or terminate in the city in question, what would the train service look like? The
important issue here is that most trains should be able to depart from most stations. At this stage, the
infrastructure may be revised to form a ring-layout, a trunk distributor, or other possible layouts. With the
layout, journey time and competitive mode-split analysis can then be carried out. The whole process is not too
dissimilar for the planning process used to design urban bus routes. Although the focus is different, the basic
ideas are the same. It is likely that similar planning tools as buses could be applied to find the optimal route.
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NORTH AMERICAN EXAMPLES
How can the Urban Distributor Concept be Appied?
To demonstrate that the journey time savings are real, we
evaluated the concept of the intercity urban distributor in
Boston, Massachusetts. The journey times shown are based
on a variation of the Boston MetroFyer scheme. While the
precise alignment must be selected through a rigourous and
specific project evaluation process, the sample journey time
savings projected here will be fairly robust regardless of the
actual alignment eventually selected.
Boston. This is a hypothetical scheme, and is referred to
here only to illustrate the order of magnitude of the actual
journey time savings possible if a similar scheme was
implemented. While this may not be possible in Boston, due
to the expense of construction downtown, there may be
other cities where such rights-of-way already exist and can
simply be interconnected to give rise to journey time savings.
Mishawum/128
North Station
Park St.
Back By 
-
South Station
To Route 128, New York ond the th
Columbus. For instance, in Columbus, Ohio, existing freight railroads already criss-cross the city. The former
Big Four alignment passes within one mile of Ohio State University and 1-270/1-71 at Worthington, an ideal site
for a Park & Ride. If the Big Four corridor was ever considered for a high-speed passenger rail upgrade, it is
important that multiple stops are made in Columbus to ensure the maximum catchment of potential demand.
Before the Railroad Dig (Boston)
Total Journey Time, Boston Residence to New York Penn Sta. (after Acela speed-ups through CT)
Road Air Bus Train Air-Rail DI
hrs mins hrs mins hrs mins ffin
Mishawum/128 4 hr 35 mins 3 hr 20 mins 6 hrl 15 mins 4 hr 28 mins 68 mins
Framingham, MA 4 hr 13 mins 2 hr 50 mins 5 hr 40 mins 3 hr 43 mins 53 mins
North Station 4 hr 39 mins! 2 hr 50 mins 5 hr 20 mins 3 hr' 38 mins 48 mins;
Park4treet 4hr 39 mins 2~hr 55 ins Shr 10 mins 3 hr 23 mins 33 mins
South Station 4 hr 39 mins 2 hr 50 mins 5 hr 00 mins 3 hr! 08 mins 18 mins
Conention Center 4 hr 39 mins 2 hr 35 mins 5 hrl 25 mins 3 hr 15 mins 40 mins!
Route 128, MA 4 hr 22 mins 3 hr 05 mins 6 hrj 00 mins 2 hr 56 mins -09 mins
Prof4dence, RI 3 hr 44 mins 2 hr 50 rnins 6 hr 20 mins 2 hr 50 mins 00 mins
New York, NY
[5] Negatite is rail faster
After the Railroad Dig (Boston)
total Journey Time, Boston Residence to New York Penn Ste. (after Acela speed-ups through CT)
Road Air Bus ' Train A
his m* hrs mins hrs mins
Mishawum/128 4 hr 35 mins 3 hr 20 mins 6 hr 15 mins 3 hr 45 mins
frarninham, MA, 4 hr 13ms 2 hr: 5n Shr! 40mins, 4 hr 13mins-
North Station mins 2hr " mins hr 2 -mins 3hr 18mins
Park Street 4 hr 39 mins 2 hr 50 mins 5 hr 10 mins 3 hr 13 mins
South Station 4 hr 39 mins: 2 hr 50 mins 5 hr 00 mins 3 hr 08 mins
Conwntion Center 4 hr 39 mins 2 hr 35 mins, 5 hr 25 mins 3 hr 00 mins,
Route 128, MA 4 hr 22 mins 3 hr 05 mins 6 hr O0mins 2 hr 56 mins
Providence, RI 3 hr 44rmins 2 hrl 50 mins 6 hr 20 mins 2 hr 50 mins
New York, NY
[5] Negative is rail faster
25 mins
283 mins
23 mins,
18 mins;
25 mins
-09 mins
00 mins;
Orlando. In Florida, where there
had been much discussion about
a high-speed rail system, rail
would likely be much more
successful in Orlando if it
connected the downtown, the
airport, and DisneyWorlds at
Kissimmee to Tampa, Miami and
beyond. Although new
construction would likely be
required, an arc connecting the
three intercity demand generators
would be much cheaper and nicer
than a system to funnel people to
a downtown collection point.
Critically, both the airport and
DisneyWorldo is en-route to
Tampa and Miami; additional
stations will eliminate
"backtracking" for rail riders.
Monday, January 13, 2003. 
17
Alex Lu From the Limiteds and the Zephyrs to the 21 st Century MetroFlyer
17, J r  13, 2003.
From the Limiteds and the Zephyrs to the 21st Century MetroFlyer
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS: LONDON, ENGLAND.
We developed a detailed operational planning model for a hypothetical downtown distributor ring in London for
intercity trains to understand the operational feasibility of the idea in more detail.
The hypothetical distributor (for intercity trains) is based loosely on
London Underground's Circle Line. The main result of the study was
that it was necessary to restrict the number of stops to achieve journey
time savings. However, if six key stations (out of 11) around London
were designated as "union terminals" where departures were possible in
every direction, the average cross-town travel times could be reduced
by 11 minutes. This is in addition to enabling a one-transfer ride across
London (instead of the present-day two-to-three transfers) and one-
seat ride into downtown. In general, transfer times using a "union
terminal" is reduced by 20 minutes, while the transfer times from the
other terminals remain unchanged. The twenty-minute saving is
extremely significant, against Railtrack's 2000 Network Management
Statement which calls for a "2020 Vision" of 2-5 mins in-vehicle time
reduction on most commuter routes, and -10 mins on intercity routes.
Cut Cross-London journey by 20 minutes
OStion
Dwel at Average
ArriMing (unn)[
station Speed
Miles (clo In(1] (mrph) [41
1.4
0.7
0.5
0.9
1.5
11.2
Cross-London Joumney Time [6]
W Walk [11
1 Anglia
2 ECMIL
3 MML
4WCML
5 M40
6 Great Westem
7 South Westem/Portsmouth
8 Brighton
9 Kent Coast
10 Soulthend (LTS)
BEFORE
..%6oftwhich
Running ' stio
Time for Dwellfor Stage Ar
skip- Thr Time clock
stops Trains Contrib. Tic
(min) (clIn) (clIn) (m
0.4 7 12.0 2.0 1 3.0
1 2
0.7 7 33.9 1.2 1 2.2
1.3
1. 2 5 44.0 1.6 1 2.81.4 7 26.0 3.2 1 4.2:
7 45.8 0.7 1 1.7
7 42.3 2.1 1 3.1
W
12
12
12
17
15
18
15
9
10
1 2
12 12,
25 25
30 30
40 40
28 25
74 65
30 27
37 34
38 35
56 55
55 66
3 4
12 15
F5 -28
30 30
40 40
25 25
65 65
27 24
34 31
35 3255 6666 71
Cross London Transfer pax (including Commuter Rail
Downtown London Terminating pax
Non-CBD Terminating pax
AFTER
... %_of which
Cross London Transfer pax (including Commuter Rail,
Downtown London Terminating pax
Non-CBD Terminating pax
Sum saved per day a
5
17
W55
65
50
40
51
61
73
7en
6
15
32
42
24
66
25
29
30
76P0
7 8
18 15
49 45
31 27
76 83
29 25
25 26
31 3056 67
75 70
pax/day
25% 231,393
55% 509,064
20/6 185,114
. .11 Ml Using a relatively simple methodology and
ti- clockwile lwellst
In'g ' .'mi'g"I conservative assumptions, we estimated the daily directl , hrr passing assmpiosthoniiIn) (min) SngsX (min) [1]
30 13.9.9 9 0 benefits to commuters and intercity riders to be at least3.0 13.9 13.9 10
5.2 11.7, 11.7 101 $1.34 million per day in time saved alone. Although the
9 01 9 5 infrastructure necessary for this type of public works
are necessarily expensive, the benefits are substantial
18.9 0.0 10, and are distributed widely to a large proportion of
12.9 1riders (instead of route-specific high-speed upgrades
9 10 Station Tube Stop which only benefit specific origin-destination pairs).
9 10
*KingsX K'3Pas By constructing the infrastructure at the focal point of
2 66 St Pancras KGX/St Pancras
8 56Euston Euston Square the system, riders on many routes would benefit.
76 Marylebone Baker St
68 65 Paddington
48 60 Waterloo
64 60 Victoria
33 60 London Bndg
67 40 Fenchurch S
Transfer TI Value
58
29
58
pax/day Transftr TIValue
25% 231,393 47
55% 509,064 23.5
20% 185,114 58
Paddington
Waterloo
Victoria Of course, investment in intercity infrastructure
eLondon Bridge
I TowerHill downtown should not divert scarce funds from urban
$hr Acces infrastructure. However, track-sharing is possible; re-
$15' $3,355k<
$15 $3,691k use of existing urban infrastructure is possible; and
$15 $2,684k
removing outer suburban commuters from transit
Sihr Accesa TI systems at peak hours may actually benefit local transit
$15: $2,719k
$15 $2,991k riders. The environmental concerns of such major$15 $2,684k
works in established urban areas are considerable, but$1,336k
the benefits are also considerable. Downtown
distribution is clearly a leveraged area in passenger rail.
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KingsX
Euston
Marytobone
Paddington,
South Kensington
Victoria
Waterloo
London Bridge
Fenchurch St
Liverpool St
Isolingfon
KingsX
Total
5
7
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CONSTRUCTION IMPACT CONSIDERATIONS: ORLANDO, FL.
Where is it useful? High-speed rail will necessarily involve substantial new
construction. When considering constructing a new system, attention should be
focused on where the demand generators are - simply linking downtown to
downtown in a straight line is not necessarily effective, especially in cities where
the downtown may not be the economic, tourism, or cultural focus. The example
shown here, a conceptual diagram of how the distribution network around
Orlando might look, serves to illustrate how this idea might have practical value.
Visitors to DisneyWorld* from Tampa, is unlikely to choose the high-speed train
if they have to travel to Orlando and "backtrack" some 12 miles out to the final
destination. DisneyWorld® also serves as a Park & Ride for 1-4 and the suburbs.
100%
750/
50%
250/
0%/
conceptual
Diagram
20mph 40mph 60mph 80mph
Maximum Speed of High-speed Train
within the Metropolitan Area
O rlando I..
* tstig Ai ort
DisneyWord
Intercession Citylce-
How do we build it? The effective re-use of existing infrastructure and
rights-of-way is key to constructing a cost-efficient urban distribution
network. By limiting the train speed in the urban area to just a little
more than what can be expected from a subway car (say about 45-60
mph), many alignments previously considered too constrained now
become viable. The subway-like speed is key: in congested urban areas,
the subway remains the most effective way of getting around. Even with
urban expressways present, that speed will remain competitive with the
private auto as a feeder mode, while the highway network experiences
increasing congestion in future. Increasing train speed beyond about
60mph in local portion of intercity trips is expensive, and probably will
not lead to significant increase in ridership. In addition, speeds above
60mph make track-sharing with subway-like service extremely difficult.
Re-use of Existing Infrastructure is key...
The Florida Example. The existing Atlantic Coast Line alignment is used Driving to reach the
almost unavoidable,
between downtown Orlando and Bee Line Expressway, where a 3-mile diversion Ride with car-hir]
alongside the highway right-of-way would be needed to reach the airport terminal. than having to driv
Exiting to the south, an existing industrial spur could be used to reconnect to the
mainline. Another 8-mile diversion alongside the Florida Greenway would be
necessary to reach DisneyWorld®. Exiting to the south, another 5-miles of new
trackage would be necessary to connect to the mainline at Intercession City.
Compared to simply constructing a high-speed cut-off through heavily urbanized
areas to reach the downtown perhaps 15 minutes faster, the winding alignment is
likely to be cheaper and offer better ridership potential.
Without detailed engineering studies, it is not known if the line will
permit the desired speed of 60mph. Since it is mostly laid out
alongside existing corridors, disruption will be limited to easing
tight curves. Very little wholesale taking of properties would occur.
beach oncejou get to Florida is
but driving from a Park &
cdlities near afreeway is better
fmi a downtown rail terminal
h, Florida (htp:1 ,/ 1w .dVnas.a co
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WITHIN-CITY DEMAND ANALYSIS: LOS ANGELES, CA.
Decentralization of Economic Activities. Access is even more important in
decentralized cities, although the focus would not be on walk-up demand but
on situating Park & Rides such that the high speed rail can be reached from
most parts of the city reasonably quickly, and the parking lots do not become
so large as to make the auto-to-platform walk substantial.
In lesser dense and highly decentralized cities such as Los Angeles,
constructing a new right of way to host high-speed rail and give increased
access may be easier from an engineering standpoint. However, from a
planning perspective, the more suburban living style may mean planning
permissions are more difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, a state-level agency may
have the authority to bypass local zoning ordinances.
F. 64N &LWEL IVALLIV
OLMMAN _.- OWTAUU1 AWDNY0
LAI AiMSLEN IA4M STA IUV
LAX 4INPOCWT
ANAHEIM
UWWEWTV WPM~ (LWrfi *= W
fC) CAAl VOENJA HiGH W5FL XAU RAL IFHUOT EFAVI' OFWD
The current plan in Los
Angeles calls for study of a
number of stations, but does Even though ther is a recognitabk downtown in Los
not seem focused on the Angeles, most of the economic activity occur in suburban
needs of the core city itself. business distics.
Photo: Matthew Weathers, htt:llwuw.mAuhwmathers.om/
The two routes to San Diego follow traditional corridors but
the airport spur seems operationally inconvenient and many
areas of Los Angeles seems underserved. Potentially, transfers
would be required at Union Station, which may also become an operational bottleneck. Los Angeles does not
seem to be designed as a through-node, and the routing appears to be based on existing Metrolink services.
Direct service... enables work without interruptions
Applying the 'Ring' concept, we believe that Los
Angeles's dispersed origin-destination pattern is
better served by a high-speed rail network similar to
the one shown to the right. By making LAX a
through-station and part of the metropolitan ring
for LA, we can avoid the awkward spur and serve
the busy business districts of Santa Monica, Long
Beach, and students at UCLA directly. Terminating
trains will travel around the ring and reverse
directions, while through-trains will travel either via
LAX or LA/Union. Arriving trains on the Inland
Route may continue to San Francisco or simply
return to San Diego via LAX and the Shore Line.
California High Speed Raiil
L.A. Area - Hypothetical
Burbank a
To San Diego
vsia Inland Route
Santa Monica
LAUnion
I uxA Noi TFullerton
Too many permutations of services would be confusing to passengers. However, with reasonable service design,
many more points on the network would be directly connected without transfer at LA/Union. Not only does
this save time for passengers, they may also have luggage and may be travelling with small children, or prefer to
work without interruptions. Direct service looks a lot more attractive than a hub-and-spoke type design.
From the Limiteds and the Zephyrs to the 21st Century MetroFlyerAlex Lu
Monday, January 13, 2003. 20
CURRENT ACTUAL PLANNING STUDY: NEW YORK, NY.
New York's Railroads was like London. Through
historical accident, commuter railroads around New
York have long terminated at a number of different
stations. In the past, each terminal was dedicated to a
fixed set of routes, as in London. More recent
improvements has allowed some terminals to be
reached from more routes, through transfer stations
such as Secuacus, Jamaica, Newark, Flatbush and
Hoboken. The presence of many terminals recognizes
the fact that New York has many activity centers
(Midtown, Downtown, Jersey City, Brooklyn Heights)
and that a single union terminal would be inappropriate.
Penn Sta.
Jamaica
Hobokenab
Flatbush
Relationship between Local Transit and Intercity Rail. The multiple terminals serve to
decentralize the distribution of commuters, reducing the need for very large terminal
facilities. Nonetheless, Penn Station continues to experience capacity shortages. The
current MTA planning studies "East Side Access" and "Access to the Region's Core"
acknowledge the need for regional trains to service more than one location in the
downtown by proposing a link-up between Penn Station and Grand Central. Ideally,
Downtown, and other activity centers of significance would be directly served by intercity
rail, although at present the benefits seem limited, given the high density of local transit.
At off-peak times, when the commuter-oriented downtown distribution infrastructure is not
being intensively utilized, it is likely that the mode-share of high-speed intercity trains would
benefit from calling at more than one station within the metropolis. Amtrak trains from
Boston can call at Baychester/95 Park & Ride, 125' Street, Grand Central, Penn Station,
Secaucus/NJ Turnpike Park & Ride, and Newark to maximize accessibility to high-speed
rail service.
How does Access Impact Total Trip Time? Taking a trip between
Harvard Sq., Cambridge, Mass. and the Upper West Side in Manhattan,
New York as an example, improving access reduces the trip time by
more than 30 minutes, in addition to allowing a longer in-vehicle time.
Off-pa-k .T
T=. .1
*Th V
BetterAcc- BetterAcc- Air
T I
V.1k
Aut.
Comparing the auto as
, a feeder mode against
transit is appropriate
as a faster train that
terminates in the
5:15 downtown will not
allow the auto to be
used as a feeder mode.
Parking & congestion
are major issues at
downtown terminals.
The high densigy and qualit of local transit options in Manhattan
means that incremental benefit of enhancing acressfor intercio rail is
limited. However, access is still an important issue, and needs to be
addressedfor the interiy rail to compete effective#y against those who
choose to drive to a Park & Ride on Metro-North orfy into JFK
Airport and take Transit.
Both Photos: Father Mark Meyer, Maryknoll Catholic Mission.
(&" - a
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MISCELLANEOUS CASE STUDIES
Cleveland. Expert panel analysis suggests the main downtown activity center lies between Public Square (near
Cleveland Union Terminal) and 1-90, an area of approximately 1.5 miles in length. The current Waterfront
station is relatively distant from the main activity centers. MetroFlyer-type approach would restore direct rail
service to Cleveland Union Terminal, and open a new station near Cleveland State University to serve both walk-
up demand and to provide a downtown Park & Ride. New infrastructure would be required in the form of a
new rail line beneath or above 1-90.
Pittsburgh. The main constraining factor in Pittsburgh is likely to be the challenging terrain. The downtown is
divided into two main activity centers: The Golden Triangle, and Oakland. Using mostly existing rights-of-way,
it was found to be possible to serve the downtown, Oakland at Forbes Ave., and a number of Park & Ride
options outside the city. The MetroFlyer approach would consider the location of existing mainlines with
respect to modern demographics, and re-route trains accordingly (after infrastructure upgrades). For instance,
trains departing to the East could exit via the former Pennsylvania, if it happens to serve the best suburban
locations, but interchange to the former B&O via the Youngwood/Scottsdale alignment (if the B&O were
chosen as the main East-West passenger trunk route).
High Speed Routing. If the U.S. is committed to a high-speed passenger rail system, it is conceivable that the
New York Central and Pennsylvania mainlines could be re-constructed as four-track freight arteries, taking the
pressure off the B&O, which could then be re-constructed for high-speed passenger use. The current approach
of designating existing historical trunk corridors as "high speed corridors" may (1) overlook real opportunities
for consolidation and maximizing service-effectiveness by using a combination of old mainlines, branch lines,
spare highway rights-of-way width (reserved for widening), and abandoned alignments; (2) require more
mitigation for freight customers than otherwise necessary. Fundamentally, there are not many reasons to build
more than one dedicated passenger mainline between the Northeast and Chicago (and similarly, not many
reasons for more than one dedicated freight mainline).
"U"ME"T San Francisco. Although San Francisco is not a city with
multiple "walkable" downtown business districts, the current
California high-speed rail plan acknowledges that access is an
aAAFAAS important issue in the greater metropolitan area. Especially
NW MPA1FRT IEUNr/ in dispersed cities on the West Coast, economic activities
a w R1EWARM occur in many locations other than the downtown. The plan
provides for branch to Oakland and stops at Redwood City
and San Jose - important suburban city terminals upon
which the success of the high speed rail depends.
(2; AiIVRNIA w1 .MffDRAl AL)Ttt;RIT EL.IOV
In San Francisco, the ring concept is inappropriate as the San Francisco Bay Crossing is more than four miles
wide and it would be very expensive to connect San Francisco to Oakland. Especially for residents living far
from the airport, having a local station within a 15-minute drive is a major advantage for rail service. The
stations need to be designed with the local environment in mind - while we can expect some walk-up ridership
in downtown San Francisco, the other stations are likely to be more of a Park & Ride nature.
In practice, exiting the Bay Area due South is likely to be the only high-speed alignment in the future, due to the
lack of large populations due North and the physical difficulty of constructing a direct line to Sacramento. The
Bay Area, being a stub-end type location, the ring concept is not as important as it is in a node where the rail
services depart in many different directions.
Monday, January 13, 2003.
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WHY IS OVERNIGHT RAIL SERVICES IMPORTANT?
In the same way that urban rail corridors could also be used for subway service if the
vehicles were made compatible, a series of interconnected high-speed rail and regional
rail corridors could be used for overnight services. Given the dominance of
infrastructure costs over vehicle costs, if a service could reach operating self-
sufficiency at all, it should be operated - the increased utilization of interurban
infrastructure (typically not capacity-constrained at night) will increase the benefits
leveraged from the investment beyond that available from economic development
fostered by high-speed rail corridors.
Overnight Service: journey time Magically disappears!
Why is Access Important in Overnight Rail? Overnight Rail's main competitive advantage lies in the fact
that, operated over reliable infrastructure, it is able to depart from the originating stations close to the time when
the travellers are ready for bed, and arrive at the destination shortly after they have finished breakfast. To the
traveller, this feels like being teleported: journey time has magically disappeared. Even if they departed the
previous day or early in the morning, they would still have had to sleep at home or in a hotel room. However,
that important advantage is eclipsed if the traveller needs to spend more than about an hour at either end getting
to and from the rail terminal; over the distances that overnight high-speed rail are typically competitive
(600~1,200 miles), a morning flight can just as easily result in an arrival at the same time at the final destination,
while allowing the traveller the same amount of sleep, if more than an hour is required in access time. Transfers
to and from late-night corridor rail services is not acceptable, since sleep would then be interrupted. Thus, the
overnight train must fulfil the functions of both the regional collector and the overnight line-haul. In heavily
urbanized areas such as the Northeast, this means station stops are required about every 30 minutes of runtime -
even if it is not strictly optimal, as it is necessary to maximize catchment and retain competitive advantage.
The Capitol Fryer
Ann Arbor, MI ptlFy rBsoMMilwaukee, WI Detroit, MI Legacy of the B&O Boston, MA
Providence, RI
Toledo Transfer, OH New Haven, CT
Gary, IN Cleveland, OH NY Long Island
Chicago, ILAkoO
Youngstown, OH
Pittsburgh, PA Philadelphia, PA Trenton, NJ
Using a basic analytical approach, we were Baltimore, MD Wilmington, DE
able to show that by constructing or upgrading
1,380 miles of high-speed rail trackage, 49% of the Washmgton, DC
Richrnond, VA
population of the adjacent states (or 22% of the U.S.
population) would be within an hour's drive (or transit ride) of a high-speed rail station, where there would be
local corridor departures and long-distance overnight departures. Demand analysis demonstrated that all stations
would receive at least one train daily, and some will receive two trains, in addition to the corridor services already
planned or in operation on these corridors. There are substantial benefits to operating overnight services over
interconnected high-speed corridors, and more research, perhaps with GIS, is needed to explore the possibilities.
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OVERNIGHT CASE STUDY: THE CAPITOL FLYER
Assuming a service speed of 125mph, we found that overnight
services between the Northeast and the Industrial Heartlands are
indeed feasible operationally, and could generate considerable
demand. Coupled with the corridor services in the Northeast, the
Midwest, and perhaps throughout Western Pennsylvania and Eastern
Ohio, a credible National Interurban Passenger Rail Network could
be built. At a time when air infrastructure is perceived to be subject
to disruptions, if the right incentives are offered, broad support from
the states may be possible - given the large number of people it
would serve.
Who would support this? The urban population would
be a core supporter, especially if the investment results in
new urban infrastructure for transit, with differential
pricing applied such that the urban poor is not
disadvantaged. The suburban population perceives a large
advantage in no longer having to drive to the airport, and
having their own local access point (Park & Ride) to the
national network, reducing trip times and providing
additional intercity transport options at times of heavy
interstate congestion. The rural population, which makes
up about half of the U.S. population, have the strongest
reason to object, although if the construction leads to
economic boost in the short term, and the environmental
effects are mitigated in a sensitive fashion, there may be
some support from states that are predominantly rural.
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Public Timetable, based on Preliminary 125mph Operating Plan, The
Capitol Flyer. (Source: How to Run Overnight Senices Profitably -a Case
Study in Eastern U.S., Alex Lu, 2002.)
The broad accessibility of the Interstate Highways helped to secure
bipartisan support for its funding. If high speed rail were to become
more accessible, both to the rural and the urban population, it may
receive similar support.
Operating Plan, The Capitol Flyer. Based on preliminary
operations analysis, an electrified double track main line would be
sufficient for all services shown in the example public timetable.
Using methodology similar to that demonstrated in the earlier
Boston MetroFlyer case study, high density signalling in urban areas
will further enhance the usefulness the infrastructure by allowing
regional rail and urban transit services to be offered. The overnight
service will leave from strategic stations at between 9pm and 11pm,
arriving at the destinations at between 7am and 9am - in plenty of
time for the start of the next business day. Some trains are required
to pause at a "Sleeping Siding" near Cumberland, Maryland, to
ensure that the trains do not arrive too early. Essentially, this
operating plan is based on a linear hub-and-spoke network.
Monday, January 13, 2003. 
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BALANCE SHEET: HIGH SPEED RAIL V.S. METROFLYER
High Speed Rail 1 MetroFlyer
Typical Route Length 200 miles 220 miles
Typical Scheme upgrade 100mph to 125mph 10 miles of 60mph new
(rural areas) right of way (urban areas)
Typical Costs $ 1.0 billion $ 2.0 billion
Ratio of Investment 1 2
Typical Annual Ridership
(enhanced facility)
Intercity 1 million paxs 200,000 paxs
Regional zero 1,250,000 paxs
Urban zero 5,000,000 paxs
Typical Time Savings
Intercity 24 minutes 15 minutes
Regional zero 12 minutes
Urban zero 20 minutes (over bus)
Elimination of Transfers zero saves additional 10 mins
Pax-hr Savings /year 400,000 hours 6 h
Values of Time Saved /hr
Intercity $25 $35 (saves access time)
Regional not applicable $25
Urban not applicable $10
Typical Benefits /year
(calculated)
Intercity $10 million $2.92 million
Regional zero $11.5 million
Urban zero $25 million
Total $10 million $39.4 million
Benefits recoverable
through farebox (75%
Intercity, 50% Regional) $7.5 million $7.92 million
Net Present Benefit (50
yrs, discount rate = 7%) $138 million $544 million
Benefit per unit of
investment 1.41 2.7
Dollar for $, MetroFyer is about twice as effective
as a comparable High Speed Rail scheme.
Alex Lu From the Limiteds and the Zephyrs to the 21 st Century MetroFlyer
25Monday, January 13, 2003.
FROM THE LIMITED EXPRESS TO THE METROFLYER
In the past thirty or so years, high-speed rail has pursued a limited-stop express business model. There are good
logic behind this:
- Customers prefer not to stop en-route.
- Short point-to-point times are required to compete with the airlines.
- High speed rail is perceived as a niche product serving the downtown-to-downtown business travel market.
Such a business model has not generally proven to be profitable without government subsidies. Some of this
must change in future, to ensure a more sustainable basis for intercity passenger rail. Rail technology, by nature,
enjoys greater economies of density, scope, and scale (in seats per vehicle, number of stops en-route) than air
technology. Thus, it is in the rail advocate's interest to serve the mass-market, recovering capital costs through
Ramsey-pricing.
Single downtown station of magnificence and splendour, with rail
halts en-route due to steam traction & signalling technology.
The Old Railway
Multiple stations in metropolitan areas caters for intermodal
transfers, closely matching supply to demand.
The 21" Century Railroad
Simply removing intermediate stops and upgrading the linespeed
does not fully exploit the advantages of modern rail technology.
The "High Speed Rail"
Better downtown distribution is one way to expand rail's market reach and market share, while realizing
potentially cost-saving economies. Having multiple rail terminals in the walkable neighbourhoods of large cities
is not only a good competitive response to cities with multiple airports, it is also a good way to serve the large
suburban population currently in a better position to access the out-of-town airfields.
The main emphasis should be matching the supply of rail terminals to the originating travel demands within the
immediate locale, enabled by technology changes over the last century. Ideally, the "nearest rail terminal" should
always be more accessible in any part of the city except for the communities immediately adjacent to the airport.
The rail depot could then once again return as the focus of the community in an urban landscape, in a way that
airports simply cannot - in addition to providing good transportation services.
Monday, January 13, 2003.
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MetroFyer equipment is comfortable, not value-engineered, just likeyour lounge at home -
not a subway car, not a high-speed train, not an aeroplane.
(Amtrak #449 at Albany, New York, waiting for a connexion with #49 en route to Chicago.)
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G. TECHNOLOGY VIGNETTES FOR RAILROADS
Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation Studies
Based on the research group's practical railroad operations experience, a number of ideas for potential
applications of technology had been developed for future railroad research programmes. The approach
taken in this section is generally thought of as "market-pull", where the current operators and managers are
attempting to persuade the technologists to come up with an invention to solve their problems. The
technological ideas and application we discovered through brainstorming and interviewing operating
personnel range from near-term, immediately applicable technologies that enhance day-to-day operations to
long-term concepts that may change the system as fundamentally as the steam to diesel and D.C. to A.C.
transition. The following table is a summary of the technology ideas:
" Optical Coupler for Budd Cars
" Long Pantographs Stable at High Speeds
" Electroluminescent wire/surface
* Combined Intermodal Dispatching Systems
* Biological Breeding of Coach Designs
" Half Person Crew: Remote Operations
" Sensor Chair: For a More Comfortable Ride
" Application of Neural Technologies to Traction Control
* No More Gauge Corner Cracking - Track that Changes Colour
" Magnetically-guided High Speed Rail Systems
A brief review of the ideas are presented in this working paper, from the most immediately applicable to the
most conceptual.
5.1 Optical Coupler for Budd Cars
Couplers are a maintenance headache, well known throughout the railroad and transit industries. The
current technology is inadequate. AAR-derivative couplers require a manual connection of 27-pin MU
jumper, brake pipe, and HEP line between two carriages by the conductor. Not only is this a potential
hazard, it is also a time consuming process, with a known history of high failure rates. Various solutions
have been developed to address this problem. On British Rail metals, as many as three different types of
"intelligent" couplers are in use. With the advent of optical technology, it is conceivable that the electrical
connexion between adjacent carriages may one day be replaced with a laser-based information transmittal
link. The laser link would function in all weather (given a line-of-sight between the transmitter and the
receiver), and would require minimal maintenance since there will be no moving parts and everything would
be solid-state. If an information link cannot be made, the operator simply needs to clean the glass.
5.2 Long Pantographs Stable at High Speeds
Long pantograph have not generally been developed. This has meant that there are height restrictions for
freight vehicles in electrified territory. The longest pantograph available are those on the Eurostar which
has British dimensions but has to traverse under the wires in Europe which has a more generous loading
gauge. The loading gauge in the Chunnel is also high but it will not support double stack operations. By
developing pantographs and catenary supports which will support double-stack operations "under the
wires", greater economies of density can be reaped from an expensive piece of infrastructure by allowing
double-stack and high-speed passenger trains to share the same track.
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5.3 Electroluminescent wire/surface
Railroads used luminescent things for many reasons: signals, emergency lighting, permanent speed
restriction warning signs, posession limits, etc. Over the past few years, traditional lamps with coloured
lenses had been replaced with LED clusters. Electroluminescent Wire is a new technology which combines
some of the properties of the existing lighting technologies. The basic design for the electroluminescent
wire makes use of a transparent material (some kind of polymer) which is excited by the passage of A.C.
current, and emits light of a specific color. It should be theoretically possible to build the device into a flat
panel. This can clearly be used as a subsitute for a railroad signal whilst occupying less space than both the
conventional bulb. It would also be possible to build active panels for speed restriction warning signs.
5.4 Combined Intermodal Dispatching Systems
The current state-of-practice in the trucking industry calls for dispatching decision-support models which
use a combined demand model and optimization model to dispatch trucks for optimal utilization and also to
assist in pricing. The concept has not been extended intermodally. Conceivably, if the railroad intermodal
network is run in a scheduled departure fashion, the 'slots' available onboard an intermodal train could
affect optimal utilization of truck trailers and tractors. Under a total logistics company framework, a model
could be developed to assist the railroad carrier in winning a greater proportion of intermodal business if
through its scheduled network, trucking companies are able to decrease their operating costs through more
efficient use of drivers and tractors.
5.5 Biological Breeding of Coach Designs
There are many different coaching stock designs throughout the world, each with its own strengths and
weaknesses. Each had been designed to different engineering standards. The efforts to standardize had
been slow and the lessons learned by a particular group of design engineers are not necessarily applied to the
designed produced for a different railroad by a different group of engineers. Genetic algorithms are already
able to "cross-breed" different diesel engine designs to produce a more efficient diesel with characteristics
such as lesser emissions and design features such as shape of cylinders etc "inherited" from its "parents".
Through an iterative process of introducing random perturbations and then selecting the most successful
engines, development is cut down drastically. This process may be applied to the coaching stock design
process.
5.6 Half Person Crew: Remote Operations
In general, in low density freight operations on single-track railroad, the train spends much of its time sitting
in sidings waiting for passing maneuvers. This is not an effective use of traincrew time. With better and
cheaper video transmission technologies, it is conceivable that a train could be operated with a remote crew,
especially in rural areas this could lead to considerable savings. The view of the right-of-way and the
instrument panel readings could all be transmitted back to an office using a wireless link. While the train is
waiting for the signal, the train could be immobilized and the engineer could take over the control of a
different train, effectively allowing less-than-one-man crews on average on a given set of trains. There are
also economies associated with eliminating field operations - traincrew logistics would be simplified, with a
central sign-on and sign-off location. Working environment for the traincrew could also be improved.
5.7 Sensor Chair: For a More Comfortable Ride
Train seats are uncomfortable. Current seats aren't specifically designed for comfort. Aside from
ergonomic designs adapted from office furniture, sensors also could be fitted to seats, along with active
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support fibres woven into the seat that will change stiffness and other physical properties with an electrical
signal. The chair thus "adapts" to each rider depends on her posture and gives a more comfortable ride.
5.8 Application of Neural Technologies to Traction Control
This is a century-old problem which forms the core of the train engineer's skill: the ability to start a train
against a steep grade in the rain. This is the reason why engineers have to 'learn a traction', and a very
important part of 'learning a route'. More commonly this is done in a brotherly fashion; experience is
passed on from generation to generation, whether correct or not. Not running the train at the maximum
coefficient of friction permitted by the rail conditions will lead to unnecessary loss of time and deviation
from schedule; attempting to run the train at above the maximum coefficient of friction will result in signal
overruns and mechanical damage when the wheel spins.
EMD has developed very sophisticated wheelspin control systems, giving the engineer much control even in
the worst of rail conditions. Nonetheless in bad rail conditions it is still possible to spin the wheel.
Defensive driving isn't really a satisfactory solution. The performance of the rail system could be enhanced
if the engineer didn't have to worry about braking when the machine could operate at its maximum
performance. Neural networks are already used in many areas to create illusion of artificial intelligence.
Basically, neural networks are used to detect subtle correspondences between a set of inputs and a set of
outputs which are perhaps to complex to be derived analytically. Neural networks also appears to give
machines a way of 'learning' a skill.
5.9 No More Gauge Corner Cracking - Track that Changes Colour
Tracks are a high maintenance item, because when they break the consequences are disasterous. The
inspection costs are too high. Current focus in technology is in developing technologies which will detect a
rail break more efficiently and earlier, so that preventative maintenance can be carried out. However the
current technology still depend on an active polling process - "the search for broken rail", instead of a
passive listening process, whereby the rail tells you if it is about to break. Development of either self-
strengthening or "smart" materials may lead to a breakthrough in safety in this area. For example, a new
type of track material or additive which turns hot pink when subjected to stress beyond design levels or
when cracks are expected to appear could dramatically cut down the cost of inspections whilst improving
safety. Although ultrasonic testing technologies are already available, this remains nevertheless a passive
mode of track defect monitoring.
5.10 Magnetically-guided High Speed Rail Systems
High Speed Rail requires sweeping curves to minimize lateral acceleration while traversing a curve.
However, sweeping curves are amongst the most expensive components of high speed rail systems. A
breakthrough in level of passenger comfort whilst traversing restrictive curves was pioneered by Amtrak in
the 1960s with the lightweight aerotrain. However, vehicle stability and rail wear issues had not been
adquately addressed. Magnetic levitation (Maglev) technology for ground passenger transportation
applications is already mature, although cost has precluded its deployment or planning except in Germany
and China. The proposed solution combines Maglev technology with conventional rail.. The magnetically-
guided conventional train will only use superconducting magnet for one purpose: forming a guideway. On
straight or slightly curved sections of right-of-way, conventional wheel flange guidence will be used. On
severely curved right of way and a small transistion section on either end, electromagnets will be installed on
one or both sides of the track.
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Abstract
New technologies offer ways for railroads to reduce costs, increase market share, and achieve higher
profitability. Determining the best opportunities requires understanding of the marketplace and translation
of technological improvements into competitive advantage for the rail industry. This three-year research
effort uses the Performance-Based Technology Scanning (PBTS) methodology for identifying such
"leveraged" areas. Applying PBTS to intercity passenger rail revealed that line-haul speeds and access times
are both very important. High line-haul speeds differentiate the service from the private auto, while better
access time competes with air service.
The current high-speed rail research programmes in the United States have focused on two distinct
approaches: (a) upgrading existing rights-of-way through conventional technologies such as tilting vehicles,
track realignment and positive train control to enable service speeds of up to 150mph; (b) constructing new
rights-of-way with advanced propulsion technologies such as magnetic levitation to enable service speeds of
up to 300mph. The former approach sometimes fail to make appreciable difference in journey time or
market share, and introduces conflicts with freight trains, while the latter isn't currently considered
economical for corridors longer than about 30 miles, due to the high cost of new infrastructure.
We therefore recommend a hybrid approach for further engineering research & development. Rail vehicles
with magnetic guidance equipment could travel as conventional trains over "wide open spaces" on low-cost
existing rights-of-way at up to 110mph, then switch to magnetic guidance to climb very steep grades or
achieve higher speeds around sharp curves. Climbing steep grades allows more direct new routes through
mountains, avoiding potentially costly tunnels. Maintaining stability with magnetic guidance allows usage of
existing, curvaceous infrastructure at higher speeds to reach downtown areas. Hybrid maglev vehicles and
railroad maglevification is backwards compatible, thus allows sharing of the high, fixed infrastructure costs
with commuter and freight trains already running over the national rail network.
Word counts:
296 Words (Abstract)
9,219 Words (Abstract, Body and References)
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Introduction
New technologies offer ways for railroads to reduce costs, increase market share, better service offerings,
and achieve higher profitability. Determining the best opportunities requires understanding of the
marketplace and translation of technological improvements into competitive advantage for the rail industry.
This three-year research effort uses the Performance-Based Technology Scanning (PBTS) methodology for
identifying such "leveraged" areas. Applying PBTS to intercity passenger rail revealed that line-haul speeds
and access times are both very important. High line-haul speeds differentiate the service from the private
auto, while better access time competes with air service.
The current high-speed rail research programmes in the United States have focused on two distinct
approaches: (a) upgrading existing rights-of-way through conventional technologies such as tilting vehicles,
track realignment and positive train control to enable service speeds of up to 150mph; (b) constructing new
rights-of-way with advanced propulsion technologies such as magnetic levitation to enable service speeds of
up to 300mph. The former approach sometimes fail to make appreciable difference in journey time or
market share, and introduces conflicts with freight trains, while the latter isn't currently considered
economical for corridors longer than about 30 miles, due to the high cost of new infrastructure.
We therefore recommend a hybrid approach for further engineering research & development. Rail vehicles
with magnetic guidance equipment could travel as conventional trains over "wide open spaces" on low-cost
existing rights-of-way at up to 110mph, then switch to magnetic guidance to climb very steep grades or
achieve higher speeds around sharp curves. Climbing steep grades allows more direct new routes through
mountains, avoiding potentially costly tunnels. Maintaining stability with magnetic guidance allows usage of
existing, curvaceous infrastructure at higher speeds to reach downtown areas. Hybrid maglev vehicles and
railroad maglevication is backwards compatible, thus allows sharing of the high, fixed infrastructure costs
with commuter and freight trains already running over the national rail network.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of maglevication of existing railroad infrastructure. When
Pennsylvania Railroad electrified the Philadelphia-Paoli mainline in 1914, they designed the catenary such
that ordinary steam freight trains could run 'under the wires' to reach Lancaster and points beyond. Maglev
could be seen as the next step forward - and maglev infrastructure should be designed such that ordinary
diesel freight trains could run 'over the magnet'. More importantly, since maglev infrastructure is expensive,
express passenger trains should be able to switch between maglev and conventional modes, to navigate
different types of terrain at different speeds. We call this process of retro-fitting magnetic infrastructure to
existing railroads the process of railroad maglevication.
Lifting the steel wheels from the track may not actually be necessary to achieve the range of journey time
savings customers desire. With advanced truck designs, rolling contact resistance could be substantially
decreased compared to the typical levels when maglev trains were first proposed. Maglevication would
utilize the existing steel wheel-rail interface to provide support for the weight of the rolling stock, while
utilizing magnetic forces to assist horizontal and lateral movements.
Performance Based Technology Scanning
PBTS is a methodology whereby the process of determining the technology strategy for railroad carriers and
industry is broken down into five distinctive steps, ranging from the general broad-brush explorations to the
very specific strategic direction. The highest level is a generalized search for new and emerging
technologies, often conducted by science and engineering graduates using industry sources and the science
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press (e.g. New Scientist, Scientzfic American). The objective is to identify novel and exciting technologies that
may have an impact on the transportation industry. Technologies can affect transportation in quite subtle
ways: travel patterns, nature of goods being transported, the technologies available to transport them, and
the relative economics of different modes, could all change with new technological development.
Generalized Search
for New and Emerging Technologies (Step 1)
Technology Mapping Customer Requirements Analysis
"Technology-Push" (Step 2A) "Market-Pull" (Step 2B)
Technology Focus (Optional)
Detailed Technology Analysis
Performance-Based Technology Scan
Comparative Technology Evaulation (Step 3)
Individual Technology Evaluation
and Implementation Research (Step 4)
Figure 1: The Five-Step Process of Technology Scanning
Two approaches of classifying the impact of technologies could be distinguished: (a) Technology Mapping,
and (b) Customer Requirements Analysis. The former is a "technology push" approach where vendors of
technologies identified in Step 1 attempts to identify the areas where the emerging technologies could be
applied to transportation. The latter is a "market-pull" approach where transportation companies actively
seek technological solutions to existing operational problems. The potential technological applications are
then evaluated using a comparative technology evaluation framework to ascertain whether the proposal will
generate the best net social benefit (versus not deploying the technology, or deploying an alternate
technology), in Step 3. The final step is to develop and implement the most promising (or leveraged) ideas.
Substantial development costs could be incurred at this stage, and the comparative technology evaluation
serves as a screening process to differentiate between lemons and silver bullets.
Detailed discussion of the PBTS process developed as part of this project is detailed in a prior publication
(Lu, Martland, et al., WP-2002-3). In the present paper, a promising idea for high-speed ground
transportation, as identified in the Step 3 of the PBTS process is described.
The State of Practice in High Speed Ground Transportation
There are a number of technologies currently competing for the 100~600 mile transportation market in the
developed world. Amongst them: (1) private auto, (2) intercity buses, (3) conventional train, (4) high-speed
train, (5) magnetically levitated train, (6) conventional aircraft, (7) tiltrotor and other light aircrafts. There
are also a number of permutations of each type of technology, e.g. high-speed trains could be electrically
propelled, gas-turbine driven, or carry diesel prime movers; conventional aircrafts could be large aircrafts or
regional jets. The argument between whether airbourne or land-based transportation modes should be
preferred could rage on due to unaccounted externalities. Assuming that a ground transportation option is
desirable, a range of current options is reviewed here, to better understand their cost structure and service
characteristics.
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The Private Auto
In North America at least, the private auto is by far the dominating form of intercity transportation, at least
in terms of trip volumes. For person-trips between 100~499 miles, the private auto captured 93.7% of the
market, while commercial airlines captured 2.3%, intercity bus 0 .4 %, and intercity rail 0.7% [1]. This
automobile dominance is not limited to the rural areas. In the Northeast Corridor, where intercity rail
service is well developed, the private auto nevertheless achieved a 72% market share between New York and
Washington (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas), while airlines carried 22%, and rail 6% of all
person-trips [2].
What explains this automobile superiority? There are a variety of reasons: (1) collective transportation
requires either geographical or temporal consolidation, sometimes both, thus a high demand-density is
needed; (2) other benefits are associated with having "your car" -- including easier freight carriage, the
convenience factor, choice of schedules, etc.; (3) usage of the private auto is subsidized to different extents
by the government than other modes of transportation; (4) the incremental cost per person is approximately
zero, for the same origins and destinations.
For shorter trips in the 100-600 mile market, the access time is an important part of the total journey time,
where the route structure could mean convoluted routings that make collective transportation unattractive.
55% of all passengers in New England drive more than 16 miles to an airport [3]; nationwide median
distance for airport access is 21 miles [4]. These statistics suggest that with today's North American
metropolises, which are sprawled over large areas, the private auto has an important advantage in its totally-
connected route network that collective modes will find difficult to surpass. Lu & Mardand (2002) discusses
the accessibility question in greater detail in a previous publication.
Interciy Buses
Common carrier intercity buses has all the disadvantages of collective transportation, but none of the speed
or comfort advantages associated with the other modes. The statistics demonstrates this: despite a much
wider route network than intercity rail, common carrier buses achieves only half the market share. Intercity
buses tend to carry captive riders without access to an automobile, or choice riders with very low value-of-
time whose major criteria is price. However, in some areas, the demand density is so low that the only
intercity mass-transportation option is coach. While remaining an important element of rural public
transportation in states such as Vermont, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio, Utah, New Mexico and Texas, the
common carrier intercity bus is unlikely to be a serious contender for choice travellers in high-volume
corridors.
Conventional Train
The conventional train is sometimes seen as a large bus. In the intercity sector at least, there aren't many
corridors in the world that would justify conventional train service on the basis of capacity alone. Bus
service, on the other hand, could be much more flexible and offers much better access. The main
advantages of the train is that it is able to offer hereto unparalled level of comfort and amenities, in addition
to immunity from highway congestion and much higher speeds where infrastructure permits such
operations. If the conventional train is unable to offer higher speeds than the intercity bus, it will be seen as
simply a large bus and destined to fail even more miserably than the bus. On the other hand, if the train is
able to distinguish itself from the automobile through a combination of higher speeds, better amenities, plus
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immunity to congestion experienced at airports and on urban expressways, it would be the dark horse of
intercity transportation.
Much research has already been done in making the conventional train more competitive through
incremental upgrades. The current FRA Next Generation High Speed Rail Technology Demonstration
Program is focused on four distinct areas: (1) positive train control; (2) high-speed non-electric locomotive;
(3) high-speed grade-crossing protection; (4) high-speed track and structures (FRA, 2002). This is consistent
with the incremental high-speed rail approach discussed in Roth (1994), where existing rights-of-way are
retrofitted with technology enhancements to enable higher-speed operation of passenger trains.
This approach has several distinct advantages, compared to the other high-speed rail solutions: (1) it takes
advantage of inherent value in existing railroad networks; (2) because of its phased nature, positive cash
flows occur earlier in the investment cycle, providing financing for later stages; (3) due to the total
backwards-compatibility of the equipment, high-speed trains are able to penetrate areas with lighter demand
density on conventional infrastructure, resulting in a much wider route network than otherwise possible; (4)
the comfort level and space available associated with conventional equipment is preserved -- a very
important market consideration in the North American market.
The disadvantages of this approach are inherent in the paradigm: (1) because of the need to share track
space with other trains operating as slowly as 30mph, dispatching trains efficiently becomes a major issue for
speeds above 70mph or so -- track capacity for mixed speed traffic is much lower than that for traffic at a
given speed; (2) the level of investment to reach a given speed could be higher, because of the additional
safety precautions needed on a mixed-traffic railroad; (3) at higher speeds, conventional wheel-flange
guidence systems become disproportionately expensive to maintain safely; (4) to cater for different types of
traffic, the engineering parameters for track geometry are constrained by the least common denominators,
making high performance for a particular traffic type difficult if not impossible to achieve.
High-Speed Trains
Pioneered by the Japanese Tokyo-Osaka Shinkansen in 1964, exclusive-guideway high-speed trains have
always been seen as the silver bullet to the passenger rail problem by advocacy groups. What is often not
appreciated is that the Tokyo-Osaka Shinkansen was justified not on the basis of increased performance, but
as an alternative to four-tracking the Old Main Line (Yamanouchi, 2000). Even in traditionally exclusive-
guideway systems, penetration into conventional trackage by high-speed rolling stock is usually considered
an advantage, as doing so greatly enhances the accessibility of high speed services. During the first phase of
the Paris-Lyons TGV, services extended beyond Lyon to provincial cities running on conventional
infrastructure. In Britain, Intercity 125 sets operated on a scheduled basis to the north of Scotland, often
operating over trackage that enabled a maximum speed of only 45mph. Such "penetration" by Shinkansen
trains was impossible in Japan due to the existing narrow-gauge infrastructure.
The fundamental problem with high-speed trains remain the high cost of infrastructure. On high-speed
track structure, gradient is practically limited to about 3%, and there are strict standards on curvature, length
of transisiton, cant and cant deficiency, as well as tolerances in track gauge, track level, and axle-loads. For a
mixed-traffic railroad, these constrants are even more severe: gradient is limited to about 2%, cant about six
inches, and curvature limited by the highest speed passenger train that is designed to operate over it. These
engineering constraints are not a major problem on the prairies, where the costs of laying straight track may
simply be associated with buying out specific farms. In mountainous territory, however, these engineering
constraints may increase (in a non-linear fashion) both mileage and the amount of rock blasting required.
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On the Usui Pass between Tokyo and Nagano, relaxing the maximum permissible grade from 2 .5% to 6.7%
would half the construction expenses from Y7.1 billion to Y3.6 billion, while decreasing distance from 16
miles to 7 miles and drastically reducing the curvature required (Yamanouchi, 2000). Similar experience was
found while constructing transcontinentals in North America. Many cut-offs were later built to reduce
operating costs and transit times on originally curvaceous and heavily graded mainlines. In most cases, the
revised alignment was more expensive and only made possible through reinvesting revenues generated by
earlier traffic.
Magneticaly-Levitated Trains
Magnetically-levitated trains is the ultimate in exclusive-guideway technology. Instead of using steel-wheels
on steel-rails to provide support and guidance, maglev use magnetic forces to accomplish the same. Vehicle
bodies are slightly elevated above the track structure with magnetic repulsion to eliminate any contact
resistence, while the train is both pulled and propelled forward with magnetic attraction and repulsion,
generated by fixed superconducting magnets buried into the track structure.
Maglev was designed to be a high-cost, high-performance system worthy of the space age. However, the
high costs of creating a brand-new right-of-way in an urban area (where the demand density is sufficiently
high to justify high speed rail), and the inherent high costs of superconducting magnets has limited its
potential. Commercial implementations of maglev have been limited to very-short distance, transit-like
applications, usually proposed as a non-stop, ultra-high speed link from an airport to the downtown area --
playing a similar role to that proposed for the tiltrotor aircraft 20 years ago. The only commercial
implementation to date has been one 17-mile link between downtown Shanghai and its airport in China
(Blow et al, 2003).
Maglev has the high per-mile costs of fixed-guideway technology, while being unable to share that cost with
any other type of traffic due to its exclusive-guideway nature and lack of backwards compatibility.
Applications of maglev, at least in its purest form, is likely to be limited to very-short distance markets
where use of aircrafts is infeasible, and where the journey time differece between ten and 30 minutes is able
to justify billions of dollars in right-of-way costs.
However, because of the enhanced technical characteristics of maglev, several possibilities have been raised
that were not previously available to high-speed fixed-guideway transits. Because maglev technologies does
not rely on adhesion, maglev trains are able to negotiate at very high speeds curves and grades (up to 10%)
that are comparable with interstate highway engineering standards. This raises the possibility of putting
maglev-type infrastructure along highway alignments, reducing costs and potentially allowing more direct
alignments. The Baltimore-Washington maglev (BWMaglev.com, 2002) proposal is substantially based on
placing an elevated maglev alignment over the existing 1-95 Corridor. Nonetheless, the need for a brand
new guideway could make any maglev scheme very capital intensive; about 53% of the projected costs of the
BWMaglev are in the construction of the right-of-way, despite the existence of the interstate highway.
Strategy to Combat Automobile Dominance - Technology Needs
For collective intercity ground transportation to be successful, it must emulate the automobile as far as
possible in terms of accessibility, retain the speed advantage of steel-wheel guidence, space and carrying
capacity advantage of a railcar, while minimizing the cost of capital construction. In traditional service
planning and design, the trade-off between speed and accessibility has often been represented as a hierachy
(see Van Nes, 2001). Higher-speed, limited-stop modes offers lesser accessibility, but make up for it
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through shorter journey times. Van Nes suggests that when changing hierachical levels, the higher-speed
mode ought to travel at about three times the speed of the lower-speed mode. As seen in Figure 2, there
may be a niche market between the automobile (extremely high accessibility at about 50mph), and the
commercial airline (very low accessibility at around 550mph). In theory, the high-speed rail could succeed
by offering better accessibility than the commercial airline at an average speed of 110mph, provided that the
infrastructure costs remain under control.
U
The
Private
Auto
The
Common Carrier
0 Airline
Slow Fast
Maximum Speed
Figure 2: Intercity Rail's Possible Strategic Positions
on the Accessibility/Speed Plane
In certain circumstances, where a travel corridor covers regions of high demand density (requiring three or
more levels) and low demand density (requiring only two levels), it is conceivable that high-speed rail could
transcend between levels without change of vehicle, simply by changing the station spacing between stops --
in the same way that an automobile would interchange between an interstate highway and a rural route
without having to stop or transfer passengers. The critical business needs for intercity ground
transportation therefore are:
* Reasonable infrastructure costs, especially over urban and mountainous terrain
0 Comfort factor similar to a conventional train
* Fast acceleration to permit stop spacing of about two miles in urban areas
* Average speeds of about 110mph for most station pairs
0 Both a line-haul and a distribution mode - transcend network layers without transfers
The technology needed resembles essentially an FRA-compliant subway car with a generous loading gauge
that is capable of travelling at very high speeds (150~200mph) in the rural areas to achieve an average speed
of 110mph while making multiple stops within an urban area. Although this appears to be a technology that
is already available, part of the problem is the persistent high costs of making steel guideways support heavy
vehicles travelling at speeds above about 100mph, and the engineering constraints in terms of curvature and
vertical alignment that can dictate viable high-speed rail alignments, as already discussed.
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Rapid Transit Technology Case Study - Relationship to High Speed Rail
In infrastructure-intensive systems, sunk investment plays a major role in determining what technologies are
viable, given what has happened before. In the rapid transit industry, this has resulted in subways being
maintained where its large carrying capacity is no longer needed. Successful technologies have mostly been
designed to be backwards-compatible. In North America, the railroad network is extensive and represents
considerable sunk investment. It is imperative for the success of high speed rail to leverage the value of
existing infrastructure and rights-of-way, while maintaining freight access.
The Importance of Inherent Value in Existing Infrastructure
The effect of sunk investment on the economics of infrastructure-intensive systems is reviewed here.
Historically, as technology progressed, newer technologies have not always replaced older systems. There
are many examples: (1) Light rail is considered more cost-effective than heavy rail, although many cities
continue to operate heavy rail systems constructed at the turn of the century; (2) The double-stack
innovation in North American railfreight have generally not spread to Europe, due to the high costs of
raising bridges and enlarging tunnels.
The common reason for these seemingly back-wards decisions are the same. The value inherent in existing
infrastructure is so large that the new technology has no choice but to interface with the older technology.
Economically efficient decision-making would allow the older technology to live out its 'life-cycle' while
introducing new technology alongside it to provide enhancement and capacity relief at the most constrained
points. In most cases, the new technology does not offer a sufficient performance boost to justify
immediate replacement of the previous-generation technology at its current replacement value. Premature
abandonment of assets has a very real economic cost associated with it. Only in rare cases where there is a
performance step-change, would it be worthwhile. One such example is the wholesale replacement of diesel
locomotives with D.C. traction motors in coal service during the late 1980s. Even in that case, the value of
the scrapped D.C. locomotives are far from zero -- most were traded into the manufacturer to be
reconstructed into A.C. units, or sold to shortlines to replace locomotives built in the 1950s.
There are examples outside transportation also: (1) Until recently, personal computers have been shipped
with 4.77MHz ISA expansion slots which were developed by IBM in 1981, even though many different
types of expansion buses have been developed since then. (2) Microsoft Windows continue to start a
computer in 16-bit mode and with a memory limit of 640 Kbytes before loading a protected mode kernel to
enable linear addressing, available in Intel hardware since 1984. In these examples, the replacement value is
in terms of hardware peripherals built with the older interface, and software drivers already written assuming
a 16-bit architecture.
Sjystems Engineering in Rapid Transit Applications
Systems Engineering is the discipline that studies the attributes of different technologies, and designing a
system that may involve one or more technologies, to accomplish a desired goal in the most cost-effective
manner. An example of a systems engineering question would be the choice of mass-transit technology
with which to construct a transit line - and whether to build the line at all. Different parts of the same
transit corridor might have different demand characteristics, thus the 'optimal' technology for different parts
of the corridor might not be the same. A radial route around a city may traverse both an affluent low-
density neighbourhood and a poor high-density neighbourhood with large demands and large number of
captive riders. From a capacity standpoint, heavy rail subway might be most suitable for the high-density
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neighbourhood, while a light-rail might be able to offer higher frequencies in a low-density neighbourhood
to attract choice riders.
Here a logical solution might be to develop a hybrid scheme where some light-rail vehicles are able to inter-
operate with the subway in the core section of the corridor, while providing a higher frequency to the
lightly-travelled portions. With train-separation provided by coded-track circuits, special light-rail vehicles
fitted with third-rail shoes and able to dock at high-platform stations, it is not necessary to split the radial
corridor into two distinct lines to utilize the most appropriate technology for each section. The downside is
that this flexibility could be more expensive than a totally segregated solution.
This is certainly not a new concept: the Everett-Dudley Main Line elevated (now the Orange Line) in
Boston inter-operated with the Boston Streetcar Company between Boylston and Haymarket prior to the
construction of the tunnel beneath Washington St., today's Orange Line central subway (see Moore, 1999).
The Riverside branch of the Green Line was a former New York, New Haven & Hartford commuter rail
line, and is today operated with electric streetcars but retains commuter-rail type station spacing, demand
characteristics, and some element of rail-rapid type signalling. Hybrid-type schemes can work well because
the incremental costs of creating a hybrid is usually small compared to the costs of new rights-of-way or
applying the inappropriate technology for the sake of standardization. In the case of the Riverside branch,
the bankrupt Penn-Central was able to realize the sale value of the four-track right-of-way between
Brookline Jct. and CP-Cove (part of which became the Massachusetts Turnpike) by allowing the MTA to
replace its commuter rail service with a streetcar service, thereby sharing the costs of downtown access
infrastructure with the other Green Line branches.
Applying the Rapid Transit Experience to High Speed Rail
In transit, subway, streetcars and buses have been seen as distinctive modes with different characteristics.
The example above suggests that in some circumstances, the modes could be made to inter-operate to allow
different parts of the same corridor to be tailored to its demand characteristics, without necessitating a
change of vehicle between different sections. In the same way, highway designs are tailored depending on
the purpose of the link and geographical characteristics; the same automobile may travel over access roads,
arterials, highways and interstate turnpikes all in a single trip.
Traditionally, conventional train, high-speed rail and maglevs have been seen as different modes. As already
discussed, conventional rail and high-speed rail could coexist given suitable engineering parameters and
sophisticated train-separation technologies that ensure safety. In a sense, tilting train is simply a
technological reponse to the need to better adapt the high-speed rail vehicle to conventional rail
infrastructure where the demand density is insufficient to justify all-out investment in a brand new alignment
or realignment schemes to retro-fit conventional lines with sweeping curves.
Perhaps maglev should not be seen as a separate mode at all. The performance increase have been clearly
shown not to justify the costs, at least for intercity corridors of more than about 30 miles in length.
However, if maglev is seen as an add-on infrastructure component that could be applied to the most
constrained locations on a conventional rail network, the economics become much more feasible. In the
same way that railroad electrification is often done for high-density suburban commuter corridors where the
high acceleration and higher reliability is vital to service delivery, railroad maglevication could be done for
sections of track that meet one of the following conditions: (1) sufficiently high demand density justifies the
high speeds on performance grounds alone; (2) the terrain is sufficiently difficult such that relaxing the
gradient constraint would result in construction and substantial journey-time savings; (3) the existing urban
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corridor would require more curvature than could practically be achieved by conventional high-speed rail
trains running at reasonable speeds.
The Incremental Maglev and Maglevication Technology
The concept of incremental maglev is essentially very simple. Instead of building a dedicated guideway and
dedicated vehicles, stations, facilities, and other such large capital items, magnetic guidence infrastructure is
simply retro-fitted to parts of existing railroad network in a backwards-compatible fashion. This process
will be termed 'railroad maglevication', in the same way that retro-fitting electric power distribution
infrastructure (i.e. catenaries) to steam railroads is called 'railroad electrification'.
The Incremental Maglev Vehicle (and Truck Assembly)
The vehicle is essentially a tilting conventional train with reengineered truck assembly that is capable of
running on existing railroads, but enters an enhanced 'magnetic' mode when it encounters maglevified
infrastructure. Truck technologies are already mature, and there are a number of design possibilities for an
ultra-high performance truck: (1) active steering radial trucks could reduce rolling contact resistance beyond
what is available from passive radial trucks currently used on EMD diesel freight locomotives; (2) higher
wheel conicity than typical on current rapid transit vehicles would enable trucks to steer much more
efficiently, especially on very tight curves and when running at very high levels of cant deficiency (or
inbalance).
For the magnetic guidence system, several possibilities exist: (1) guidence magnetic plates could be fitted at a
suitable position beside the rail, exerting magnetic repulsion on the wheel, the truck frame, or the vehicle
body (see Figure 3, Options 1, 2, 3) on the outside of the curve; (2) propulsion magnetic plates could be
fitted in the four-foot, between the running rails, to guide the truck by magnetic attraction (see Option 4),
similar to the linear induction systems currently used on the Vancouver Skytrain and proposed for the New
York JFK Airtrain; (3) propulsion and guidence magnets could be fitted on both or either side of the
running rails (see Option 5 & 6), guiding the train with a combination of attractive and repulsive forces; (4)
guidence magnets could be made to act directly on the middle and upper parts of the coach body (Options 7
& 8), providing both tilting and guidence functions; (5) a flexible contact guidence system could be
developed in place of magnetic guidence. Clearly, more research would be necessary to identify the system
with the lowest costs or the highest likelyhood of success. Nonetheless, these proposals are much closer to
existing knowledge and experience in truck design than pure maglev proposals, in addition to offering the
advantage of backwards-compatibility.
With this design, it is possible to put all the intelligence on the vehicle. The track-bourne equipment could
be permanent magnets or very strong electromagnets that are either on or off. Intelligence aboard the
vehicle will adjust the polarity and strength of magnetic field generated by the vehicle-bourne magnet to give
the necessary guidance forces for the speed at which the vehicle is travelling at that point. Conceivably, the
vehicle could guide itself through a feedback system that measures the accelerating forces required and
adjusts the on-board magnetic plates accordingly, given knowledge about the physical magnetic
infrastructure available en-route. By putting the intelligence on the vehicle, the infrastructure costs per route
mile could be kept to a minimum - an important factor in the success of intercity transportation systems
with high route mileage and relatively small fleets.
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Figure 3: Options for Locating Guidance Magnets
On Dual-Mode Incremental Maglev Vehicle
Engineering Feasibilio
How feasible is this from an engineering perspective? Obviously, detailed engineering and design work
would be required to answer that question. In principle, the concept is not ridiculous. Conventional rail is
unable to achieve grades of more than 3% due to adhesion limitations. If the bogie frame was magnetically
assisted by being dragged up a grade, the reaction forces at the wheel-rail interface remains constant, but the
work required against gravity is reduced, as part of the work is done by invisible magnetic forces that act on
the bogie frame independently of friction. Conventional rail is unable to negotiate sharp curvatures at high
speeds due to the limited ability of the wheel flange to provide reaction forces for lateral acceleration. At
locations with high rail cant, this force is augmented by the component of gravitational force that is parallel
to the plane formed by the two rails. If the bogie frame was magnetically assisted by being repelled against a
magnet on the outside of the curve, the required lateral acceleration to be provided by gravity and the wheel
flange is reduced (see Figure 4). The bolster assembly would require considerable re-engineering, as it could
no longer be assumed that gravity would hold the carbody on top of the trucks. Obviously, the trainset
would also need to be designed with a low centre of gravity, or other stabilization features, to minimize the
overturning risks at high levels of imbalance.
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Figure 4: Forces available to accelerate the train around the curve is the sum of magnetic and reaction
forces in an maglevified vehicle. Active or passive tilt systems addresses passenger comfort issues.
Signalling systems would prevent non-authorized trains from entering the maglevified cut-offs that could
create a dangerous condition if non-maglevified vehicles were to enter. Maglevified cut-offs actually serve a
natural purpose in regulating traffic. In a highly congested, mixed-traffic intercity corridor, passing high-
speed passenger trains and coal trains may be problematic. Where a maglevified cut-off of about 20 miles in
length is constructed, the older railroad by-passed essentially becomes a low-grade freight route. Since the
slower coal trains are likely to take a long time to cover the ascent to the summit, the high-speed passenger
trains using the maglevified cut-off could overtake the coal trains while they are in the low-grade loop. In
urban corridors, commuter trains can conceivably benefit from the maglevified infrastructure through
greater acceleration and therefore shorter time between closely-spaced stops (see also Lu, 2001).
Operation of Freight Trains Over Maglevfied Trackage
Of course, maglevified sections of trackage that depend on the linear induction motor to prevent stall on a
steep gradient would be incompatible with freight applications, although any trains fitted with maglev trucks
could in principle traverse the trackage (just as any train with pantographs may receive power from the
catenaries while traversing electrified trackage). The design values used for the magnetic infrastructure
could have interesting implications for the operation of freight trains. On gradient-limited portions of
maglevified lines, only a portion of cars are required to have magnetic trucks - provided the 200,000 lbs
knuckle load limit is not exceeded at any point along the consist, and that the weight of the consist could be
supported by those trucks within the consist that are magnetic. It is possible that a maglevified locomotive
would be able to tow ordinary freight cars over the maglevified route, although this is unlikely to be
economic except for highly time-critical freight. On curvature-limited portion of maglevified lines, any train
may traverse maglevified trackage, but only trains that are completely maglevified on every truck would be
able to traverse it at the higher speed permitted for maglevified traction on that section of the railroad, since
high levels of cant deficiency without magnetic assistance could result in derailment risks.
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Figure 5: Sample System Timetable for a Maglevified Line
The operations of freight trains have always been a highly skilled discipline. Geographic familiarity in terms
of gradients, maximum authorized speeds, and other infrastructure constraints have been required for
freight train crews since the early days of railroading. The addition of knowledge of maglevified
infrastructure, and the necessary calculations of magnetic versus adhesive tractive effort available from given
types of traction (and consumed by given types of freight cars) would complicate matters, but with
increasing portability of computer systems it is possible for these complex calculations to be performed on-
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the-fly with onboard intelligence as part of the train control and regulation system. How the system
timetable might look, to convey all necessary information about the maglevified infrastrcuture, is shown in
Figure 5.
The Technology: Would it Stick?
Whenever novel ways to approach engineering is proposed, there is inevitably a forest of criticism
suggesting why it wouldn't work, citing previous experiences that have failed to accomplish their goals. One
example frequently mentioned is the proposal to attach retractable rail trucks to buses so that buses could
also operate on rail rights-of-way. The fundamental reason why railbuses failed to take off have very little to
do with engineering: track maintenance crews on railroads routinely use hi-rail vehicles, which are designed
for both highway and railroad use. The reason the railbus did not succeed is because allowing buses to run
on rails offered very little benefits. Buses operating on interstate highways can achieve almost as high
speeds as buses operating on railroads, thus railbuses offered little differentiation from highway-only buses.
In the case of the hybrid maglev-HSR vehicle, maglevs clearly offers a significant speed advantage, plus
considerable infrastructure cost savings at certain locations compared to a rail only vehicle. These costs and
benefits are analyzed in greater detail in the next section.
Cost-Effectiveness of Railroad Maglevication
To assess the cost-effectiveness of the incremental maglev proposal, a typical intercity corridor is considered
in terms of journey time performance, construction investment costs, and cost-per-minute-saved as a cost-
effectiveness measure. The typical corridor is 210 miles in length, consisting of five stops each in two large
metropolitan area at either end, and two intermediate nodes at mileposts 70 and 150. The metropolitan-area
stops are spaced at two-mile intervals. The typical corridor is further divided into five subdivisions: City,
Prairie, Mountain, Seaboard, and Metropolitan. The Metropolitan Subdivision hosts extensive commuter
rail services that share a corridor with the intercity service. The Seaboard Subdivision features three major
bridges and many curves, limiting speed of conventional operations to 79mph. Mountain Subdivision
features one major mountain pass and two tunnels, the resulting curvature and gradient limits speed of
conventional operations to 60mph. Prairie Subdivision features featureless plains and farmland which allows
bee-line construction of conventional lines that allows unimpeded 110mph operations. The City
Subdivision features similar urban constraints, limiting speed to 60mph, but without commuter rail service.
The detailed assumptions for the typical corridor is given in Table 1.
Speed
Subdivision Begins Ends (Conventional)
City MP 0.0 MP 20.0 60 mph
Prairie MP 20.0 MP 105.0 110 mph
Mountain MP 105.0 MP 140.0 60 mph
Seaboard MP 140.0 MP 190.0 79 mph
Metropolitan MP 190.0 MP 210.0 70 mph
Table 1: Assumptions of Geography for a Typical Intercity Corridor
The base case is a conventional express service that currently connects the two cities at slightly below the
posted speeds (due to station stops and other speed restrictions such as that associated with bridges and
switchwork). The trip currently takes just over three hours, resulting in an average station-to-station speed
of 70mph -- only slightly better than the private auto, and the majority of people drive between the cities.
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The journey time resulting from each type of upgrades was compared to the base case to ascertain the time-
savings, while a typical cost-per-mile for the type of infrastructure and the type of terrain was used to
calculate the likely costs. The cost-effectiveness measure was then calculated. Although this is a surprisingly
simple methodology, it is extremely powerful, and can differentiate between the sour lemons, the silver
bullets, and the marginal cases that warrant detailed modelling and assessment work.
Figure 6: Graphic Representation of a Typical Corridor
This type of cost-effectiveness analysis, where technological alternatives are compared in terms of their
benefits, costs, and likely impact in terms of performance (often modelled using a customer utility measure),
is Step 3 of the Performance-Based Technology Scanning framework (see Figure 1). Railroad maglevication
was one of the more promising ideas identified using this method. Other technological ideas analysed are
detailed in a separate working paper (Lu & Martland, WP-2002-03).
Traction Performance Modelling
In the City and Metropolitan Subdivisions, a key issue is whether maglevification will truly enhance the
performance of the metropolitan distributor, where station spacings of around two miles is required to
maintain access competitiveness with the private auto and thus continued running a very high speeds are
impossible. Using a traction performance model that calculated sectional running times based on installed
power, rolling contact resistance, consist weight, and calibrated using British Rail traction performance data,
it was determined that on flat terrain, the best-performing conventional traction will reach a top speed of
about 70mph between two stations spaced two-miles apart, taking approximately 150 seconds. On the
other hand, a consist with performance characteristics more consistent with maglev-type traction will reach a
top speed of 115mph, and travel the same distance in about 100 seconds. The likely time saving for our
assumption of five stations per metropolitan area is therefore about four minutes.
This result has more implications for commuter rail than intercity rail. Many commuter rail lines feature ten
or more stops. Daily round-trip time saving for travel from the outer suburbs could be as much as 18
minutes per day with maglevification. This time saving is very significant for a daily commuter, and for the
commuter operator.
This result is sensitive to station spacing. Instead of assuming five uniformly-spaced stations, if stations for
the City Subdivision were located at MP 0.0, MP 8.0, MP 10.0, MP 12.0, MP 20.0 to describe the typical
configuration of Park & Ride stations in the exurbs with three downtown distribution stations, the time-
saving of maglevication could be about six minutes. However, because of the relatively short distances
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involved between stations, maglevication could not realize its full potential, as no extended runnnig at very
high speeds take place.
Mountain Railroading
In the Mountain Subdivision, the key issue is whether maglevication would deliver the required cut-off
offering time savings and higher speeds. In typical mountain terrain, if gradient constraints were relaxed,
analysis of topological maps of Maryland revealed that a mileage savings of 20%~40% may be possible (the
Usui Pass at 56%, was an extreme case). For the purpose of the case study, it was assumed that the
construction of a 10-mile maglevified cut-off would reduce the total mileage of Mountain Subdivision from
35 miles to 30 miles. Maximum permissible speed on the cut-off would be 125mph. Using the traction
performance calculator, assuming an entry speed of 70mph, the maximum speed achieved on the
maglevified cut-off would be 125mph, achieved two-miles into the cut-off. Due to the gradient
considerations, 125mph may not be actually achievable within that distance, although with a 10-mile cut-off
and presumably a considerable downhill section, at least 5-mile of the cut-off could be assumed to be
crusing at 125mph.
Based on these assumptions, journey time over the ten-mile cut off would be about 350 seconds, compared
to the base case of 900 seconds (15-miles @ 60mph). The total journey time saving achieved is therefore 9
minutes. If speeds were unconstrained for the cut-off, the train will reach a top speed of about 180mph,
travesing the cut-off in 250 seconds, achieving a total journey time saving of 11 minutes.
Coastal Railroading
In the Seaboard Subdivision, since gradient is not a constraining factor, it is conceivable that maglevication
is only necessary where there are severe reverse curves. In addition, some economies are possible since
maglevication is only necessary for those sections of track where realignment would be required to handle
conventional traffic at high speeds. It is incorrect to consider only those section of trackage affected by
maglevication, since removal of severe permanent speed restrictions due to curvature could enable higher
actual trains speeds to be achieved in neighbouring sections where the train is unable to make use of
available line speeds due to acceleration characteristics. In this study, it was assumed that 40% of non-
contiguous trackage in the Seaboard Subdivision required maglevication to handle trains travelling at
110mph, while the other sections will handle 110mph using conventional techniques and with very little
track realignment work. Thus the result of upgrading 20 miles of track is to enable trains to travel over the
Seaboard division at an unimpeded 110mph, except the permanent speed restrictions associated with the
structures.
Based on these assumptions, journey time over the Seaboard Subdivision would be about 1,800 seconds,
compared to the base case of 2,600 seconds. The total journey time saving achieved is therefore 13 minutes
or so. If the structural constraints could be removed, the journey time savings would be 16 minutes. If the
entire Seaboard division could handle trains operating at 125mph, the journey time saving would be 19
minutes.
It is likely this technique could also be applied to the portion of Mountain Subdivision not affected by the
cut-off, generating further time savings. Using this method, if Mountain Subdivision required maglevication
for 60% of all track miles to achieve 110mph operating speeds in the section of track not by-passed with the
cut-off, an additional eight minutes of the time savings would be possible.
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BenefitAnaysis
Using the most aggressive version of the schemes discussed in the previous section, the total journey time
saving over the 210-mile trip would be 50 minutes. Using the least aggressive version, the total time saving
would be about 30 minutes. Utilizing a similar methodology, journey time saving estimates was made with
reasonable assumptions, for a variety of investment and upgrade options. The results are presented in Table
2. It was assumed that maglevication would not achieve savings in the Prairie Subdivision beyond
conventional methods.
Minute Saving by Investment Alternative
Hybrid Hybrid Conventional HSR Maglev Maglev
Division Best Case Conservative New Line New Line Port to Port
Seaboard 19 11 5 9.5
Mountain (cut-off) 111 9 -
Mountain (realignment) 8.5 0 5 10
Prairie - - - 14.6
City 6 4 --
Metropolitan 6 4 -
Total 50.5 28 10 34.1 96 43.5
Table 2: Results of Benefit Analyses for Different Route Improvements Technologies
Purely from the perspective of journey time savings, obviously the highest-technology option (new maglev
line) achieves the highest speed and the most time savings. Given the relatively high speeds in the existing
conventional railroad corridor, it is not clear that a new, dedicated high-speed rail line could achieve much
time savings, even though the new alignment in the Prairie Subdivision was designed for 150mph
operations. The time savings available with the maglevication option depends to a large extent on the
aggressiveness of combining maglevication with conventional realignment methods, but it is clear from the
above analysis that the time savings are in the order of a new dedicated high-speed rail line - not as good as
a new maglev line, but better than simple realignment and re-engineering. The port-to-port maglev does not
save nearly as much time as the downtown-to-downtown maglev once access time and transfer time has
been taken into account.
The hypothetical corridor under current discussion is typical of North American rail corridors: capacity
issues can be addressed without new infrastructure, thus the Tokaido Shinkansen type of benefit is unlikely
to be seen - all benefits accured are in terms of reduction in trip times. In the next section, cost-
effectiveness of the upgrade is considered in terms of investment cost per time saved.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
To assess the costs of construction, some typical cost figures from publicly available industry sources were
used. The cost of maglevication was assumed to be similar to the cost for track and structures in recent cost
estimates for maglev proposals. The 40-mile BWMaglev project is costed at $3.7 billion -- $93 million per
mile, 53% ($49 million) of which is in the guideway structure. A significant proportion of that cost is in the
elevated structure, which maglevication of existing trackage would not require, thus $30m per mile seems a
reasonable figure. Using the assumptions described in the above discussion, a cost model to estimate the
cost of different investment alternatives was created. In essence, the cost model separates the cost of
realigning, maglevifing existing infrastructure, and constructing new rights of way. A representative run of
the model is shown in Table 3.
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Rail Route Improvement Cost Model
Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation Studies, 26/05/03
Costs Scenario IA: Incremental Maglevication (Aggressive)
Subdivisions City Prairie Mountain Cut-off Seaboard Metropolitar
% new right of way 100%% maglevication required 50% 60% 100% 40% 50%
% realignment/track required 10% 20% 1 5% 10% 10%
Total Mileage 20 85 20 10 50 20
of which new 10
maglevified 10 12 10 20 10
reconstructed 2 17 3 5 2
existing 8 68 5 0 25 8
Cost per mile ($ million/mile)
new right of way 75 2 20 25 20 100
maglevication 30 30 30 30 30 30
conventional enhancements 8 8 8 8 8 8
Total Cost ($ million) 316 136 384 550 640 316
Allowance for Structures 300
Cost of Speed Enhancements $2,642 million $12.89 million per mile
Table 3: Representative Run of Rail Route Improvement Cost Model
Using this (admittedly primitive) model, the costs and cost-effectiveness for different investment alternatives
were evaluated. The average cost-per-mile clearly reflects the relative costs of the different technologies,
with conventional route improvements being the cheapest option and the city-to-city maglev being most
expensive, due primarily to the costs of constructing new rights-of-ways (or constructing elevated viaducts
or tunnels over existing highway corridors) to provide downtown and suburban access. However, the cost-
per-mile does not trade off investment against performance. The cost-per-minute-saved is a better cost-
effectiveness measure and a better proxy for the likely cost-benefit ratio of the technology. The results in
Table 4 show that conventional route improvements and maglevication are roughly equally as effective in
terms of cost-per-minute, although obviously much greater savings are available with maglevication than
with conventional methods alone. Although savings associated with dedicated maglev is substantial, the
costs are a lot higher. It is only half as cost-effective as the incremental schemes where the capacity of
existing rights-of-way is not constrained.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Maglevication
Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation Studies, 26/05/03
Distance Costs Cost/mile Time Saved Cost/min
Investment Alternative (miles) ($ million) ($m/mile) (minutes) ($m/min)
Aggressive Maglevication 205 2,642 12.9 50.5 52
Conservative Maglevication 205 1 ,688 8.2 28 60
Conventional Route Improvements 210 656 3.I 10 66
Conventional HSR New Link 2 16 3,898 18.0 34.1 I I 4
Maglev New Link, City-Metropolis 203 I 1,770 58.0 96 I23
Maglev New Link, Magport-Magport 163 7,070 43.4 43.5 163
Table 4: Cost-Effectiveness of Maglevication Versus Other Methods of Route Improvements
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There are two most notable features of this table: (1) different methods of route improvements may yield an
alignment of different length, due to the engineering and cost contraints of the chosen technology; (2) the
new maglev travelling between remote Park & Ride lots on the outskirts of the metropolitan area is the least
cost effective of all options, since maglev offers little advantage in the wide open spaces of Prairie
Subdivision, and the transfer time required from a local mode to the high-speed mode could negate much of
the time savings. In high-speed rail, access to the urban neighbourhoods, suburban business districts, and
the downtown, can be a constraining factor.
Other Implication of Maglevication Versus New Alignment Construction
From a project evaluation perspective, the beauty of maglevication lies precisely in the fact that it is
incremental in nature. At discount rates of 7% to 8% typically used for public sector projects where tax
increases may be necessary for its financing, the need to achieve significant benefits within the first few years
of the project is important. Large projects are extremely difficult to justify, because of the huge debt burden
incurred initially. The new alignment options, whatever the technology, is the typical 'big project' where
large costs are incurred up front and the revenue stream builds up slowly over the life of the project. The
route improvement and maglevication approaches are incremental, where smaller projects could be carried
out in a number of phases, reducing the debt burden. Although the dual-mode maglev/conventional
vehicles could be as much as three times the cost of a straight high-speed electric set, the immediate pay-off
would be the tilting capability which enables marginally faster journey times, and very high speeds that
becomes available as each piece of maglevified infrastructure come on-line. In any case, vehicles are a small
proportion of the total cost of an intercity high-speed rail scheme. If those vehicles could be constructed on
a rolling basis and phased into the existing fleet, the debt burden of the project could be kept manageable, in
line with a pay-as-you-go incremental high speed rail plan.
Discussion
The main uncertainties facing the incremental maglev proposal are twofold: (1) whether adaptation of
magnetically-levitated technology to a purpose for which it was not originally designed would work; (2)
given that the technology works, whether maglevication of existing railroad trackage could be achieved at a
cost of $30 million per mile. $30 million per mile may seem like a lot of money, but in addition to the fixed
magnets that are required, the associated civil and realignment works, sophisticated signaling systems would
also be necessary to regulate coal traffic at running at 30mph, perhaps regular passenger trains at 79mph, as
well as maglevified vehicles capable of running at 125mph and above. In this case, sensitivity analyses
reveals that the costs of maglevication must exceed $70 million per mile for the new conventional high
speed rail alignment alternative to rank with maglevication in terms of cost effectiveness. At $70 million per
mile, it is likely that an incremental approach to constructing a new conventional alignment (by progressively
building cut-offs of constrained sections) may be a cheaper alternative than maglevication.
Quite clearly, the performance of incremental maglev will depend to a large extent on the terrain. For an
intercity corridor comprising entirely of geographical features similar to the Prairie Subdivision, it is likely
that neither tilting trains nor maglevication will achieve much. However, in that type of corridor, common
in the Midwestern plains, conventional methods of route improvement, such as the positive train control
schemes currently being tested in Michigan, is perfectly adequate - at least for speeds of up to 150mph.
Unless ultra high speed is desired, maglev or maglevication may have little role to play. In intercity corridors
that lie either along a coastline, or cuts through mountains, curvature is almost unavoidable, and the benefits
of maglevication are most significant. There is a limit (either in engineering or financial terms) to what
could be accomplished through construction of sweeping curves and applying ever greater degrees of rail
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cant, especially in territories with significant reverse curvature. Maglevication could be the logical extension
to the tilting train, conquering curves at ever higher speeds.
In worldwide terms, human population have traditionally congregated along the coastline, because of the
important role of steamship in transportation from the 16th to the 18th centuries. Passenger railroads over
wide open spaces have tended to be fairly rare except in North America. In Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the
Southeastern coast of China, Britain, Sweden, Norway, the Rhine Valley, the Alps, and other similar
locations, there are great demands for efficient transportation in congested urban, coastal and mountain
corridors. Although maglevication would not be economically justifiable everywhere, especially where the
passenger value-of-time is low, for the most common geographical features and demand characteristics, it is
likely that maglevication would be a better alternative than either a new maglev alignment, or a new
conventional high-speed rail alignment. The only exception to this are in locations where existing rail lines
are already heavily congested.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have used some reasonable assumptions based on planning principles and engineering
experience to demonstrate that if magnetically-levitated technology could be applied to conventional railroad
equipment at a reasonable cost, the incremental maglev proposal offers better cost-effectiveness than either
the exclusive high-speed rail or the exclusive maglev right-of-way options. The incremental maglev would
take advantage of magnetic forces generated by large magnets to hold the train in place (and enable higher
speeds without derailment) while a conventional train travels around a series of sharp reverse curves, and to
assist conventional trains to climb sharp grades which wheel-rail adhesion alone cannot accomplish.
The basic premises underlying these planning assumptions are that: (1) accessibility to high speed rail within
a large metropolitan area is important; (2) door-to-door journey time is more important than point-to-point
travel speed. The basic engineering assumptions are that: (1) high-speed rail corridors travel over different
types of terrain and incurs different type of engineering costs; (2) the cost of providing the right-of-way,
including land and/or air rights acquisition, is independent of the cost of providing the guideway technology
(i.e. railroad, or maglev). These are not unreasonable assumptions, although in some cases the choice of
guideway technology would constrain the available choices of rights-of-way.
Analysis of a hypothetical corridor with typical geographical features of a high-speed rail corridor in the
United States demonstrates that under those circumstances, incremental maglev is at least twice as cost-
effective in terms of investment costs per journey time saved than either the dedicated high-speed rail and
the dedicated maglev options. The cost-effectiveness of incremental maglev was found to vary fairly
strongly with the terrain. The conventional high-speed rail (or other methods of route improvement
involving limited realignments and deviations of existing rail routes) was most effective over wide-open
spaces, while the incremental maglev is most effective over mountainous territory and near bodies of water,
where reverse curvature are commonplace. As most heavily populated rail corridors are near bodies of
water, incremental maglev represents a very attractive technology which offers better performance than
conventional methods without resorting to the high costs of brand new alignments. In a situation where the
existing rail corridors are not already congested with low-speed traffic, maglevication represents a
technology option worthy of further study and engineering research.
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Appendix: Demand Sensitive Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Railroad Maglevication
As a teaser for possible future economic analysis work, a demand-sensitive cost-effectiveness analysis was
carried out for railroad maglevication as applied to the intercity passenger market. Railroad maglevication at
$30 million per route mile was found to be far more cost-effective in terms of cost-per-passenger-mile and
cost-per-passenger-trip than the new alignment alternatives, but slightly less cost-effective than the
conventional route improvement alternative. This is not surprising, as diminishing returns are likely in the
quest for ever higher speeds.
The results from this model should be treated with caution. Firstly, the $30 million figure has not been
verified with engineering research, and will substantially affect the cost-effectiveness vis- -vis the
conventional realignment method. Secondly, the assumptions made in the demand model were extremely,
exceedingly, almost pompously simplistic. Better demand models that are sensitive to fares, competition by
the other modes, and other such factors, will deliver different conclusions for different circumstances. In
this appendix, an exposition of this simple demand-sensitive model is provided, in the hope of stimulating
further research interest in the topic.
Market Share Model
The market share model is essentially a simple Gaussian distribution with mean and standard deviation that
varied with the distance between markets. It was not based on any survey data, and was calibrated according
to author's experience. In essence, at low mileages, automobile competition is likely to be dominant, and
thus increasing train speed would do very little to woo passengers who are probably looking for lower access
time. Thus, an asymptotic value for the cumulative Gaussian distribution is set according to the distance
between markets. In this sort of market, people who take trains are likely to be choosing trains for reasons
other than speed, thus the distribution is likely to be quite flat, with a large standard deviation with respect
to speed.
Figure 7: Market Share Projections w.r.t. Corridor Length and Speed, Simple Model
MIT Center for Transportation Studies
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At higher mileages, airline competition is dominant, thus increasing train speeds would help, but nothing
would happen unless train speed exceeded a certain threshold value - presumably where the door-to-door
time by train is become competitive with door-to-door time by air. However, the distribution is likely to be
much narrower, with all passengers switching to train if the effective train speed exceeded the effective
airline speed by a long way (e.g. Paris-Lyon, Tokyo-Osaka, London-Birmingham). Thus, the demand model
was calibrated to reflect this set of assumptions, using four variables: mean, sigma, baseasym, and
asym.div. The resulting demand curves are reproduced in Figure 7, and appears vaguely consistent with
expert opinion.
Ridershp Model
The Ridership Model is also very simple. It is essentially a two-variable gravity model (population and
distance), calibrated using a few single data points from the American Travel Survey. The traffic carried by
the train is then the total demand (from the gravity model) multiplied by the mode share (from the market
share model) at the average speed generated by a specific investment alternative. Thus, in the 210-mile base
case, the market share would be the market share captured by the train at 70mph in a corridor about 200
miles in length (i.e. 4%). A representative run of the ridership model is shown in Table 5.
Ridership Analysis for Maglevication
Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics, 31/05/03
Discount Rate % 7% (from Summary Sheet)
210 miles (Base Scenario) Cost/mile Distance Time Saved Base Time Average SpeMS %
Investment Alternative ($m/mile) (miles) (minutes) (minutes) (mph) (Look Up)
Base Case 0 210 0 180 70 4%
Aggressive Maglevication 12.9 210 50.5 180 97 13%
Conservative Maglevication 8.2 210 28 180 83 7%
Conventional Route Improvements 3.1 210 10 180 74 4%
Conventional HSR New Link l8 210 34.1 180 86 8%
Maglev New Lnk, City-Metropolis 58 210 96 180 I50 38%
Maglev New Link, Magport-Magport 43A 210 43.5 180 92 11%
210 miles (Base Scenario) Demand Annuity Traffic Costipax Costlpaxmil CostInewridt
Investment Alternative (kpaxs/yr) ($m) (paxs/yr) ($/pax) ($/pmile) ($/pax)
Base Case 3,462 0 131.558
Aggressive Maglevication 3,462 189.63 445,018 $426 $2.03 $8,642
Conservative Maglevication 3,462 120.54 228,836 $527 $251 $17,702
Conventional Route Improvements 3,462 45.57 131,558 $346 $1.65 -
Conventional HSR New Lnk 3,462 264.6 291,827 $907 $4.32 $23.585
Maglev New Unk, City-Metropolis 3,462 852.6 1,310,787 $650 $3.10 $10,329
Maglev New Unk, Magport-Magport 3,462 637.98 364,181 $1,752 $834 $39,179
Table 5: Sample Ridership Analysis for Different Investment Alternatives
To calculate the cost per passenger, an annuity method was used at a discount rate of 7%. It was assumed
that the cost per passenger is at least the annual payment on the cost of the incremental upgrade, amortized
over a long time (-30 years), divided by the annual ridership. This yields a lower-bound on what the ticket
prices would have to be to make a profit.
In this particular case, although the Maglev New Link option clearly achieves the highest market share and
highest market share gain, it does so at twice the invesment cost per passenger trip of the conventional route
improvement option, and 1.5 times the cost/trip of the aggressive maglevication option. Although the
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conventional route improvement achieves the lowest investment cost per passenger mile, the model doesn't
even register any ridership increase (thus the cost per new rider could not be calculated).
The Verdict
In terms of cost-per-passenger mile, maglevication is generally twice as expensive as conventional route
improvements. However, maglevication is still half the cost (per passenger mile travelled) of a new high
speed rail alignment, and quarter the cost of a new maglev alignment, and eighth of the cost of a maglev
alignment that only went from magports to magports. These results are shown in Table 6.
Demand-Sensitive Cost Effectiveness
Lexcie Lu, MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics, 3 1/0!
City Size 2,000,000
Discount Rate 7%1
Cost per Passenger Mile Corridor Configurati
Investment Alternative 50 miles 100 miles
Base Case
Aggressive Maglevication
Conservative Maglevication
Conventional Route Improvements
Conventional HSR New Link
Maglev New Li* City-Metropolis
Maglev New Lnk, Magport-Magport
$0.91
$0.80
$OA1
$1.54
$2.86
$3.34
$0.91
$0.80
$OA1
$1.54
$2.86
$3.34
- Ridership from gravity model, single parameter (city siz
- Rail is price taker, therefore Profit = Cost - Airline Pric4
on
50+50 mile 150 miles 210 miles 250 miles
$0.36
$0.32
$0.16
$0.62
$1.14
$1.34
$125
$1.15
$0.60
$2.21
$3.03
$4.71
$2.03
$2.51
$1.65
$4.32
$3.10
$8.34
$5.15
$9.59
$8.67
$1427
$3.77
$24.05
Table 6: Cost per Passenger Mile for Different Geographic Assumptions
and Technological Investment Alternatives
If the assumption is that there is severe airline price competition and that the railroad is a price-taker in the
express passenger market, then it is possible to calculate the carrier profit potential given geographic
assumptions and technology assumptions. In the analysis shown in Table 7, the air-fare between two points
was assumed to be $150 flat, regardless of mileage. With these assumptions, except in the case where there
are three cities of 2 million population each, spaced 50 miles apart on a straight line (the 50+50 miles
alternative), the new conventional and maglev links would require substantial decrease in the cost of
technology to cover the costs of investment. In the 50-mile corridor, 100-mile corridor, and 50+50
configuration, maglevication and conventional route improvement could at least cover the costs of
investment (although it is not clear whether they will cover the cost of operations).
Carrier Profit per Trip
Investment Alternative
Aggressive Maglevication
Conservative Maglevication
Conventional Route Improvements
Conventional HSR New Link
Magiev New Link, City-Metropolis
Maglev New link, Magport-Magport
Corridor Configuration
50 miles 100 miles 50+50 mile 150 miles
$105
$110
$130
$73
$7
-$17
$59
$70
$109
-$4
-$136
-$184
$114
$118
$134
$88
$36
$16
-$38
-$23
$61
-$182
-$305
-$557
210 miles 250 miles
-$276
-$377
-$196
-$757
-$500
-$1,602
Table 7: Carrier Profit Potential Assuming a Ticket Price of $150
These results are not set in stone. There are a lot of quick-and-dirty assumptions in these models, some
unsubstantiated. The readers should develop their own models and reach their own conclusions.
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-$1,138
-$2247
-$2,018
-$3,417
-$793
-$5,864
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